Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game

We investigate experimentally if an option to obtain free information can disadvantage a player, relative to when information is unavailable. In the Ultimatum game, the Responder chooses a minimum acceptable offer and the Proposer decides at the same time whether to obtain and use information about the minimum acceptable offer. We find that the option of using free information on average reduces Proposers’, and increases Responders’, payoff, but by less than predicted. This is due to the presence of Proposers who either refuse information or who use it in a self-servingly fair manner. Information changes the distribution of the surplus, and increases inefficiency.Information; information acquisition; value of information; Ultimatum game; fairness; self-serving fairness

Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance

The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player can make a strategic move of committing to not seeing what another player will demand. Our data show that subjects do, but only after substantial time, learn to make the predicted strategic move. We find only weak evidence of physical timing effects.strategic moves; commitment; bargaining; strategic value of information; physical timing effects; endogenous timing; experiment

Coherence Properties of Guided-Atom Interferometers

We present a detailed investigation of the coherence properties of beam splitters and Mach-Zehnder interferometers for guided atoms. It is demonstrated that such a setup permits coherent wave packet splitting and leads to the appearance of interference fringes. We study single-mode and thermal input states and show that even for thermal input states interference fringes can be clearly observed, thus demonstrating the multimode operation and the robustness of the interferometer.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

TCR remote monitoring for the LHC technical infrastructure

The remote monitoring of the LHC technical infrastructure will mainly be done in CERN’s Technical Control Room (TCR). The technical infrastrucure consists of specialised equipment from different groups and divisions, mainly cooling and ventilation and electrical equipment. The responsibility for the definition, operation and maintenance of the equipment is covered by the relevant equipment group. However the monitoring and alerting for action in case of equipment failure is initiated by the TCR and is based on alarms that are sent by the equipment. This implies the correct integration of the equipment and the establishment of rules to follow during the commissioning and start-up of the equipment in order to ensure proper operation. This paper shows the integration possibilities and the different tasks and steps to follow by the different parties for smooth equipment integration and avoiding organizational problems