The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System

The basic patterns of the initial Indonesian party system have reemerged after more than four decades of authoritarianism. The cleavage model by Lipset and Rokkan is well-suited to analyzing the genesis of and the most salient features of this party system. However, in applying the approach, some adjustments have to be made. For instance, the national and industrial revolutions have to be conceived of differently. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish critical phases in the formation of parties. The four cleavages have to be reinterpreted and additional ones need to be identified. In Indonesia, economic cleavages are hardly significant in conflicts between political parties (especially the “capital” versus “labour” cleavage) or are expressed in terms of religion or allegiance to political leaders based in a specific region (“urban” versus “rural”). In addition, in comparison with 1999 and particularly with the 1950s, today’s cleavages are less marked. Thus, the Lipset- Rokkan model has to be combined with other approaches which underline the importance of clientelism and the dealignment of parties.Indonesia, party system, cleavages, historical analysis

Political Party and Party System Institutionalisation in Southeast Asia: A Comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

It is generally acknowledged that a higher degree of party and party system institutionali-sation is positively correlated with the consolidation of democracy. It is, thus, useful to compare different levels and types of institutionalisation. In this article the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ vs. ‘behavioural routinisation’) with reference to party institutionalisation will be employed. Moreover, institutionalised party systems are char-acterized, according to Mainwaring and Torcal, by ‘stability of interparty competition’. The empirical research of this paper finds that the early organisational consolidation of so-cial cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalisation. Furthermore, the rela-tion between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques un-dermine institutionalisation in the Philippines and in Thailand respectively. Most Indone-sian parties are better institutionalised than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to ‘value infusion’. In addition, the party system in Indonesia is better institu-tionalised in terms of ‘stability of interparty competition’.political party institutionalisation, party system institutionalisation, South-east Asia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand

Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between politik aliran and ’Philippinisation’

Surprisingly, the outcome of the 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia and the resultant constellation of political parties are reminiscent of the first Indonesian parliamentary democracy of the 1950s. The dynamics of party politics is still marked by aliran (‘streams’), i.e. some of the biggest political parties still have a mass base and are embedded in specific milieus. But politik aliran has lost a lot of its significance and re-emerged in a quite different form after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Starting with this observation, it is argued that parties are still socially rooted, so a modified aliran approach still has its analytical value. However, one can also witness a weakening of aliran (dealiranisasi) and a concomitant ‘Philippinisation’, which is indicated by the rise of presidential or presidentialised parties, growing intra-party authoritarianism, the prevalence of ‘money politics’, the lack of meaningful political platforms, weak loyalties towards parties, cartels with shifting coalitions and the upsurge of new local elites.political parties, post-Suharto Indonesia, Philippinisation, politik aliran

Opposition in transition: pre-electoral coalitions and the 2018 electoral breakthrough in Malaysia

In May 2018, the Malaysian opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan or Hope Alliance won the federal elections for the first time in the history of the country. The electoral authoritarian system is now in a state of transition. The electoral breakthrough was the result of longer-term socio-economic transformations, but the formation of a strong pre-electoral coalition was ultimately decisive for the victory. The article compares various coalitions and their performance during seven elections since 1990. The structured, focused comparison analyses the coalitions during this period because prior to 1990 the opposition was fragmented. On the basis of a three-level concept regarding the strength of pre-electoral coalitions, the article argues that Pakatan Harapan was successful because the coalition was sufficiently comprehensive (as indicated by the number and the competitiveness of candidates), cohesive (concerning ideological proximity and behavioural routinization) and well-rooted in society (in terms of linkages to voters/supporters and to civil society networks or organizations)

Party presidentialization in post-Suharto Indonesia

Indonesia presents an extremely rare quasi-experimental research case: the constitutional reforms and the transition to full presidentialism have effected a presidentialization of political parties that is largely in line with the changes predicted by the model of Samuels and Shugart [2010. Presidents, parties and prime ministers: How separation of powers affects party organization and behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. Especially the rise of the new president and his difficult relationship with his own party are testimony to this. But a closer look reveals that the model has to be adapted to Indonesian politics. Presidents have tools to forge grand coalitions and to overcome the dualism to an extent. The size and history of political parties as well as wider socio-economic changes, that is an increasing oligarchization of party organization, have to be considered. Moreover, highly personalized vehicle parties serving the interests of a presidential candidate have emerged. It follows that institutional and structural incentives combined have produced a party system consisting of different party types

