Dall'organizzazione <i>multi-stakeholder</i> all'impresa reticolare [From the multi-stakeholder organisation to the network enterprise]

Le organizzazioni multi-stakeholder sono a tutt’oggi molto meno diffuse delle organizzazioni mono-stakeholder. Gli approcci più ortodossi allo studio dell’economia quali quello neoclassico e quello neo-istituzionalista tendono a riscontrare in questa evidenza una conferma della capacità delle organizzazioni mono-stakeholder di minimizzare i costi e di raggiungere i più elevati livelli di efficienza. Tuttavia, le teorie dominanti contrastano con altre evidenze secondo le quali le organizzazioni multi-stakeholder, soprattutto quelle non controllate dagli investitori si stanno in realtà diffondendo almeno in alcuni ambiti specifici, quali i settori dei servizi sociali, caratterizzati da pronunciate imperfezioni contrattuali ed asimmetrie informative, oltre che dal carattere relazionale dei servizi off erti. Sembra dunque che, smentendo il teorema di Hansmann, le organizzazioni multi-stakeholder non siano solo colpevoli di aumentare i costi a detrimento dell’efficienza produttiva, ma che sia invece anche in grado di generare maggiore surplus con modalità diverse da quelle tradizionali ed in contesti dove spesso le imprese a scopo di lucro e le organizzazioni a proprietà pubblica non sono in grado di operare. La partecipazione degli stakeholder diversi dagli investitori richiede o suggerisce in molti contesti l’esclusione dello scopo di lucro in quanto essa permette l’internalizzazione di interessi eterogenei ed il superamento all’interno del governo organizzativo delle maggiori imperfezioni contrattuali che si presentano sul mercato. Tuttavia, l’esclusione dello scopo di lucro non è una soluzione necessaria per le organizzazioni multi-stakeholder, che possono ricorrere tanto alla soluzione del governo duale, quanto ad altre forme più blande di partecipazione quali la consultazione ed i flussi informativi. Sembra però di potere affermare che il controllo esercitato dagli investitori sull’organizzazione sia uno degli elementi che più di tutti sfavoriscono la piena internalizzazione di interessi eterogenei all’interno del governo organizzativo a causa del modello di governo tendenzialmente più gerarchico, e dell’instaurarsi di rilevanti contrasti di interesse tra chi controlla l’organizzazione e gli altri soggetti a lei legati. I contrasti di interesse derivano dalla necessità di perseguire prima di tutto gli interessi degli investitori e quindi di massimizzare il valore di mercato dell’organizzazione. Necessità inevitabile quando si consideri che, nell’ipotesi controfattuale di un’impresa di capitale che non massimizza il suo profitto ed il suo valore di mercato, la possibilità di take-over e di scalate ostili verrebbe incrementata. [The article introduces the concept of ‘network enterprise’ as a development of the notion of the multi-stakeholder organization apparently better suited to grasping the structural characteristics and change dynamics of the environmental context in which social enterprises develop.

A needs theory of governance

New-institutional economics hypothesizes imperfect rationality, self-seeking preferences, monetary-related needs, and opportunism as fundamental features of human behavior. Consistently, new-institutionalist models of governance highlight the efficiency and transaction costs minimizing features of control rights and governance. Differently, needs theory of governance, as here presented, hypothesizes imperfect rationality, multiple needs, and reciprocity, in which case opportunism is reduced to an exception to individual behavior. Consistently, it presents a theory that links production governance with the wellbeing of those partaking in production. Building on Maslow’s human psychology, the governance model suggested in this paper is aimed at evidencing the self-actualization potential of control rights, organizational structures and practices. The application of Maslow’s theory to the institutional structure of organizations suggests that the deepest organizational layers (control rights and governance) broadly correspond to the most basic needs in Maslow’s theory (survival, security and belonging), while the outer layers (managerial models and employment relations) correspond to the fulfillment of the highest needs (self-esteem and self-actualization). Cooperative firms are used as an illustration of governance solutions consistent with needs theory in human psychology

The firm as a common. The case of accumulation and use of common resources in mutual benefit organizations

Common resources are quasi-public resources, which are rivaled but non excludable in consumption or in appropriation. While the exploitation of common resources has been widely studied in the literature originated by Elinor Ostron’s works (starting from 1990), the study of common resources inside entrepreneurial organization in not sufficiently developed to date. This paper establishes three dimensions that highlight the relevance of the communality of resources in entrepreneurial organizations: the accumulation and use of common capital resources owned by the organization; the distribution of a rivaled, but non excludable value added among the controlling patrons; and the management of common non-owned resources (for example natural resources) by the organization. The first theme is selected and developed further. Cooperative firms are introduced are instance of ownership form that appears, historically and institutionally, to be particularly keen to accumulate, use, distribute common resources.common resources; rivalry; non-excludability; entrepreneurial organizations; accumulation; cooperative firms

