Organizational interactions in global energy governance

This chapter explores inter-organizational relations in the field of global energy governance. It starts by mapping the policy field of energy governance, the existing literature, and the multilateral energy architecture. It then performs an organization-set analysis of the International Energy Agency (IEA), which is widely regarded as the most advanced multilateral energy organization. More precisely, it presents an overview of the IEA’s interactions with four other energy-related international organizations: the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, the Energy Charter Treaty, the Group of Eight/Group of Twenty, and the International Renewable Energy Agency. It finds that these dyadic relationships have evolved quite dramatically over the years and points out some of the salient factors that drive these relationships, before suggesting some avenues for future research

Towards a new multilateral energy architecture?

From climate change over peak oil to the geopolitical scramble for the Arctic, there are ample signs that a global energy crisis is unfolding. The sheer scale and urgency of this looming crisis calls for international coordination. Yet, even a cursory look at the existing international energy institutions leads to a sobering conclusion: the global energy governance architecture is weak, fragmented and incomplete. This policy brief discusses both the flaws in the multilateral energy architecture and some emerging ideas to strengthen it, such as the proposal for a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement and the new American disclosure rules for the extractive sector

Is OPEC dead? Oil exporters, the Paris agreement and the transition to a post-carbon world

The Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) faces a perfect storm. It is squeezed between the revolution in unconventionals, which has increased global supply of hydrocarbons and lowered their price, and the prospect of a global peak in oil demand, stemming from climate policies and the falling costs of alternative energy technologies. In the face of these challenges, media commentators have declared the death of OPEC as a cartel. This perspective argues that the claims about OPEC’s demise are misguided for four reasons: (1) OPEC never acted as a cartel, let alone a powerful one; (2) thanks to its cheap production costs, OPEC’s oil will remain competitive in a low-cost environment; (3) the group has always proved to be flexible; and (4) OPEC is still attractive to its member states, most notably as a source of prestige, as is illustrated by the recent re-entries of Indonesia and Gabon. That said, over the longer term OPEC will inevitably need to adapt to a changing external environment. A likely possibility would be for the club to gradually morph from an output-setting cartel into a forum for deliberation and information-sharing

United States non-cooperation and the Paris agreement

In June 2017, the Trump administration decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate agreement adopted in 2015 by 195 nations. The exit of the US has not just raised concern that the US will miss its domestic emission reduction targets, but also that other parties to the Paris Agreement might backtrack on their initial pledges regarding emission reductions or financial contributions. Here we assess the magnitude of the threat that US non-cooperation poses to the Paris Agreement from an international relations perspective. We argue that US non-cooperation does not fundamentally alter US emissions, which are unlikely to rise even in the absence of new federal climate policies. Nor does it undermine nationally determined contributions under pledge and review, as the Paris Agreement has introduced a new logic of domestically driven climate policies and the cost of low-carbon technologies keeps falling. However, US non-participation in raising climate finance could raise high barriers to global climate cooperation in the future. Political strategies to mitigate these threats include direct engagement by climate leaders such as the European Union with key emerging economies, notably China and India, and domestic climate policies that furnish benefits to traditional opponents of ambitious climate policy

The geopolitics of oil in a carbon-constrained world

Aviel Verbruggen and Thijs Van de Graaf posit that the dominant view of oil geopolitics as a struggle over scarce reserves is lopsided. Assuming that strict carbon limits will be imposed as a result of expected climate change, they believe oil markets will face a structural glut. The geopolitics of oil revolves around abundance-induced conflict, with rival oil producers competing to serve the shrinking oil market

Toward a global coal mining moratorium? A comparative analysis of coal mining policies in the USA, China, India and Australia

