It is Hobbes, not Rousseau : an experiment on social insurance

We perform an experiment on social insurance to provide a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. There is no social contract by which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau : an experiment on social insurance

We perform an experiment on social insurance to provide a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. There is no social contract by which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.

Pediatric Resuscitation: Evaluation of a Clinical Curriculum

Objective: To assess the impact of a 6-hour pediatric resuscitation curriculum on the comfort levels of resident physicians’ evaluation and treatment of critically ill pediatric patients. Methods: An evaluation instrument assessed resident comfort levels, measured on a seven digit Likert scale ranging from significantly uncomfortable to significantly comfortable, in 13 areas of pediatric resuscitation. To complete the curriculum, residents had to demonstrate proficiency in knowledge and procedural skills during mock resuscitation scenarios and on both written and oral examinations. Results: Thirty-one residents participated in the study: 51.6% were pediatric, 12.9% were medicine/pediatric and 35.5% were emergency medicine residents. Participants in the curriculum had little previous experience with pediatric resuscitation (83% had been involved in five or fewer pediatric resuscitations). In all 13 areas of pediatric resuscitation tested, residents reported improvement in comfort levels following the course (p<0.002; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests). The most significant changes were observed for the following items: resuscitation of pulseless arrest, performance of cardioversion and defibrillation, performance of intraosseous needle insertion, and drug selection and dosing for rapid sequence intubation. Fewer than 48% of learners rated themselves as comfortable in these areas prior to training, but after completion, more than 80% rated themselves in the comfortable range. All residents but one received passing scores on their written examinations (97%). During the mock resuscitation scenarios and oral examination, 100% of the residents were assessed to have ‘completely’ met the learning objectives and critical actions Conclusion: Implementation of a pediatric resuscitation curriculum improves pediatric and emergency medicine residents’ comfort with the evaluation and treatment of critically ill pediatric patients. This curriculum can be used in residency training to document the acquisition of core competencies, knowledge and procedural skills needed for the evaluation and treatment of the critically ill child. The results reported in this study support using this model of instructional design to implement educational strategies, which will meet the requirements of graduate education

Morphological and evaluation effect within Russian syncretic derivational model

In the present study morphological and evaluation effect produced by visual presentation of morphologically complex words and pseudo-words was studied. In a lexical decision experiment Russian derivatives of a syncretic derivational type (combining nomination and evaluation in its motivational formula) were employed. The aim of the research was to reveal morphological effect in the derivatives of the syncretic model and to check the hypothesis about the semantic effect of evaluation being part of morphological processing. The results revealed a significant morphological effect in suffixed words and pseudo-words but questioned the hypothesis about the interaction of evaluation and morphological conditions in morphological processing

Deconfounding the Effects of Cu and Cr on Perceived Fe Contamination in Si Using an SPV Technique

The effects of iron, copper, and chrome on minority carrier diffusion length measurements in p type, boron doped, silicon were investigated using a surface photovoltage (SPV) technique. Attempts were made to reproduce previous results for iron and chrome, metals which form complexes with boron. Also an attempt was made to study the effect that copper contamination would have upon the SPV results. It was found that the iron results were reproducible, FeB could be photodisassociated, and that the chrome contaminated wafers were not effected by the photodisassociation, CrB pairs were not broken. The copper contaminated wafers were found to be effected by the photodisassociation step, which significantly reduced the measured diffusion lengths

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: An Experiment on Social Insurance

We perform an experiment on social insurance to provide a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. There is no social contract by which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.Social insurance, political equilibrium, voting, multiple equilibria,

Splashing of liquids: interplay of surface roughness with surrounding gas

We investigate the interplay between substrate roughness and surrounding gas pressure in controlling the dynamics of splashing when a liquid drop hits a dry solid surface. We associate two distinct forms of splashing with each of these control parameters: prompt splashing is due to surface roughness and corona splashing is due to instabilities produced by the surrounding gas. The size distribution of ejected droplets reveals the length scales of the underlying droplet-creation process in both cases.Comment: 6 pages, 6 figure