The Economic Crisis and Desires for Children and Marriage in Thailand(<Special Issue>Population and Globalization)

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Do low survey response rates bias results? Evidence from Japan

BACKGROUND In developed countries, response rates have dropped to such low levels that many in the population field question whether the data can provide unbiased results. OBJECTIVE The paper uses three Japanese surveys conducted in the 2000s to ask whether low survey response rates bias results. A secondary objective is to bring results reported in the survey response literature to the attention of the demographic research community. METHODS Using a longitudinal survey as well as paradata from a cross-sectional survey, a variety of statistical techniques (chi square, analysis of variance (ANOVA), logistic regression, ordered probit or ordinary least squares regression (OLS), as appropriate) are used to examine response-rate bias. RESULTS Evidence of response-rate bias is found for the univariate distributions of some demographic characteristics, behaviors, and attitudinal items. But when examining relationships between variables in a multivariate analysis, controlling for a variety of background variables, for most dependent variables we do not find evidence of bias from low response rates. CONCLUSIONS Our results are consistent with results reported in the econometric and survey research literatures. Low response rates need not necessarily lead to biased results. Bias is more likely to be present when examining a simple univariate distribution than when examining the relationship between variables in a multivariate model. COMMENTS The results have two implications. First, demographers should not presume the presence or absence of low response-rate biasrather they should test for it in the context of a specific substantive analysis. Second, demographers should lobby data gatherers to collect as much paradata as possible so that rigorous tests for low response-rate bias are possible

Employment and household tasks of Japanese couples, 1994-2009

The paper examines changes in the relationship between employment and household tasks of Japanese couples, using data drawn from national cross-sectional surveys in 1994, 2000 and 2009 of persons aged 20–49 and from the 2009 follow-up of the 2000 survey. Wives’ employment is structured by their husbands’ employment time and earning power, as well as by their family situations including the presence and age of children and coresidence with parents. Housework hours of husbands, though very low, increased over time, while wives’ hours decreased. Wives housework time decreases as their employment time increases. Marriage dramatically increases women’s housework time but produces little change in men’s time. Husbands’ housework hours are positively correlated with reported marital satisfaction of both spouses

Nontraditional Family-Related Attitudes in Japan: Macro and Micro Determinants

Attitudinal data are commonly used to measure values, which in turn represent moral doctrines that are resistant to change and are the foundation for societal norms. This article examines changes in the attitudinal climate in Japan. Three national surveys (1994, 2000, and 2009) are used to examine a range of attitudes that measure a) the centrality of marriage and childbearing, b) nontraditional family behaviors, and c) gender roles in the work and family spheres. There is strong evidence of movement toward less-traditional attitudes during 1994–2000, followed by limited change in the 2000s. Period factors were paramount in the 1990s. Across the board, women hold less-traditional attitudes than men, and this difference has increased over time. Both engaging in nontraditional family behaviors (being married but remaining childless) and knowing someone who has engaged in nontraditional family behaviors (cohabitation) causally lead to holding nontraditional attitudes, suggesting mechanisms whereby changes in individual behavior can lead to changes in societal values

Order amidst change: Work and family trajectories in Japan

Substantial family and work macro-level change has been occurring in Japan. Examples include a decline in the availability of jobs that afford lifetime protection against unemployment, an increase in jobs that do not carry benefits such as a pension, an increase in age at marriage and at first birth, and an increase in marital dissolution. Using life history data from the 2000 National Survey on Family and Economic Conditions, young Japanese appear to have responded to these macro-level changes in a fairly orderly manner. Marriage and childbearing have been postponed, but marriage still precedes childbearing. Education is completed prior to starting work. For men, once work commences they continue working. For women, the classic conflict between work and family roles is evident. For men and women in both the family and work spheres Japanese young adults have more orderly life course trajectories than American young adults

Parasites and Raven Mothers: A German-Japanese Comparison on (Lone) Motherhood

Having a child out of wedlock used to be associated with shame and scorn. This is mostly not the case anymore in the western world. Therefore, freed from social sanctions, single motherhood has become an additional family-choice alternative for women, along with marriage and childlessness. Yet, the institutions that influence women's decisions differ across countries. We compare the institutional frame, in particular labor-market characteristics and family law, in Germany and Japan and, in addition, the interaction between culture and institutions. Both countries had a very traditional (one-earner) family system until the second half of the 20th century. Now we can observe that social changes that happened in Germany decades ago are happening only now in Japan. We analyze if and how the consequences in terms of family structures and fertility rates that resulted in Germany can be transfered to Japan.Dieser Artikel vergleicht die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in Deutschland und Japan, die die Fertilitätsentscheidung von Frauen beeinflussen können. Wir richten unser Augenmerk speziell auf Familienrecht, Arbeitsmarktcharakteristika und die Interaktion zwischen Institutionen und kulturellen Faktoren. Daraus leiten wir Implikationen für die relative Attraktivität von Ehe und Mutterschaft in beiden Ländern ab. Wir stellen fest, dass soziale Veränderungen, die in Deutschland vor einigen Jahrzenten vor sich gingen - insbesondere die Aufweichung der traditionellen Alleinverdiener-Familie - in Japan derzeit passieren. Wir analysieren, ob sich die Konsequenzen für Familienstruktur und Geburtenrate von Deutschland auf Japan übertragen lassen

Low fertility in Japan—no end in sight

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/After more than 40 years of very low birth rates, Japan now has one of the oldest populations in the world. Sustained low birth rates mean that there are few children in the population and eventually few working-age adults to drive economic growth and support the relatively large proportion of elderly, who were born in a previous era when fertility was higher. But why are young Japanese having so few children? One reason appears to be the uncertain employment prospects for young men, which make them poor candidates for marriage. The persistence of strong gender differences in housework and childcare also make the "marriage package" unattractive for Japanese women. Over the years, the Japanese government has introduced and expanded several programs to encourage young Japanese to marry and have children, including parental leave, monetary assistance to parents, and highly subsidized childcare. So far, however, these programs appear to have had very little impact