To stop global warming at well below 2° C, the bulk of the world’s fossil fuel reserves will have to be left in the ground. Coal is the fossil fuel with the greatest proportion that cannot be used, and various advocacy groups are campaigning for a ban on the opening of new coal mines. Recently, both China and the USA implemented temporary moratoria on the approval of new coal mining leases. This article examines whether these coal mining bans reflect the emergence of a global norm to keep coal under the ground. To that end, we review recent coal mining policies in the four largest coal producers and explain them comparatively with a framework based on interests, ideas and institutions. We find that the norm of keeping coal in the ground remains essentially contested. Even in those countries that have introduced some form of a coal mining moratorium, the ban can easily be, or has already been, reversed. To the extent that the norm of keeping coal in the ground has momentum, it is primarily due to non-climate reasons: the Chinese moratorium was mostly an instance of industrial policy (aiming to protect Chinese coal companies and their workers from the overcapacity and low prices that are hitting the industry), while the USA’s lease restrictions were mainly motivated by concerns over fiscal justice. We do not find evidence of norm internalisation, which means that the emerging norm fails to gain much traction amid relevant national actors and other (large) coal producing states. If proponents of a moratorium succeed in framing the issue in non-climate terms, they should have a greater chance of building domestic political coalitions in favour of the norm

Russian gas games or well-oiled conflict? Energy security and the 2014 Ukraine crisis

This essay explores the link between energy security and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Whenever there is an international conflict involving a major oil or gas producer, commentators are often quick to assume a direct link, and the Ukraine crisis was no exception. Yet, the various avenues through which energy politics have affected the Ukraine crisis, and vice versa, are not well understood. This paper seeks to shed light on the issue by addressing two specific questions. First, how exactly did energy contribute to the crisis in the region? Second, can energy be wielded as a ‘weapon’ by Russia, the EU, or the US? We find that Russian gas pricing played a crucial role as a context factor in igniting the Ukrainian crisis, yet at the same time we guard against ‘energy reductionism’, that is, the fallacy of attributing all events to energy-related issues. We also note that there are strict limits to the so-called energy weapon, whoever employs it. In the conclusion we provide a discussion of the policy implications of these findings

Fragmentation in global energy governance: explaining the creation of IRENA

In 2009, some member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) spearheaded the creation of another international organization, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), despite the fact that the IEA had been working on renewables for decades. Why would those states create an overlapping organization, thus advancing the overall degree of fragmentation? Drawing on the work of Mansfield and Moravcsik, this article provides an explanation based on domestic preferences and institutional capture. Viewed through this lens, IRENA was part of an institutional hedging strategy instigated by domestic actors in Germany and allied states to counter the IEA’s alleged normative bias toward the fossil and nuclear energy industries with a wider set of alternative energy options. The findings of the article suggest that, depending on the domestic preferences of a set of states capable to innovate, the transaction costs associated with institutional reform may surmount those of institutional creation

The next prize : geopolitical stakes in the clean hydrogen race

This article analyses the geopolitical stakes in the hydrogen race. Hydrogen is well positioned to become the next great prize, but for all the hype, hydrogen will not become the new oil and it is unlikely to ever eclipse oil’s market share in the world’s energy mix, let alone match its geostrategic significance. Since hydrogen is a conversion rather than an extraction business, rents will likely be smaller than those for oil. That said, the author argues that the global stakes surrounding hydrogen are huge, given that mastery of hydrogen technologies can reshuffle the geopolitical cards in the 21st century. For instance, Germany’s massive green hydrogen push is a clear bid to outcompete China, while several oil- and gas-rich countries in the Middle East are banking on hydrogen to maintain their position as key energy suppliers to the world. The article notes that while some major powers may head towards hydrogen self-sufficiency, hydrogen is likely to become an internationally traded commodity which would form the basis for new bilateral energy-trading relationships. Transportation costs are currently emerging as a key bottleneck, although moving hydrogen through pipelines may make more sense, especially in cases where existing pipelines can be repurposed. Thus, the hydrogen market could mimic the natural gas market—with some key differences, including that climate-conscious importers will want to have certificates or guarantees of origin to make sure that the hydrogen they get is of the right ‘color‘. The article concludes that technologies like wind, solar, and electrolysers are on learning curves, which will make the value proposition of carbon-free hydrogen attractive, especially as a growing number of governments set carbon- or climate-neutrality goals