Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strenght. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prives when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admin closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form

Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strenght. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prives when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admin closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form.Two-Sided Market; Network Effects; Monopoly Experimentation; Bayesian Learning; Optimal Control

Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided mar- ket. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two sides are approximately symmetric. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently well known and weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prices when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal pol- icy does not admit closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form

Die "Freiheit des Wortes": nach dem Pressegesetz

Die beiden Beiträge des Heftes setzen sich mit der Situation der Presse in der Sowjetunion auseinander. Im ersten Beitrag wird das Gesetz "Über die Presse und andere Masseninformationsmedien" vom 12. Juni 1990 analysiert. An zwei Beispielen, an den Konflikten um "Ogonek" und um "Literaturnaja Gazeta", werden Aspekte und Austragungsformen der in dem Kontext dieses Gesetzes auftretenden Konflikte untersucht. Im zweiten Beitrag wird in einem Rückblick die Auseinandersetzung um die Zeitschrift "Novyj mir" und ihren Chefredakteur A. Tvardovskij analysiert. Zum einen wird die Polemik der Jahre 1988/89 interpretiert. Zum anderen wird der politische Charakter der angeblichen Literaturauseinandersetzung offengelegt, um auf diese Weise zur Diskussion um die Reformierbarkeit der Kulturinstitutionen beizutragen. (ICA

Die Organisation der künstlerischen Intelligenz in Rußland in den Jahren 1992/93

Das Ende der Sowjetunion und die Neukonstituierung der Russischen Föderation beschleunigten auch in den Organisationen der künstlerischen Intelligenz die während der Perestroika eingeleitete Umstrukturierung und die Neubestimmung von Aufgaben. Durch das Erstarken der Marktkräfte wurde der Zugang zu den materiellen Ressourcen der Kultursphäre zunehmend an den Verbänden vorbei geregelt. Der Besitz der Verbände dezimierte sich in den Wirren der Jahre 1991 und 1992 durch Inflation, Privatisierung und individuelle Bereicherung einiger führender Vertreter. Die weiter zunehmende soziale Unsicherheit der einzelnen Kulturschaffenden provozierte die Gründung von Parallelorganisationen, die sich bewußt als Gewerkschaften verstehen. (ICE

Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strenght. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prives when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admin closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form

The women on stieve's list: Victims of national socialism whose bodies were used for anatomical research

Research on the history of anatomy in the Third Reich has often concentrated on the influence of the National Socialist (NS) regime on anatomists and their consequent unethical activities. Only recently, the focus has shifted to NS victims whose bodies were used for anatomical purposes. As a first approach to learning more about the victims, this study investigated the persons whose names Hermann Stieve, chairman of the Anatomical Department at the University of Berlin, had listed after using their bodies for his research. The study draws a group portrait and recounts selected biographies of the 174 women and eight men on the list. Most women were of reproductive age, two‐thirds were German and a majority was executed for political reasons. Among the executed were at least two pregnant women. The corrected names, biographical data, and nationalities of all persons on the list are published here. None of them volunteered to be dissected, nor were the anatomists at the time interested in the victims' personal background. Future work will have to focus on the investigation of further biographies so that numbers can be turned back into people. This history is a reminder to modern anatomy that ethical body procurement and the anatomists' caring about the body donor is of the utmost importance in a discipline that introduces students to professional ethics in the medical teaching curriculum. Clin. Anat. 26:3–21, 2013. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/94885/1/22195_ftp.pd