A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS: Self-defined rules, common resources, motivations, and incentives

Cooperatives are characterised by mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms aimed at the fulfilment of individual behaviour and outcomes in cooperatives by bringing together new-institutionalism, behavioural and evolutionary economics. Our framework considers four main dimensions of the governance of cooperative firms: (1) the development and application of self-defined rules by the members of the cooperative; (2) the management, and appropriation of common resources and outcomes; (3) intrinsic motivations and reciprocating behaviours; (4) the implementation of suitable incentive mixes based on inclusion and reciprocity, including both pecuniary and non- pecuniary elements. An example is offered in order to highlight possible problems in the governance of cooperative firms, in particular the processes of distribution and appropriation of surplus. The example aims at introducing the discussion of the new framework of analysis.cooperative firms, common resources, motivations, incentives

Worker satisfaction and perceived fairness: result of a survey in public, and non-profit organizations

Exploiting a unique data set concerning a sample of 228 social service organizations, and on 2066 workers, the paper seeks to demonstrate that workers’ satisfaction with the job and loyalty to the organization are crucially influenced by fairness concerns. Worker well-being is increased by a higher degree of perceived fairness, and the effect is highest for procedural fairness. By sorting the organizations into public and nonprofits, the former are found to be at a disadvantage in regard to both satisfaction and perceived fairness. Nonprofits show the highest scores on most items and the gap is highest in the realm of procedural fairness.

Satisfaction with creativity: a study of organisational characteristics and individual motivations

In answering the question of what influences satisfaction for creativity in the workplace, this work takes into account the extent to which the organization supports human aspiration to creativity. The empirical model uses survey data encompassing over 4,000 workers in Italian social enterprises. Results show that satisfaction for creativity is supported, at organizational level, by teamwork-oriented action, including the quality of processes, relations and on-the job autonomy. At the individual level, satisfaction for creativity is enhanced by the strength of intrinsic and socially oriented motivations and by competence. The analysis of interaction terms shows that teamwork and workers' intrinsic motivations are complementary in enhancing the perception of creativity-enhancing work settings, while a high degree of required competences appears to substitute good relationships with superiorscreativity, job satisfaction, organizational processes, motivations, teamwork,autonomy, interpersonal relations

Incentives, job satisfaction and performance: empirical evidence in italian social enterprises

The paper offers a contribution to the understanding of the relations between incentives, satisfaction and performance of employees in social enterprises. It starts by criticizing the general hypotheses of the principal-agent theory and especially that employee satisfaction is determined exclusively by the level of salary received. These criticisms are explained both by looking to the organizational definition of job satisfaction by Locke and by taking a behavioural economics perspective. Job satisfaction is thus assumed to derive from a composed mix of incentives received on the job, equity perceived and employee motivations. It is no longer possible to assume that the wage is the sole (not even the most important) variable influencing worker performance. This claim is especially valid in social enterprises, where worker performance is difficult to monitor and evaluate, while high intrinsic motivations can better explain job satisfaction. The empirical analysis helps to shed light on the determinants of job satisfaction and individual performance. Data was collected on 4,134 employees working in 320 Italian social cooperatives. The paper introduces the methodologies of categorical principal components analysis, factor analysis, and Rasch models to group the items of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction, motivations and fairness. The data was then analysed by means of linear regression where the dependent variables are not only the stated degree of job satisfaction, but also satisfaction with extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of the job. The models come to demonstrate the particular relevance of employee motivations and fairness perceived in explaining job satisfaction and its sub-dimensions. Furthermore, organizational perceptions and the work environment are found to be significant as are individual perceptions and motivations.

The role of cooperative and social enterprises: A multifaceted approach for an economic pluralism

