The African Union, constitutionalism and power-sharing

Over the past decade, the African Union (AU) had put in place an important normative framework to promote constitutional rule and, in particular, orderly constitutional transfers of power in its member states. Through its Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU has actively opposed, including through the use of sanctions, unconstitutional changes of government. As a key element of its policy, the PSC systematically advocates a return to constitutional order as a remedy for unconstitutional changes of government. Free and fair elections are an important element in the PSC policy of legitimating a new constitutional and political order. However, while opposing unconstitutional means of obtaining or transferring power, the AU has been generally supportive of the use of power-sharing agreements as an instrument of negotiated conflict settlement. Most power-sharing agreements are not in accordance with the prevailing constitutional order and, as part of a larger peace agreement, often contain new constitutional blueprints. This dual policy of, on the one hand, opposing certain types of unconstitutional changes of government, in particular military coups, and, on the other, advocating power-sharing agreements in the absence of a regulatory framework or normative guidance on such agreements poses an obvious challenge for the consistency of AU policy. Insofar as the AU wishes to nurture a culture of constitutionalism in its member states, it might benefit from developing policy guidelines about how to enhance the legitimacy of a new constitutional order - and of the political regime exercising political authority – be it in the aftermath of a coup or as a result of power-sharing.

Incremental copying garbage collection for WAM-based Prolog systems

The design and implementation of an incremental copying heap garbage collector for WAM-based Prolog systems is presented. Its heap layout consists of a number of equal-sized blocks. Other changes to the standard WAM allow these blocks to be garbage collected independently. The independent collection of heap blocks forms the basis of an incremental collecting algorithm which employs copying without marking (contrary to the more frequently used mark&copy or mark&slide algorithms in the context of Prolog). Compared to standard semi-space copying collectors, this approach to heap garbage collection lowers in many cases the memory usage and reduces pause times. The algorithm also allows for a wide variety of garbage collection policies including generational ones. The algorithm is implemented and evaluated in the context of hProlog.Comment: 33 pages, 22 figures, 5 tables. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP

Legal Loopholes and the Politics of Executive Term Limits: Insights from Burundi

Die Nominierung des amtierenden Präsidenten Pierre Nkurunziza zum Präsidentschaftskandidaten bei den nationalen Wahlen 2015 löste in Burundi eine tiefe politische Krise aus. Ein entscheidender Punkt der Kontoverse um seine dritte Amtszeit war die Frage der Rechtmäßigkeit seiner Kandidatur. Der Autor analysiert die Reaktionen von Akteuren innerhalb und außerhalb Burundis auf die juristischen Schlupflöcher, die für das Rechtsinstitut der Amtszeitbegrenzung in Burundi kennzeichnend sind. Er unterscheidet drei Formen der Reaktion: Erstens beriefen sich Befürworter einer dritten Amtszeit - paradoxerweise - auf Verfassungskonformität, ein Wert, auf den sich sonst eher Gegner dritter Amtszeiten berufen. Zweitens bezog man sich auf ein Friedensabkommen als Rechtsquelle und Rechtsnorm. Drittens wurde das Verfassungsgericht angerufen, um die Gesetzeslücke zu schließen. Trotz der offensichtlichen Irrelevanz gesetzlicher Normen in einem zunehmend autoritär regierten Umfeld spielten rechtliche Überlegungen in der Debatte und im Verlauf der politischen Krise zunehmend eine Rolle. Der Fall Burundi illustriert zudem die Grenzen von Verfassungsgestaltung als Instrument zur Sicherung demokratischer Regierungsführung.The nomination of incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza to stand again for president in the 2015 national elections triggered a political and security crisis in Burundi. A crucial element in the controversy around his third term was the legality of his candidacy. This paper analyses how domestic and international actors responded to the legal loopholes that characterised Burundi’s term-limit legislation. Three responses are distinguished. First, quite paradoxically, an argument was put forward by third-term supporters that stressed constitutional legality, a value usually invoked by third-term opponents. Second, a peace agreement was referred to as a source of legitimacy and as a legal norm. Third, a Constitutional Court ruling was invoked to address the legal loophole. Despite the apparent irrelevance of legal norms in an increasingly authoritarian environment, law significantly shaped the dynamics of the third-term debate and of the wider crisis. The Burundi case also illustrates the limitations of constitutional engineering of democratic governance

Ethnic Quotas and Foreign NGOs in Burundi: Shrinking Civic Space Framed as Affirmative Action

