222 research outputs found

    Episodic homelessness and health care utilization in a prospective cohort of HIV-infected persons with alcohol problems

    Get PDF
    BACKGROUND: Because individuals with HIV/AIDS often have complex medical and social needs, the impact of housing status on medical service utilization is difficult to isolate from the impact of conditions that may worsen during periods of homelessness such as depression and substance abuse. We examine whether episodes of homelessness are independently associated with suboptimal medical utilization even when accounting for concurrent addiction severity and depression. METHODS: We used data from a 30-month cohort of patients with HIV/AIDS and alcohol problems. Housing status, utilization (ambulatory visits, emergency department (ED) visits, and hospitalizations) and other features were assessed with standardized research interviews at 6-month intervals. Multivariable longitudinal regression models calculated incidence rate ratios (IRR) comparing utilization rates during 6-month intervals (homeless versus housed). Additional models assessed whether addiction severity and depressive symptoms could account for utilization differences. RESULTS: Of the 349 subjects, 139 (39%) reported homelessness at least once during the study period; among these subjects, the median number of nights homeless per 6-month interview period was 30. Homelessness was associated with higher ED utilization (IRR = 2.17; 95% CI = 1.72–2.74) and hospitalizations (IRR = 2.30; 1.70–3.12), despite no difference in ambulatory care utilization (IRR = 1.09; 0.89–1.33). These associations were attenuated but remained significant when adjusting for addiction severity and depressive symptoms. CONCLUSION: In patients with HIV/AIDS and alcohol problems, efforts to improve housing stability may help to mitigate intensive medical utilization patterns

    Additive Pressures of Elevated Sea Surface Temperatures and Herbicides on Symbiont-Bearing Foraminifera

    Get PDF
    Elevated ocean temperatures and agrochemical pollution individually threaten inshore coral reefs, but these pressures are likely to occur simultaneously. Experiments were conducted to evaluate the combined effects of elevated temperature and the photosystem II (PSII) inhibiting herbicide diuron on several types of symbiotic algae (diatom, dinoflagellate or rhodophyte) of benthic foraminifera in hospite. Diuron was shown to evoke a direct effect on photosynthetic efficiency (reduced effective PSII quantum yield ΔF/F′m), while elevated temperatures (>30°C, only 2°C above current average summer temperatures) were observed to impact photosynthesis more indirectly by causing reductions in maximum PSII quantum yield (Fv/Fm), interpreted as photodamage. Additionally, elevated temperatures were shown to cause bleaching through loss of chlorophyll a in foraminifera hosting either diatoms or dinoflagellates. A significant linear correlation was found between reduced Fv/Fm and loss of chlorophyll a. In most cases, symbionts within foraminifera proved more sensitive to thermal stress in the presence of diuron (≥1 µg L−1). The mixture toxicity model of Independent Action (IA) described the combined effects of temperature and diuron on the photosystem of species hosting diatoms or dinoflagellates convincingly and in agreement with probabilistic statistics, so a response additive joint action can be assumed. We thus demonstrate that improving water quality can improve resilience of symbiotic phototrophs to projected increases in ocean temperatures. As IA described the observed combined effects from elevated temperature and diuron stress it may therefore be employed for prediction of untested mixtures and for assessing the efficacy of management measures

    Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

    Get PDF
    This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations
    • …
    corecore