The future of world religions: population growth projections, 2010-2015

Environmental effects of reactive nitrogen (Nr) are a result of intense anthropogenic activities.1 Thy are evident in different parts of the world. Proper treatment is, inter alia, a scale issue. With individual countries in mostof Europe too small for comprehensive coverage of all effects, regulation of pollution in Europe co-emerged with political inegration in general. In this article, we describe the most important frameworks of international regulation in Europe. We als discuss the interaction of such institutional setting with the scientific initiatives at the samelevel, and finaly assess how scientific results have been fed with some success into strategies to mitigate pollution levels

Young Adult Failure to Thrive Syndrome

Many young working age adults in developed countries are failing to thrive in economic, demographic and social terms. Their 'failure to thrive' is a relatively new phenomenon that has not been widely recognized, but it affects young adults in virtually all the more developed countries for which we have relevant data. Young adults nowadays are more often in poverty. They are leaving their parental homes at ever later ages and in some countries the frequency of psychological problems increased. The seriousness of failure to thrive syndrome is reflected in the relationship between relative economic conditions and increased suicide rates. The syndrome is important because young adults are at the prime ages for finding employment, establishing long-run career paths and building an economic basis for founding a family. Developing strategies to arrest the spread of failure to thrive syndrome among young adults, in order to keep them vibrant contributors to our societies, should be a priority for policy makers

Global and Regional Population Growth if European Demographic Transition Patterns Had Been Universal

This study provides simulations showing what global and regional population sizes would be if the rest of the world would have experienced similar population growth patterns as what was observed in Europe during the demographic transition. In 1820-2010, slower growth was observed in Europe & North America where population increased by 4.6 times to a level of 1,088 million. The population of Asia increased from 720 million to 4,165 million. However, the biggest change from 1820 to 2010 was observed in regions that had relatively small populations in 1820 -- Latin America (which increased by 38 times to 597 million) and Africa (which increased by 14 times to 1,031 million). Our simulations show that if the French pattern of population growth had been followed (French population size increasing by 2.5 1820-2010), the global population would have merely doubled during the demographic transition (increasing to 2.02 times its original size) over the 1820-2010 period. All regions would have had a significantly lower population size: Europe & North America would have increased to 474 million and Asia to 1,453 million, while Africa would have grown to 150 million, which is just 15% of its current population. Projections suggest that population implications of following the in the coming decades would have been much lower -- e.g., if Nigeria would have followed the French population growth trajectory, it would grow to 72 million in 2100, while UN median variant projections suggest it would reach 914 million people by 2100

The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and implications of demographic divergence

At nearly 170 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country by twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between Christians and Muslims has widened with significant political implications for a nascent democracy. Where the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) survey of 1990 revealed a non-significant difference of 0·3 children, this figure had increased to 2·3 children by 2013. As the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from 6·1 to 4·5 children per woman between 1990 and 2013, the TFR of Muslims increased from 6·4 to 6·8 children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in 1999. We examine the role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious composition of Nigeria in the coming decades

Consequences of a universal European demographic transition on regional and global population distributions

This study provides simulations showing what global and regional population sizes would be if the rest of the world would have experienced similar population growth patterns as what was observed in Europe during the demographic transition. In 1820-2010, slowed growth was observed in Europe & North America where population increased by 4.6 times to a level of 1088 million. The population of Asia increased from 70 million to 4165 million. However, the biggest change from 1820 to 2010 was observed in regions that had relatively small populations in 1820 - Latin America (which increased by 38 times to 597 million) and Africa (which increased by 14 times to 1031 million). Our simulations show that if the French pattern of population growth had been followed (French population size increasing by 2.5 from 1820-2010), the global population would have merely doubled during the demographic transition (increasing to 2.02 times its original size) over the 1820-2010 period. All regions would have had a significantly lower population size: Europe & North Amrica would have increased to 474 million and Asia to 1453 million, while Africa would have grown to 150 million, which is just 15% of its current population. Projections suggest that population implications of following the in the coming decades would have been much lower. While UN median variant projections suggest that it would reach 914 million people by 2100

Fertility patterns of native and migrant Muslims in Europe

This study focuses on Muslim fertility in Europe. Evidence from 25 countries suggests that the Muslim total fertility rate is on average 47% higher than the national level. However, we find a significant difference in the level of fertility of native-born Muslims and immigrant Muslims. The native-born have a 19% higher total fertility rate, while immigrants have 62% higher fertility. Our main research question is whether religion is an important determinant of fertility outcome, or whether the other characteristics that are specific for Muslims in Europe (e.g. socio-ecoomics, migrant status, and religiosity) determine the observed difference in fertility. To answer this question, we focus on three case studies: Spain, where most Muslims are immigrants; Bulgaria, where most Muslims are native; and Greece, which has significant shares of both recent migrants and native Muslims. Our findings suggest that the immigrant status of Muslims and their socio-economic status are more important than religion in terms of explaining their high fertility

Could nations invest in cognitive skills and become effectively younger?

Countries around the world are faced with inevitable demographic change and the phenomenon of ageing populations. Estimating the burden of aging across countries hinges on the availability of valid and comparable indicators. Demographic indicators like old-age dependency ratios and median ages are widely used to rank countries by age -- however, these are exclusively based on chronological age distributions. Based on such measures, the populations of Germany or Japan are much older than those of China or Mexico. Alternative aging measures include those based on subjective health and economic activity levels. However, these measures may be influenced by for instance cultural variation in revealing health problems or by business cycle fluctuations

The end of secularisation through demography? Projections of Spanish religiosity

This article presents the first projection, to our knowledge, of the intensity of religiosity in a population, which has a strong bearing on the critical question of the religious future of Europe. Spain has, in recent decades, simultaneously experienced rapid religious decline and marked demographic change through high immigration and declining fertility. To investigate future trends, we carry out population projections by religion and religiosity to the year 2050. We find that both fertility and immigration increase the share of the highly religious, as the more religious tend to have more children and immigrants tend to be more religious than non-immigrants. The non-religious population grows because people switch from religion to no-religion and because they are younger. Our findings suggest that in the longer term (2050), there may be growth in the no-religion population, a decline in the share of highly religious Christians, and moderate development of low religious Christians. The Muslim population would substantially increase, unless there is an end to migration and fertility differentials

Projections of religiosity for Spain

In this study we carry out multistate population projections by religion and religiosity for Spain in the period 2010-2050. First we estimate the base population, for the year 2005 by age, sex, religion and religious intensity. We identify the size and composition of migration flows by denomination and religiosity. Differentials in childbearing patterns by religion and degree of religiosity are then calculated. We also estimate and model age- and sex-specific religious conversion rates by denomination and religiosity. We further assume that the child's religion and religiosity assumed is identical to that of mother's until the age of 15, so that the fertility differentials affect the variation in the religious (both denomination and intensity) composition of the next generation. We assume that there are no causal relation between mortality and religion. Several scenarios, based on combining different assumptions for fertility and migration, covering wider uncertainty range of the demographic future are constructed. The Spanish population disaggregated by age, sex, religion, and degree of religiosity was projected till 2050 according to these scenarios. The results are then analyzed for the sensitivity in the future structure of the population to the different assumptions on fertility and migration of future Spanish population