70 research outputs found
Most Peers Donât Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False
Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Loveringâs argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argumentâs conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises
Future Certainties
I argue that there are three kinds of future certainties: metaphysical, natural, and promises
Presuppositions of (Human Movement) Science
This paper argues that science, human movement science included, proceeds from many presuppositions. First, it explains what sorts of things presuppositions are. Next, it argues that science proceeds from metaphysical, epistemic, and normative presuppositions. The argument entails that neither scientism nor Naturalism is a presupposition of science.Esta ponencia argumenta que la ciencia, incluyendo la ciencia del
movimiento humano, procede a partir de muchas presuposiciones. Primero explica
qué clase de cosa son las presuposiciones. Luego arguye que la ciencia procede a
partir de presuposiciones metafĂsicas, epistĂ©micas y normativas. Este argumento
implica que ni el cientificismo ni el naturalismo son una presuposiciĂłn de la ciencia
The Metaphysics of Progress
A conceptual analysis of âprogressâ makes clear that progress is always relativized to certain respects, or properties that admit of degrees (âgradable propertiesâ). What is an embodiment of progress in one respect can be an instance of regress in another. Moreover, since progress occurs over time, it presupposes that time is real and that atemporal entities (e.g. numbers) cannot make progress. Even though there is a general concept of progress (that allows for phrases such as âthe cancer is progressingâ), we usually think of progress in a more specific sense, viz. as signalling a development in a direction which we positively value. Thus, this specific concept of progress presupposes that values are real
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