How Intense Policy Demanders Shape Postreform Politics: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act

The implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has been a politically volatile process. The ACA\u27s institutional design and delayed feedback effects created a window of opportunity for its partisan opponents to launch challenges at both the federal and state level. Yet as recent research suggests, postreform politics depends on more than policy feedback alone; rather, it is shaped by the partisan and interest-group environment. We argue that “intense policy demanders” played an important role in defining the policy alternatives that comprised congressional Republicans\u27 efforts to repeal and replace the ACA. To test this argument, we drew on an original data set of bill introductions in the House of Representatives between 2011 and 2016. Our analysis suggests that business contributions and political ideology affected the likelihood that House Republicans would introduce measures repealing significant portions of the ACA. A secondary analysis shows that intense policy demanders also shaped the vote on House Republicans\u27 initial ACA replacement plan. These findings highlight the role intense policy demanders can play in shaping the postreform political agenda

The U.S. Government's Global Health Policy Architecture: Structure, Programs and Funding

Provides an overview of the history, scope, and role of U.S. engagement in global health, including funding; statutes, authorities, and policies; agencies involved; major initiatives; and countries with U.S. bilateral programs and funding

Special Libraries, February 1920

Volume 11, Issue 2https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sla_sl_1920/1001/thumbnail.jp

Bankrollers: Lobbyists' Payments to the Lawmakers they Court, 1998-2006

Lobbyists and their political action committees (PACs) have contributed at least $103.1 million to members of Congress since 1998. This report is the first comprehensive effort to match names of lobbyists with Federal Election Commission campaign contribution data. The result provides details about the biggest lobbyist contributors and congressional recipients of campaign largesse and furnishes a contribution total nearly double the previous estimate.The report details the amounts given to members of Congress since 1998 by the 50 biggest lobbyist money-givers. Twenty-seven percent of lobbyists have contributed an amount to lawmakers large enough to be recognized by the Federal Election Commission ($200 or more), and a select 6.1 percent of lobbyists have contributed at least $10,000 -- totaling 83.4 percent of all lobbyist contributions. Many of the top recipients of congressional campaign money are on appropriations committees that dole out federal money.The report also records the rise of contributions by lobbyists from$17.8 million in the 2000 election cycle to $33.9 million in the 2004 cycle -- a 90.3 percent increase. In the 2006 election, lobbyists and their PACs are already on track to give about 10 percent more than in the previous cycle, not accounting for the expected increase in contributions as Election Day draws nearer.Profiling the 10 lobbyists who have given the most to members of Congress since 1998, the report also provides behind-the-scenes glimpses of some of the most egregious policy-making fiascos in recent years. One prime example is Kenneth Kies, who served as the chief of staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation from 1995 to 1998 and who, along with his wife Kathleen, is the study's fifth-highest lobbyist-contributor to Congress with$292,866 since 1998

Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy

Congress regularly enacts legislation providing for redundant administrative programs. For example, there are more than 100 federal programs for surface transportation, 82 programs to ensure teacher quality, 80 programs to promote domestic economic development, and 47 programs to provide employment and job-training services. Recent high-profile legislation–-such as the financial-industry reform measure and the health-care reform measure–-add new programs without repealing existing ones directed at the same policy goals. Prior academic analyses generally have not considered why Congress pursues redundancy. This article addresses that question through both theoretical and institutional analysis. The article first constructs an organizational theory that attributes redundancy in administrative programs to the congressional committee system. Specifically, the article demonstrates that two critical components of the existing committee system-–fragmented jurisdictions and parliamentary prerogatives–-systematically bias legislative outcomes in favor of redundancy. Building on leading theoretical accounts of congressional committees from political science, the article then presents a novel cost-benefit analysis of this tendency toward redundancy. It shows that redundancy allows legislators to increase distributive favors for constituents and interest groups but that redundancy is also linked to the desirable pursuit of informational efficiency. Thus, the institutional structures facilitating redundancy have mixed effects. Consequently, the article describes and analyzes specific institutional reforms that trade off the distributive costs and the informational benefits associated with redundancy. One approach would subject more legislative decisions to external advisory processes such as that used to close unneeded military facilities. A second and more promising approach would preserve existing committee jurisdictions but would scale back committees’ parliamentary prerogatives, thereby encouraging redundancy in program design but discouraging redundancy in program implementation