9,236 research outputs found
[Review of] Paula Gunn Allen. The Woman Who Owned the Shadows
Paula Gunn Allen\u27s novel, The Woman Who Owned the Shadows, is important -- one of few written by an American Indian woman focusing on an Indian woman\u27s life. (Other examples are Sophia Alice Callahan\u27s Wynemia: A Child of the Forest, 1891, and Mourning Dove\u27s Cogewea, the Half Blood, 1927). Allen writes out of her Laguna Pueblo heritage (she says she is Laguna Pueblo/Sioux/Lebanese-American), and gives the reader a view of a contemporary Indian woman\u27s life through her character, Ephanie
Teaching Our Education Students to Teach Christianly
What does it mean to teach Christianly? We may not always agree on what it means. There can be no doubt, however, that the calling of teacher education departments in Christian post-secondary institutions is to prepare students to teach Christianly, whether in public or Christian schools. But how do we do this? I shall address this question by considering four themes: current conceptions of what it means to teach Christianly, an alternative model, the context of teaching Christianly, and some implications for our teacher education programs
Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection
Can the persistence of a human being's soul at death and prior to the bodily resurrection be sufficient to guarantee that the resurrected human being is numerically identical to the human being who died? According to Thomas Aquinas, it can. Yet, given that Aquinas holds that the human being is identical to the composite of soul and body and ceases to exist at death, it's difficult to see how he can maintain this view. In this paper, I address Aquinas's response to this objection . After making a crucial clarification concerning the nature of the non-repeatability principle on which the objection relies, I argue that the contemporary notion of immanent causal relations provides us with a way of understanding Aquinas's defence that renders it both highly interesting and philosophically plausibl
Eat YâSelf Fitter: Orthorexia, Health, and Gender
Orthorexia is a condition in which the subject becomes obsessed with identifying and maintaining the ideal diet, rigidly avoiding foods perceived as unhealthy or harmful. In this paper, I examine widespread cultural factors that provide particularly fertile ground for the development of orthorexia, drawing out social and historical connections between religion and orthorexia (which literally means ârighteous eatingâ), and also addressing how ambiguities in the concept of âhealthâ make it particularly prone to take on quasi-religious significance. I argue that what makes this sort of disordered eating destructive to both men and women is ultimately a common urge to transcend rather than to embrace the realities of embodiment. In sum, I believe that orthorexia is best understood as a manifestation of age-old anxieties about human nitude and mortalityâanxieties which current dominant sociocultural forces prime us to experi- ence and express in unhealthy attitudes toward healthy eating
Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and âThomistic Substance Dualismâ
Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinasâs own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophersâespecially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinasâs own view amounts to, however, is subject to debate. Philosophers have claimed that âThomistic substance dualismâ centers around two beliefs: the rational soul is an immaterial substance, and this immaterial substance is the human person. In this paper, I argue that labeling such an account âThomisticâ proves dangerously misleadingânot only does Aquinas himself explicitly deny both of these claims, but he denies them for philosophically significant reasons. Furthermore, I argue that Aquinasâs own position provides an account of human nature both more coherent and philosophically attractive
Self-Knowledge, Abnegation, and Ful llment in Medieval Mysticism
Self-knowledge is a persistentâand paradoxicalâtheme in medieval mysticism, which portrays our ultimate goal as union with the divine. Union with God is often taken to involve a cognitive and/or volitional merging that requires the loss of a sense of self as distinct from the divine. Yet affective mysticismâwhich emphasizes the passion of the incarnate Christ and portrays physical and emotional mystical experiences as inherently valuableâwas in fact the dominant tradition in the later Middle Ages. An examination of both the affective and apophatic traditions demonstrates that, in addition to constituting a necessary stage on the path toward union with the divine, self-knowledge in medieval mysticism was seen not just as something to be transcended, but (particularly in the works of female mystics) as a means of overcoming alienation from embodied existence
Review of: Science Advice to the President (William T. Golden, ed. AAAS Press 2d Ed. 1993).
Review of: Science Advice to the President (William T. Golden, ed. AAAS Press 2d Ed. 1993). Acknowledgments, index of names, introductions, notes, tables. ISBN 0-87168-509-4 [340 pp. $29.95 paper. American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1333 H St. NW, Washington DC 20701.
What Has History to Do with Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition
This paper highlights the corrective and complementary role that historically informed philosophy can play in contemporary discussions. What it takes for an experience to count as genuinely mystical has been the source of significant controversy; most current philosophical definitions of âmystical experienceâ exclude embodied, non-unitive states -- but, in so doing, they exclude the majority of reported mystical experiences. I use a re- examination of the full range of reported medieval mystical experiences (both in the apophatic tradition, which excludes or denigrates embodied states, and in the affective tradition, which treats such states as fully mystical) to demonstrate how a better understanding of the historical medieval mystic tradition can serve as a valuable complement to ongoing philosophical discussions of religious and mystical experience
âMany Know Much but Do Not Know Themselvesâ: Self-Knowledge, Humility, and Perfection in the Medieval Affective Contemplative Tradition
Today, philosophers interested in self-knowledge usually look to the scholastic tradition, where the topic is addressed in a systematic and familiar way. Contemporary conceptions of what medieval figures thought about self-knowledge thus skew toward the epistemological. In so doing, however, they often fail to capture the crucial ethical and theological importance that self-knowledge possesses throughout the Middle Ages.
Human beings are not transparent to themselves: in particular, knowing oneself in the way needed for moral progress requires hard and rigorous work. Yet, medieval contemplatives insist, without this work we will never attain our final end. In this paper, I trace the connection drawn in this tradition between self-knowledge, humility, and self-fulfillment, arguing in section 1 that the humility that results from introspection needs to be understood in the context of contemplative expectations for eventual perfection. Self-knowledge is key for developing the relationship with God that leads to mystical union, but (as I show in section 2) in the affective tradition of the 13th-14th centuries, which emphasizes the role of emotion and the body, such union with God tends to restore rather than annihilate us. In fact, I argue in section 3, the outcome of such union even in this life is often knowledge that benefits not only the individual who experiences it but also their broader community
Manly Meat and Gendered Eating: Correcting Imbalance and Seeking Virtue
The ecofeminist argument for veganism is powerful. Meat consumption is a deeply gendered act that is closely tied to the systematic objectification of women and nonhuman animals. I worry, however, that presenting veganism as "the" moral ideal might reinforce rather than alleviate the disordered status quo in gendered eating, further disadvantaging women in patriarchal power structures. In this chapter, I advocate a feminist account of ethical eating that treats dietary choices as moral choices insofar as they constitute an integral part of our relationships to ourselves and to others. I believe that we should think of dietary choices in Aristotelian moral terms as a mean relative to us, falling on a continuum between the vice of doing injustice to ourselves, on the one hand, and the vice of doing injustice to others, on the other. On this view, what it is moral to eat for individuals is not a fixed ideal, but rather depends on particulars of our physiological, psychological, economic, cultural, and relational situations
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