Since January 2017, foreign non-governmental organisations (ONGEs) active in Burundi are required to respect ethnic quotas (60 per cent Hutu, 40 per cent Tutsi) when employing local staff. The ethnic quota requirement was adopted amidst fears of re-ethnicisation of politics and society, enhanced control on civil society and tense relations between the Burundi government and its aid partners. While authorities justify the measure as a remedy for decades of discrimination along ethnic lines, an analysis of the legal reform shows that a variety of other motivations and dominant party interests account for its adoption and enforcement. While the reform mirrors a wider international trend of shrinking civic space, the Burundi case study also shows how a clever discursive strategy may skillfully divide ONGEs and their funding agencies. Furthermore, the case study reveals the instrumental use of obscurity and ambiguity in terms of the legal wording and enforcement of the ethnic quota requirement.Seit Januar 2017 müssen ausländische Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs) in Burundi ethnische Quoten für einheimische Beschäftigte erfüllen (60 Prozent Hutu und 40 Prozent Tutsi). Diese Quotenpflicht wurde vor dem Hintergrund wachsender Angst vor einer erneuten Ethnisierung von Politik und Gesellschaft, verstärkter Kontrolle der Zivilgesellschaft sowie angespannten Beziehungen zwischen der burundischen Regierung und ihren Partnern in den Entwicklungszusammenarbeit beschlossen. Während die Behörden die Regelungen als Gegenmaßnahmen für jahrzehntelange ethnische Diskriminierung darstellen, zeigt eine Analyse der Gesetzesreform, dass etliche andere Motivationen und starke Parteiinteressen für ihre Annahme und Durchsetzung verantwortlich sind. Die Reform spiegelt einen weltweiten Trend wider, dass zivilgesellschaftliche Freiräume zunehmend unter Druck geraten. Der Fall Burundi zeigt auch, wie die diskursive Strategie des Regimes einen Keil zwischen NROs und ihre Geldgeber treibt. Darüber hinaus analysiert die Fallstudie die instrumentelle Verwendung von Unklarheit und Ambiguität in Bezug auf den gesetzlichen Wortlaut und die Durchsetzung der ethnischen Quoten

Théorie Consociative et Partage du Pouvoir au Burundi

In order to put an end to a lengthy process of political transition, involving years of political violence, Burundi has introduced a system of power-sharing that is largely consociational. This article analyses the political and institutional reforms introduced by the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in 2000 and the Constitution of 2005 in the light of the new political landscape resulting from the 2005 elections. These have been primarily marked by the victory of the former rebellion CNDD-FDD and the election of its leader Pierre Nkurunziza as the new president. Power-sharing in Burundi is strongly based on consociational pillars, such as the grand coalition, proportionality, veto rights and elite cooperation. Although the literature on consociationalism allows for some optimism that Burundi will benefit from a period of political stability, several problems and challenges remain. These are, amongst other things, related to the largely externally driven nature of Burundi’s power-sharing arrangement.

L'égibilité de l'actuel Président de la République du Burundi aux élections présidentielles de 2015: une analyse juridique

Presidential elections are likely to be held in Burundi in July 2015. Like in several other African countries, a debate has arisen around the eligibility of the incumbent president at the next presidential elections. This paper offers a legal analysis of the constitutionality of a possible candidacy of President Nkurunziza in 2015. A twofold perspective is adopted. On the one hand, attention is paid to the presidential term limit laid down in the Constitution (including to the provision possibly allowing for a third term). On the other, an analysis is made of the impact of (currently applicable and draft) transitional justice legislation on the possible candidacy of President Nkurunziza. The paper reveals the major impact of the legal (in particular constitutional) status of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000. It also highlights the crucial role of the Constitutional Court in clarifying several of the unanswered issues highlighted throughout the paper. More generally, the case-study addressed in this paper shows the complexity of the important linkages between post-conflict elections, peace accords, power-sharing and transitional justice.

Women's descriptive representation in Burundi: the mixed effects of gender quotas

Building on original data collected for the period between 2001 and 2020, this article contributes to the research on the effectiveness of gender quotas. It does so, first, by looking into the salience of ministerial portfolios allocated to women, and, secondly, by examining the spillover effect of the gender quotas in positions where they do not apply. We find that the implementation of gender quotas gradually resulted in women being assigned to high-salience ministerial portfolios. Also, gender quotas have produced mixed results in positions where they are not mandated. These findings can be explained mobilising a multi-perspectival argument that takes into account the history of gender quotas adoption in Burundi, the specific political context of their implementation, as well as an interpersonal resources perspective.Auf der Grundlage von Originaldaten, die für den Zeitraum zwischen den Jahren 2001 und 2020 erhoben wurden, leistet dieser Artikel einen Beitrag zur Forschung über die Wirksamkeit von Geschlechterquoten. Dies geschieht zum einen durch die Untersuchung der Bedeutung der an Frauen vergebenen Ministerämter, und zum anderen durch die Untersuchung des Spillover-Effekts der Geschlechterquoten in Positionen, in denen sie nicht gelten. Wir stellen fest, dass die Einführung von Geschlechterquoten allmählich dazu geführt hat, dass Frauen mit hochrangigen Ministerämtern betraut wurden. Außerdem haben die Geschlechterquoten in Positionen, in denen sie nicht vorgeschrieben sind, zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen geführt. Diese Ergebnisse lassen sich damit erklären, dass die Geschichte der Einführung von Geschlechterquoten in Burundi, den spezifischen politischen Kontext ihrer Umsetzung sowie eine Perspektive der zwischenmenschlichen Ressourcen berücksichtigt