he role of cooperative and social enterprises in contemporary market economies has been downplayed and marginalised to date by the dominant economic approaches. This insufficient attention (Kalmi, 2008 su Cambridge Journal of Economics) derives from the limited applicability of the main assumptions of microeconomic to the case of cooperative and social enterprises. We mainly refer to models. the assumption of self-seeking individuals and of profit maximisation as the only possible firm objective. The mismatch between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence has led to the underestimation of the growth potential, weight and role of cooperative and social enterprises. We maintain that the improvement of the scientific understanding of cooperative and social enterprises requires to enlarge and deepen the assumption of the relevant theoretical models. Individuals cannot be characterised any more as purely self-interested. Instead, the importance of motivational complexity, and the diverse nature of preferences needs to be introduced in the model as suggested by the behavioural approach. Furthermore, firms cannot be interpreted any more in an exclusive way as profit maximizers. They are instead coordination mechanisms of the economic activity, as suggested by the evolutionary approach. To this end they develop specific organisational routines, and their objectives can be diverse, ranging from purely private appropriation, to mutual benefit based on reciprocity, to public benefit aim supported by other-regarding preferences. (Le teorie economiche dominanti, ed in particolare l’approccio ortodosso e quello neo-istituzionalista, hanno sottostimato e marginalizzato il ruolo delle cooperative e delle imprese sociali nei mercati economici contemporanei. L’insufficiente attenzione a queste organizzazioni deriva principalmente dall’impossibilità di applicare ad esse le assunzioni principali della teoria microeconomica ortodossa, ossia la presenza di individui auto-interessati e di organizzazioni che puntino solo alla massimizzazione del profitto. Anche la teoria neo-istituzionalista non riesce a spiegare la presenza e la crescita del ruolo ricoperto da cooperative e imprese sociali. Per questa ragione, il presente paper è volto a dimostrare come, per spiegare il ruolo di cooperative ed imprese sociali da un punto di vista scientifico, i principali modelli teorici economici debbano essere estesi. Innanzitutto, tanto gli individui quanto le istituzioni non possono essere più assunti come soggetti meramente egoistici, ma ne vanno studiate la complessità motivazionale e le strutture di preferenze, così come proposto dalla teoria comportamentale (behavioural economics). Inoltre, le imprese devono essere concepite come meccanismi di coordinamento delle attività economiche, come suggerito dall’approccio evoluzionista, e devono quindi esserne analizzate le specifiche routine organizzative sviluppate al loro interno e gli obiettivi organizzativi, i quali possono variare tra gli interessi di appropriazione privata dei profitti ed obiettivi pro-sociali sostenuti da preferenze altruistiche.Cooperatives, social enterprises, organizational pluralism, economic theories

The Growth of Organizational Variety in Market Economies: The Case of Social Enterprises

Institutional and organizational variety is increasingly characterising advanced economic systems. While traditional economic theories have focussed almost exclusively on profit-maximizing (i.e. for-profit) enterprises and on publicly-owned organizations, the increasing relevance of non-profit organizations, and especially of social enterprises, requires scientists to reflect on a new comprehensive economic approach for explaining this organizational variety. The paper examines the main limitations of the orthodox and institutional theories and comes to assert the need for creating and testing a new theoretical framework, which considers the way in which diverse enterprises pursue their goals, the diverse motivations driving actors and organizations, and the different learning patterns and routines within organizations. The new framework of analysis proposed in the paper draws upon recent developments in the theories of the firm, institutional evolution, and motivational complexity to explain the presence of diverse types of organizations on a continuum ranging from purely for-profit and commercial forms to socially-oriented entrepreneurial ones. (La varietà istituzionale ed organizzativa sta sempre più caratterizzando le economie avanzate. Mentre le teorie economiche tradizionali hanno tuttavia focalizzato l’attenzione esclusivamente sulle imprese che massimizzano il profitto (tipicamente le for-profit) e sulle organizzazioni pubbliche, la crescente importanza, in questi ultimi anni, delle organizzazioni nonprofit e specialmente delle imprese sociali sta richiedendo agli studiosi di ripensare un approccio economico capace di spiegare questa varietà organizzativa. Il presente articolo spiega i principali limiti della teoria ortodossa e delle teoria neo-istitizionalista e giunge ad affermare la necessità di creare e testare una nuova teoria economica che consideri le diversità negli obiettivi delle organizzazioni, le differenze nelle motivazioni degli attori economici e delle organizzazioni stesse, le differenti modalità di apprendimento e di generazione di routine all’interno delle organizzazioni. Il nuovo contesto di analisi proposto attinge ad alcuni recenti sviluppi delle analisi economiche dell’impresa ed in particolare all’evoluzione delle istituzioni e alla complessità motivazionale, giungendo a delineare la presenza di diverse tipologie organizzative lungo un continuum che va dalle organizzazioni interessate esclusivamente alla massimizzazione del profitto (for-profit) alle organizzazione orientate al benessere sociale.)Social enterprises, organizational pluralism, neo-institutional economics, behavioral economics, organizational continuum

Productivity, wages and intrinsic motivation in social enterprises

In our empirical analysis of wage differentials in a sample of workers in the cooperative not for profit sector we find that, consistently with the donative-labor hypothesis, more intrinsically motivated workers “donate more work” (unpaid overtime, arrear holidays) but are also more productive and earn significantly higher wages. Our results are robust to several measures of workers’ remuneration and controlled for endogeneity. We interpret these findings by arguing that the hypothesis of the static negative correlation between intrinsic motivations and wages (where intrinsic motivations work as a compensating differential) is dominated by the effect by which intrinsic motivations cause or are a signal of higher productivity.Productivity; wages; intrinsic motivation; social enterprises