Consumption, Happiness, and Climate Change

In this article, we explore the implications of this literature for understanding the relationship between climate change policies and consumption. We identify a number of ways in which accounting for the implications of the new happiness literature could lead to laws and policies that influence consumption in ways that increase the prospects for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in developed and developing countries. We do not examine every nuance of the growing happiness literature, but we provide a brief introduction and observations that we hope will stimulate further efforts by academicians and policymakers.happiness, life satisfaction, subjective well-being

Beyond Gridlock

Private climate governance can achieve major greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions reductions while governments are in gridlock. Despite the optimism that emerged from the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, almost a quarter century later the federal legislative process and international climate negotiations are years from a comprehensive response. Yet Microsoft, Google and many other companies have committed to become carbon neutral. Wal-Mart has partnered with the Environmental Defense Fund to secure 20 million tons of GHG emissions reductions from its suppliers around the world, an amount equal to almost half the emissions from the US iron and steel industry. Investors holding roughly $90 trillion in assets have pressured large corporations to disclose and reduce their carbon footprints, and participating companies report having reduced emissions by an amount equal to a major emitting nation. Private forest certification programs have taken steps to reduce the GHG emissions from deforestation. Household carbon regulation is off the table in many countries, but private advocacy groups and corporations have reduced household emissions through home energy disclosure, eco-driving campaigns, employee programs, voluntary carbon offsets, and other initiatives. To explain the importance of private climate governance, this Article is structured around three propositions. The first is the need for urgency... The second proposition is that the barriers to adopting and implementing a carbon price are unlikely to be overcome in the next decade... The third proposition is that unlocking the potential of private governance will require a conceptual shift by scholars, philanthropists, and corporate and NGO managers... Private initiatives cannot keep global emissions on track to achieve the most widely adopted climate target, but they can achieve a private governance wedge: they can reduce emissions by roughly 1,000 million tons (a gigaton) of CO2 per year between 2016 and 2025. When combined with other efforts, this private governance wedge offers a reasonable chance of buying a decade to resolve the current government gridlock

Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage

This article provides a critical missing piece to the global climate change governance puzzle: how to create incentives for the major developing countries to reduce carbon emissions. The major developing countries are projected to account for 80% of the global emissions growth over the next several decades, and substantial reductions in the risk of catastrophic climate change will not be possible without a change in this emissions path. Yet the global climate governance measures proposed to date have not succeeded and may be locking in disincentives as carbon-intensive production shifts from developed to developing countries. A multi-pronged governance approach will be necessary. We identify a new strategy that will be an important component of any successful effort. Our strategy recognizes that in the context of climate change the simplified Coasian approach to pollution should be updated to include a more complete view of the options firms face in response to emissions reduction pressure and the sources of that pressure. We demonstrate how governments and non-governmental organizations can use expanded corporate carbon reporting boundaries and product carbon disclosure to harness social norms in developed countries. This informal social license pressure, in turn, will create incentives for firms to seek emissions reductions from their domestic and global supply chains. The private market pressure conveyed through supply chains will reduce leakage from developed countries, create new incentives for developing country firms and national governments, and play a surprisingly important role in the formation and implementation of a successful post-Kyoto global policy architecture

Macro-Risks: The Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation

Drawing on the recent financial crisis, we introduce the concept of macro-risk. We distinguish between micro-risks, which can be managed within conventional economic frameworks, and macro-risks, which threaten to disrupt economic systems so much that a different approach is required. We argue that catastrophic climate change is a prime example of a macro-risk. Research by climate scientists suggests disturbingly high likelihoods of temperature increases and sea level rises that could cause the kinds of systemic failures that almost occurred with the financial system. We suggest that macro-risks should be the principal concern of rational risk assessment and management, but they are not. The principal analytical tool, cost-benefit analysis using expected values, is far less valuable for addressing macro-risks than micro-risks because it fails to adequately treat tail-risks that are capable of disrupting the entire economy. We note the difficulty of assessing and responding to macro-risks such as catastrophic climate change, and we offer several proposals for improving macro-risk assessment methods and the information available to policy makers

Climate Change: The Equity Problem

A substantial proportion of the United States population is at or below the poverty level, yet many of the greenhouse gas emissions reduction measures proposed or adopted to date will increase the costs of energy, motor vehicles, and other consumer goods. This essay suggests that although scholarship and policymaking to date have focused on the disproportionate impact of these increased costs on the low-income population, the costs will have two important additional effects. First, the anticipated costs will generate political opposition from social justice groups, reducing the likelihood that aggressive measures will be adopted. Second, to the extent aggressive measures are adopted, they will miss large potential emissions reductions because the low-income population will be unable to respond by purchasing less greenhouse gas-intensive, but more expensive, consumer goods. The essay proposes a novel remedy to address this problem: equity offsets. These offsets will allow other individuals and organizations to subsidize low-income individuals\u27 purchase of less greenhouse gas-intensive goods, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the political opposition to emissions reduction measures, and the hardships caused by the higher costs of consumer goods. The essay suggests that the creation of a private or public equity offset program along these lines is feasible and will begin to address all three implications of the climate change equity problem

