Aggregating Dependency Graphs into Voting Agendas in Multi-Issue Elections

Many collective decision making problems have a combinatorial structure: the agents involved must decide on multiple issues and their preferences over one issue may depend on the choices adopted for some of the others. Voting is an attractive method for making collective decisions, but conducting a multi-issue election is challenging. On the one hand, requiring agents to vote by expressing their preferences over all combinations of issues is computationally infeasible; on the other, decomposing the problem into several elections on smaller sets of issues can lead to paradoxical outcomes. Any pragmatic method for running a multi-issue election will have to balance these two concerns. We identify and analyse the problem of generating an agenda for a given election, specifying which issues to vote on together in local elections and in which order to schedule those local elections

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience

At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true that, looking backwards, it was the case that there would be a sea battle? This tension forms, in large part, what might be called the problem of future contingents. A dominant trend in temporal logic and semantic theorizing about future contingents seeks to validate both intuitions. Theorists in this tradition--including some interpretations of Aristotle, but paradigmatically, Thomason (1970), as well as more recent developments in Belnap, et. al (2001) and MacFarlane (2003, 2014)--have argued that the apparent tension between the intuitions is in fact merely apparent. In short, such theorists seek to maintain both of the following two theses: (i) the open future: Future contingents are not true, and (ii) retro-closure: From the fact that something is true, it follows that it was the case that it would be true. It is well-known that reflection on the problem of future contingents has in many ways been inspired by importantly parallel issues regarding divine foreknowledge and indeterminism. In this paper, we take up this perspective, and ask what accepting both the open future and retro-closure predicts about omniscience. When we theorize about a perfect knower, we are theorizing about what an ideal agent ought to believe. Our contention is that there isn’t an acceptable view of ideally rational belief given the assumptions of the open future and retro-closure, and thus this casts doubt on the conjunction of those assumptions