Payment Card Systems in Europe: Convergence or Disappearance?

This article provides a descriptive overview of the payment card industry in Europe and compares the various forms of organization of payment card systems in European countries. This synthesis helps to understand the paradoxes and the challenges entailed in the creation of the Single Euro Payments Area.SEPA, payment cards, payment systems, banks, payment instruments.

Retail Payment Systems: What can we Learn from Two-Sided Markets?

Some retail payment systems can be modelled as two-sided markets, where a payment system facilitates money exchanges between consumers on one side and merchants on the other. The system sets rules and standards, to ensure usage and acceptance of its payment instruments by consumers and merchants respectively. Some retail payment systems exhibit indirect network externalities, which is one of the main criteria used to define two-sided markets. As more consumers use the payment platform, more merchants are encouraged to join it. Conversely, the value of holding payment instruments increases with the number of merchants accepting them. The theory of two-sided markets contributes to a better understanding of these retail payment systems, by showing that an asymmetric allocation of costs is needed to maximise the volume of transactions. It also starts to offer results that could explain competition between payment platforms. However, this theory entails some limits to a thorough understanding of retail payment systems. Firstly, we show that some retail payment systems, such as credit transfer or direct debit systems, do not necessarily fulfil all the theoretical criteria used to define twosided markets. Moreover, this theory does not take into account specific features of the payment industry, such as risk management or fraud prevention. This leads us to propose new research directions.payment systems; two-sided markets; platform competition; payment cards

What Drives Long-term Capital Flows? A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

What drives capital inflows in the long run? Do they follow the predictions of neoclassical theory, or are other forces at work? The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how long-term capital movements conform surprisingly well to the predictions of a simple neoclassical model with credit constraints. The most surprising prediction of this class of models is that, contrary to a pure neoclassical model, domestic savings should act as a complement rather than a substitute to capital inflows. Nevertheless, this class of models keeps the neoclassical prediction that, ceteris paribus, capital should flow to the countries where it is most scarce. Using data on net foreign liabilities over the 1970 to 1997 period, I find evidence that supports these predictions.credit constraints, net external debt, capital flows, savings, convergence

Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004Globalization has been identified by many experts as a new way firms organize their activities and as the emergence of talent as the new stakeholder in the firm. This paper examines the role of trade integration for the changing nature of the corporation. International trade leads to a ’war for talent’ which makes it more likely that an organizational equilibrium emerges in the integrated world economy in which control is delegated to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy empowering human capital. Furthermore, trade integration is shown to lead to waves of outsourcing and to convergence in corporate cultures across countries

Time-Periodic Solutions of the Burgers Equation

We investigate the time periodic solutions to the viscous Burgers equation $u_t -\mu u_{xx} + uu_x = f$ for irregular forcing terms. We prove that the corresponding Burgers operator is a diffeomorphism between appropriate function spaces

Corporate Hierarchies and the Size of Nations: Theory and Evidence

Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries with country size. The paper starts by establishing some facts about corporate organization based on unique data of 660 Austrian and German corporations. The larger country (Germany) has larger firms with flatter and more decentralized corporate hierarchies compared to the smaller country (Austria). Firms in the larger country change their organization less fast than firms in the smaller country. Over time firms have been introducing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power to lower levels of the corporation. We develop a theory which explains these facts and which links these features to the trade environment that countries and firms face. We introduce firms with internal hierarchies in a Krugman (1980) cum Melitz and Ottaviano (2007) model of trade. We show that international trade and the toughness of competition in international markets induce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We offer empirical evidence which is consistent with the models predictions

What makes nonholonomic integrators work?

A nonholonomic system is a mechanical system with velocity constraints not originating from position constraints; rolling without slipping is the typical example. A nonholonomic integrator is a numerical method specifically designed for nonholonomic systems. It has been observed numerically that many nonholonomic integrators exhibit excellent long-time behaviour when applied to various test problems. The excellent performance is often attributed to some underlying discrete version of the Lagrange--d'Alembert principle. Instead, in this paper, we give evidence that reversibility is behind the observed behaviour. Indeed, we show that many standard nonholonomic test problems have the structure of being foliated over reversible integrable systems. As most nonholonomic integrators preserve the foliation and the reversible structure, near conservation of the first integrals is a consequence of reversible KAM theory. Therefore, to fully evaluate nonholonomic integrators one has to consider also non-reversible nonholonomic systems. To this end we construct perturbed test problems that are integrable but no longer reversible (with respect to the standard reversibility map). Applying various nonholonomic integrators from the literature to these problems we observe that no method performs well on all problems. This further indicates that reversibility is the main mechanism behind near conservation of first integrals for nonholonomic integrators. A list of relevant open problems is given.Comment: 27 pages, 9 figure

Power Inside the Firm and the Market

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides to have less power inside the firm and to delegate control to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy. Thus, workers empowerment and the move to flatter firm organizations emerge as an equilibrium when competition is not too tough and not too weak. The model predicts merger waves or waves of outsourcing when countries become more integrated into the world economy as the corporate sector reorganizes in response to an increase in international competition

Power Inside the Firm and the Market: A General Equilibrium Approach

Recent years have witnessed an enormous amount of reorganization of the corporate sector in the US and in Europe. This paper examines the role of market competition for this trend in corporate reorganization. We find that at intermediate levels of competition the CEO of the corporation decides to have less power inside the firm and to delegate control to lower levels of the firms’ hierarchy. Thus, workers empowerment and the move to flatter firm organizations emerge as an equilibrium when competition is not too tough and not too weak. The model predicts merger waves or waves of outsourcing when countries become more integrated into the world economy as the corporate sector reorganizes in response to an increase in international competition