Climate Change and Consumption

To achieve the level of greenhouse gas emissions reductions called for by climate change experts, officials and policy analysts may need to develop an unfamiliar category of regulated entity: the consumer. Although industrial, manufacturing, retail, and service sector firms undoubtedly will remain the focus of climate change policy in the near term, individuals and households exert a greenhouse footprint that seems simply too large for policymakers to ignore in the long term. This paper, written as a foreword for the Environmental Law Reporter\u27s symposium issue, Climate Change and Consumption, emerges from an interdisciplinary conference of the same title held at Vanderbilt University in April 2008. The paper begins by providing an overview of the limited role that consumer behavior and decision making has played in environmental law to date. It then describes theoretical and empirical frameworks for understanding the consumer and consumption that could be deployed to inform law and policy if, as we predict, the consumer becomes a much more significant target of environmental regulation. The paper concludes by summarizing the symposium articles, which range widely across disciplines and areas of focus, but which reflect a common belief that the carbon-constrained consumer is worthy of significant academic and policy attention

Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice

We have been asked to examine climate change justice by discussing the methods of allocating the costs of addressing climate change among nations. Our analysis suggests that climate and justice goals cannot be achieved by better allocating the emissions reduction burdens of current carbon mitigation proposals — there may be no allocation of burdens using current approaches that achieves both climate and justice goals. Instead, achieving just the climate goal without exacerbating justice concerns, much less improving global justice, will require focusing on increasing well-being and inducing fundamental changes in development patterns to generate greater levels of well-being with reduced levels of material throughput. We identify several core characteristics of the public and private policy architectures and initiatives necessary to accomplish this task. We also propose examples of short- and long-term initiatives. Our near-term approach recognizes that a focus on public law remedies and nation-states is necessary but not sufficient. We suggest a feasible new mechanism, equity micro-offsets, that could reduce emissions while improving well-being among the poor. Equity micro-offsets can harness altruistic preferences, market mechanisms, and private oversight to reduce emissions and increase well-being in poor countries. Equity micro-offsets also suggest the nature of the long-term political, social, and economic macro-transformation that may be necessary. From household cook stove initiatives to policy architectures that include forestry, agriculture, and other overlooked sectors, achieving climate and justice goals will require transformative approaches, not just improved cost allocations

Replication and discovery of musculoskeletal QTLs in LG/J and SM/J advanced intercross lines

AR056280 awarded to DAB and AL. AIHC supported by IMS and Elphinstone Scholarship from the University of Aberdeen. GRV supported by Medical Research Scotland (Vac-929-2016).Peer reviewedPublisher PD

NGC 2419, M92, and the Age Gradient in the Galactic Halo

The WFPC2 camera on HST has been used to obtain deep main sequence photometry of the low-metallicity ([Fe/H]=-2.14), outer-halo globular cluster NGC 2419. A differential fit of the NGC 2419 CMD to that of the similarly metal-poor \ standard cluster M92 shows that they have virtually identical principal sequences and thus the same age to well within 1 Gyr. Since other low-metallicity clusters throughout the Milky Way halo have this same age to within the 1-Gyr precision of the differential age technique, we conclude that the earliest star (or globular cluster) formation began at essentially the same time everywhere in the Galactic halo throughout a region now almost 200 kpc in diameter. Thus for the metal-poorest clusters in the halo there is no detectable age gradient with Galactocentric distance. To estimate the absolute age of NGC 2419 and M92, we fit newly computed isochrones transformed through model-atmosphere calculations to the (M_V,V-I) plane, with assumed distance scales that represent the range currently debated in the literature. Unconstrained isochrone fits give M_V(RR) = 0.55 \pm 0.06 and a resulting age of 14 to 15 Gyr. Incorporating the full effects of helium diffusion would further reduce this estimate by about 1 Gyr. A distance scale as bright as M_V(RR) = 0.15 for [Fe/H] = -2, as has recently been reported, would leave several serious problems which have no obvious solution in the context of current stellar models.Comment: 32 pages, aastex, 9 postscript figures; accepted for publication in AJ, September 1997. Also available by e-mail from [email protected]