The Challenge of Flexible Intelligence for Models of Human Behavior

Game theoretic predictions about equilibrium behavior depend upon assumptions of inflexibility of belief, of accord between belief and choice, and of choice across situations that share a game-theoretic structure. However, researchers rarely possess any knowledge of the actual beliefs of subjects, and rarely compare how a subject behaves in settings that share game-theoretic structure but that differ in other respects. Our within-subject experiments utilize a belief elicitation mechanism, roughly similar to a prediction market, in a laboratory setting to identify subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ choices and beliefs. These experiments additionally allow us to compare choices in different settings that have similar game-theoretic structure. We find first, as have others,that subjects’ choices in the Trust and related games are significantly different from the strategies that derive from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium principles. We show that, for individual subjects, there is considerable flexibility of choice and belief across similar tasks and that the relationship between belief and choice is similarly flexible. To improve our ability to predict human behavior, we must take account of the flexible nature of human belief and choice

Nashbots: How Political Scientists have Underestimated Human Rationality, and How to Fix It

Political scientists use experiments to test the predictions of game-theoretic models. In a typical experiment, each subject makes choices that determine her own earnings and the earnings of other subjects, with payments corresponding to the utility payoffs of a theoretical game. But social preferences distort the correspondence between a subject’s cash earnings and her subjective utility, and since social preferences vary, anonymously matched subjects cannot know their opponents’ preferences between outcomes, turning many laboratory tasks into games of incomplete information. We reduce the distortion of social preferences by pitting subjects against algorithmic agents (“Nashbots”). Across 11 experimental tasks, subjects facing human opponents played rationally only 36% of the time, but those facing algorithmic agents did so 60% of the time. We conclude that experimentalists have underestimated the economic rationality of laboratory subjects by designing tasks that are poor analogies to the games they purport to test

Against Game Theory

People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers an answer, one based on games of strategy such as chess and checkers: the chooser considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily modified) is bad at predicting behavior. But instead of abandoning classical game theory, those in the social sciences have mounted a rescue operation under the name of “behavioral game theory.” Its main tool is to propose systematic deviations from the predictions of game theory, deviations that arise from character type, for example. Other deviations purportedly come from cognitive overload or limitations. The fundamental idea of behavioral game theory is that, if we know the deviations, then we can correct our predictions accordingly, and so get it right. There are two problems with this rescue operation, each of them is fatal. (1) For a chooser, contemplating the range of possible deviations, as there are many dozens, actually makes it exponentially harder to figure out a path to an outcome. This makes the theoretical models useless for modeling human thought or human behavior in general. (2) Modeling deviations are helpful only if the deviations are consistent, so that scientists (and indeed decision makers) can make predictions about future choices on the basis of past choices. But the deviations are not consistent. In general, deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In addition, people’s beliefs are in general not consistent with their choices. Accordingly, all hope is hollow that we can construct a general behavioral game theory. What can replace it? We survey some of the emerging candidates

Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?

The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will argue that deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In turn, the problem of finding an equilibrium strategy is not easier but rather is exponentially more difficult. It does not seem that game theory can be repaired by adding corrective terms (such as consideration of personal characteristics, social norms, heuristic or bias terms, or cognitive limits on choice and learning). In what follows, we describe new methods for investigating interdependent decision-making. Our experimental results show that people do not choose consistently, do not hold consistent beliefs, and do not in general align actions and beliefs. We will show that experimental choices are inconsistent in ways that prevent us from drawing general characterizations of an individual’s choices or beliefs or of the general population\u27s choices and beliefs. A general behavioral game theory seems a distant and, at present, unfulfilled hope

The Effects of Part-Time Work and a Minimum Wage Hike on Educational Outcomes for High School Students--An Overview: Dissertation Summary

My dissertation addresses two sets of questions related to labor market policies. First, should we be encouraging high school students to work during the school year? Second, what are the effects of a minimum wage hike like the one recently passed by Congress on young people\u27s school enrollment

Group Theory of Chiral Photonic Crystals with 4-fold Symmetry: Band Structure and S-Parameters of Eight-Fold Intergrown Gyroid Nets

The Single Gyroid, or srs, nanostructure has attracted interest as a circular-polarisation sensitive photonic material. We develop a group theoretical and scattering matrix method, applicable to any photonic crystal with symmetry I432, to demonstrate the remarkable chiral-optical properties of a generalised structure called 8-srs, obtained by intergrowth of eight equal-handed srs nets. Exploiting the presence of four-fold rotations, Bloch modes corresponding to the irreducible representations E- and E+ are identified as the sole and non-interacting transmission channels for right- and left-circularly polarised light, respectively. For plane waves incident on a finite slab of the 8-srs, the reflection rates for both circular polarisations are identical for all frequencies and transmission rates are identical up to a critical frequency below which scattering in the far field is restricted to zero grating order. Simulations show the optical activity of the lossless dielectric 8-srs to be large, comparable to metallic metamaterials, demonstrating its potential as a nanofabricated photonic material

Group Theory of Circular-Polarization Effects in Chiral Photonic Crystals with Four-Fold Rotation Axes, Applied to the Eight-Fold Intergrowth of Gyroid Nets

We use group or representation theory and scattering matrix calculations to derive analytical results for the band structure topology and the scattering parameters, applicable to any chiral photonic crystal with body-centered cubic symmetry I432 for circularly-polarised incident light. We demonstrate in particular that all bands along the cubic [100] direction can be identified with the irreducible representations E+/-,A and B of the C4 point group. E+ and E- modes represent the only transmission channels for plane waves with wave vector along the ? line, and can be identified as non-interacting transmission channels for right- (E-) and left-circularly polarised light (E+), respectively. Scattering matrix calculations provide explicit relationships for the transmission and reflectance amplitudes through a finite slab which guarantee equal transmission rates for both polarisations and vanishing ellipticity below a critical frequency, yet allowing for finite rotation of the polarisation plane. All results are verified numerically for the so-called 8-srs geometry, consisting of eight interwoven equal-handed dielectric Gyroid networks embedded in air. The combination of vanishing losses, vanishing ellipticity, near-perfect transmission and optical activity comparable to that of metallic meta-materials makes this geometry an attractive design for nanofabricated photonic materials

Prioritising neonatal medicines research: UK Medicines for Children Research Network scoping survey

BACKGROUND: The dosing regimen and indications for many medicines in current use in neonatology are not well defined. There is a need to prioritise research in this area, but currently there is little information about which drugs are used in UK neonatal units and the research needs in this area as perceived by UK neonatologists. METHODS: The Neonatal Clinical Studies Group (CSG) of the Medicines for Children Research Network (MCRN) undertook a 2 week prospective scoping survey study to establish which medicines are used in UK neonatal units; how many babies are receiving them; and what clinicians (and other health professionals) believe are important issues for future research. RESULTS: 49 out of 116 units responded to at least one element of the survey (42%). 37 units reported the number of neonates who received medicines over a 2 week period. A total of 3924 medicine-patient pairs were reported with 119 different medicines. 70% of medicine-patient pairs involved medicines that were missing either a license or dose for either term or preterm neonates. 4.3% of medicine-patient pairs involved medicines that were missing both license and dose for any neonate. The most common therapeutic gap in need of additional research identified by UK neonatologists was chronic lung disease (21 responding units), followed by patent ductus arteriosus and vitamin supplements (11 responding units for both) CONCLUSION: The research agenda for neonatal medicines can be informed by knowledge of current medicine use and the collective views of the neonatal community