Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking

We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes in response to changes in the country creditor rights. Also, in countries with stronger creditor rights companies’ operating risk is lower, and acquirers with low-recovery assets prefer targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, suggesting an agency-cost effect.Our results suggest that there might be a “dark” side to strong creditor rights in that they can induce costly risk avoidance in corporate policies. Thus, stronger creditor rights may not necessarily be optimal

Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking

We analyze the link between creditor rights and firms’ investment policies, proposing that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying acquisitions, which result in poorer operating and stock-market abnormal performance. In countries with strong creditor rights, firms also have lower cash flow risk and lower leverage, and there is greater propensity of firms with low-recovery assets to acquire targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, and are observed in time-series analysis around changes in creditor rights. Our results question the value of strong creditor rights as they have an adverse effect on firms by inhibiting management from undertaking risky investments.

Liquidity Risk of Corporate Bond Returns: A Conditional Approach

We study the exposure of the US corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and Treasury bonds over the period 1973 - 2007 in a regime - switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effects on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative-grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as “stress.” These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008 - 2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again, liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions.

KMV Annual Credit Risk conference (2007) hosted at NYU Stern, IRC risk management conference in Florence

Abstract We study the exposure of the U.S. corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks of stocks and treasury bonds over the period in a regime switching model. In one regime, liquidity shocks have mostly insignificant effect on bond prices, whereas in another regime, a rise in illiquidity produces significant but conflicting effects: Prices of investment-grade bonds rise while prices of speculative grade (junk) bonds fall substantially (relative to the market). Relating the probability of these regimes to macroeconomic conditions we find that the second regime can be predicted by economic conditions that are characterized as "stress." These effects, which are robust to controlling for other systematic risks (term and default), suggest the existence of time-varying liquidity risk of corporate bond returns conditional on episodes of flight to liquidity. Our model can predict the out-of-sample bond returns for the stress years 2008-2009. We find a similar pattern for stocks classified by high or low book-to-market ratio, where again liquidity shocks play a special role in periods characterized by adverse economic conditions. JEL classification: G12, G13, G32, G33

Price adjustment method and ex-dividend day returns in a different institutional setting

This article was published in the International Review of Financial Analysis [© Elsevier Inc.] and the definitive version is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2015.05.005This study investigates the determinants of the ex-dividend day price behavior in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), a unique institutional setting, and examines how a major regulatory change in the price adjustment method affects the extent of the ex-day stock price drop. We find that allowing the market to freely adjust prices, after 2001, the ex-dividend day price improves the pricing efficiency of the market in the sense that the raw price ratio tends to one and abnormal returns tend to zero. We also find that in the absence of taxes on dividends and capital gains and certain microstructure impediments discussed in the literature - i.e., bid-ask spread, market makers, price discreteness, tick size and limit order adjustment mechanism - stock illiquidity is the best candidate for explaining the magnitude of the ex-dividend day price adjustment

Explaining co-movements between equity and CDS bid-ask spreads

In this paper I show that the co-movements between bid-ask spreads of equities and credit default swaps vary over time and increase over crisis periods. The co-movements are strongly related to systematic risk factors and to the theoretical debt-to-equity hedge ratio. I document that hedging and asymmetric information, besides higher funding costs and market volatility risk, are driving factors of the commonality and are significantly priced in CDS bid-ask spreads