Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By ‘‘qualitatively valid’’ we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies n. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for n§8, which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection

Co-evolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking

Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. We provide analytic results for the limiting cases where linking dynamics is much faster than evolutionary dynamics and vice-versa, and show how the individual capacity of forming new links or severing inconvenient ones maps into the problem of strategy evolution in a well-mixed population under a different game. For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time-scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected

XMM-Newton observations of the low-luminosity cataclysmic variable V405 Pegasi

V405 Peg is a low-luminosity cataclysmic variable (CV) that was identified as the optical counterpart of the bright, high-latitude ROSAT all-sky survey source RBS1955. The system was suspected to belong to a largely undiscovered population of hibernating CVs. Despite intensive optical follow-up its subclass however remained undetermined. We want to further classify V405 Peg and understand its role in the CV zoo via its long-term behaviour, spectral properties, energy distribution and accretion luminosity. We perform a spectral and timing analysis of \textit{XMM-Newton} X-ray and ultra-violet data. Archival WISE, HST, and Swift observations are used to determine the spectral energy distribution and characterize the long-term variability. The X-ray spectrum is characterized by emission from a multi-temperature plasma. No evidence for a luminous soft X-ray component was found. Orbital phase-dependent X-ray photometric variability by $\sim50\%$ occurred without significant spectral changes. No further periodicity was significant in our X-ray data. The average X-ray luminosity during the XMM-Newton observations was L_X, bol simeq 5e30 erg/s but, based on the Swift observations, the corresponding luminosity varied between 5e29 erg/s and 2e31 erg/son timescales of years. The CV subclass of this object remains elusive. The spectral and timing properties show commonalities with both classes of magnetic and non-magnetic CVs. The accretion luminosity is far below than that expected for a standard accreting CV at the given orbital period. Objects like V405 Peg might represent the tip of an iceberg and thus may be important contributors to the Galactic Ridge X-ray Emission. If so they will be uncovered by future X-ray surveys, e.g. with eROSITA.Comment: A&A, in pres

Similarity based cooperation and spatial segregation

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behaviour of the co-player, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent on parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

Stochasticity and evolutionary stability

In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash equilibria correspond to stable fixed points that are always evolutionarily stable. However, in finite populations stochastic effects can drive the system away from strict Nash equilibria, which gives rise to a new concept for evolutionary stability. The conventional and the new stability concepts may apparently contradict each other leading to conflicting predictions in large yet finite populations. We show that the two concepts can be derived from the frequency dependent Moran process in different limits. Our results help to determine the appropriate stability concept in large finite populations. The general validity of our findings is demonstrated showing that the same results are valid employing vastly different co-evolutionary processes

The Effect of Electrical Polarization on Electronic Structure in LSM Electrodes: An Operando XAS, RIXS and XES Study

The influence of electrical polarization on Mn in La0.5Sr0.5MnO3±δ electrodes has been investigated by operando High Energy Resolved Fluorescence Detected X-Ray Absorption Near-Edge Structure (HERFD-XANES) spectroscopy, Kβ X-ray Emission Spectroscopy (XES) and Resonant Inelastic X-ray Scattering (RIXS) at the Mn K-edge. The study of polarization induced changes in the electronic properties and structure has been carried out at 500°C in 10–20% O2 with electrical polarization applied in the range from −850 mV to 800 mV. Cathodic polarizations in the range −600 mV to −850 mV induced a shift in the Mn K edge energy towards lower energies. The shift is assigned to a decrease in the average Mn oxidation state, which based on Kβ XES changes from 3.4 at open circuit voltage to 3.2 at −800 mV applied potential. Furthermore, RIXS rendered pronounced changes in the population of the Mn 3d orbitals, due to filling of the Mn d-orbitals during the cathodic polarization. Overall, the study experimentally links the electrical polarization of LSM electrodes to the structural and electronic properties of Mn - these properties are expected to be of major importance for the electrocatalytic performance of LSM electrode towards the oxygen reduction reaction

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, ie strong stochasticity: The payoff difference $\Delta \pi$ is a linear function of the number of $A$ individuals $i$, $\Delta \pi = u i + v$. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term $v$. Given that a single $A$ mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term $u$. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.Comment: Forthcoming in New Journal of Physic

Inaugural BMC Ecology and Evolution image competition: the winning images

The inaugural BMC Ecology and Evolution image competition attracted entries from talented ecologists and evolutionary biologists worldwide. Together, these photos beautifully capture biodiversity, how it arose and why we should conserve it. This editorial celebrates the winning images as selected by the Editor of BMC Ecology and Evolution and senior members of the journal’s editorial board