The legislative and presidential elections in Indonesia in 2009

Indonesia is a politically stable electoral democracy with Freedom House scores at two for political rights and three for civil liberties (on a seven-point scale with one as the highest rating). According to these ratings, the country is the most democratic in Southeast Asia. The human rights situation has improved markedly since the downfall of President Suharto and the authoritarian New Order administration in 1998. Violent conflicts in Poso and the Moluccas have been settled, and the peace agreement with the guerrilla movement in Aceh has been successful as well. Civilian control over the military has been expanded. Elections to parliament, to the presidency, and since 2005 the so-called pilkada (direct elections for governors, district chiefs and mayors), have so far been conducted mostly successfully. In line with this, the latest legislative and presidential elections, on 9 April and 8 July 2009 respectively, were mostly peaceful and considered by observers to be "free and fair". Parties and parliaments are now at the center of political power, thereby signifying one of the most profound changes in comparison with Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998). Yet Indonesia's democracy remains elitist. Politicians in provincial and district parliaments are often unfamiliar with the concept of a legitimate and organized parliamentary opposition. Corruption, collusion and nepotism, all typical characteristics of the New Order, have been re-established in new forms. Voters' links to social milieus and political parties continue to weaken

Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand

Is a higher degree of party and party system institutionalization positively correlated with the consolidation of democracy, defined here as the prevention of democratic breakdown? In order to answer this question, it is useful to compare different levels and types of institutionalization in three Southeast Asian electoral democracies. Institutionalized party systems are characterized, according to Mainwaring and Torcal, by 'stability of interparty competition.' Moreover, the distinction made by Levitsky (‘value infusion’ versus ‘behavioural routinization’) with reference to the institutionalization of individual parties will be employed. The empirical research of this paper finds that most Indonesian parties are better institutionalized than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to 'value infusion.' In addition, the interparty competition is more stable in Indonesia. Therefore, the probability of a collapse of the party system in the Philippines and Thailand is much higher. This, in turn, renders the democracies in these countries more fragile and prone to political crises or even sudden breakdowns. The early organizational consolidation of social cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalization. A few of the most important parties are socially rooted and have strong linkages to civil and/or religious organizations. Furthermore, the relationship between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques undermine institutionalization in the Philippines and in Thailand, respectively. However, in recent years there has also been a tendency towards convergence. There are signs of regression in Indonesia, such that the future of the party system is open to question. This article calls for caution with respect to the stated causal relation between institutionalization and democratic consolidation, and it questions some aspects of the concept

Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia Compared

This paper analyses forms of religious mobilisation and the resultant Islamisation in Indonesia and Malaysia after independence against the backdrop of interactions in and among three different spheres: the state, political society, and civil society. Islamisation in Indonesia has been propelled by different actors, and only from the mid-1980s until the fall of Suharto did the state apparatus control and direct its dynamics with growing intensity. Since then, the process has preponderantly been driven by civil society forces. Whereas there has been a blossoming of a diverse, yet mostly conservative Islam across the society, in the party system the Islamisation of politics has been moderate. In Malaysia, Islamisation has been much more actively planned and stimulated by the central bureaucracy. Religion in political society has been strongly politicised, while Islamic civil society organisations and groupings had a strong impact only briefly. Whereas in Indonesia civil society mass organisations have structured the discourse on Islam to a large extent and have therefore limited the ability of the state and political parties to set the agenda and mobilise Islam, in Malaysia the state and Islamic political parties have acted more independently. Authoritarian rule in Indonesia previously obstructed religious mobilisation by Islamic and Islamist parties. The brittle electoral democracy since the fall of Suharto has fuelled mobilisation efforts, but the role of the Islamic and Islamist parties has still been limited. Electoral authoritarianism in Malaysia, in contrast, has been conducive to a form of religious mobilisation that is centred upon the activities of parties

Clientelist and Programmatic Factionalism Within Malaysian Political Parties

This article analyses factionalism within ruling and opposition parties in Malaysia, with a focus on party splits and/or the toppling or near-toppling of dominant factions at the national level. Political parties are either composed of clientelist or programmatic factions or represent hybrids that combine clientelist and programmatic factionalism. The strength and the type of factionalism depend upon policy space and the intensity of control over party groups. Programmatic factionalism is more probable if policy space is wide. Policy space is an effect of the positioning (relatively dependent or independent from other parties in the coalition) and the basic ideology of a party, that is, the major stance on religion, ethnicity, and the shape of the political system at large. If there is hardly any policy space, factionalism will be clientelistic rather than programmatic. Whether this type of factionalism arises is contingent upon the intensity of control over groups within the party and the availability of patronage goods. The control of party members is dependent upon the strength of the party leader and the centralisation of party organisation. This is demonstrated with reference to UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) (from programmatic to clientelist factionalism), some coalition partners of UMNO such as the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) (clientelist factionalism), and the Islamist PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) (programmatic clientelism). Moreover, a brief analysis of East Malaysian parties in Sabah and Sarawak helps to further elucidate the major dynamics of factionalism

Jokowi's Victory: The End of the New Order in Indonesia? Asia Policy Brief 2014/05, August 2014

Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. It is of immense importance for the security situation and economic integration in Pacific Asia. Political events in Indonesia have a profound impact on the whole region of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections were hardly reported in the foreign media. The presidential elections in particular turned out to be a hard test for the young democracy