How efficient is Joint Decision-Making in the EU? Environmental Policies and the Co-Decision Procedure

This paper is a first step towards the analysis of the joint decision-making mode of governance in the EU. It argues that such a mode of governance enhances policy effectiveness in the field of environmental policy. This is mainly due to the as yet neglected phenomenon of the interaction between representative institutions at different levels in the European Union that characterises joint decision-making. The European Parliament, as a co-legislator with veto power in the co-decision procedure, has been a crucial organisational actor. Its interactions with other actors such as national parliaments and the Council of Ministers and the European Commission are particular relevant in the building-up of more appropriate and legitimate incentives for the correct implementation of common policies, internalising many externalities. It has also allowed for a more active role of EU national parliaments in the EU legislative process, increasing their leverage vis-à-vis their respective governments as far as European legislation is concerned.European governance; co-decision; policy effectiveness; informal institutions; sustainable development

On the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EMU

This paper addresses the question whether the process of European monetary integration implies efficiency-legitimacy trade-off. The paper considers that the process of monetary policy delegation to the European Central Bank (ECB), ratified by all European Union (EU) parliaments, was a non-zero-sum game, increasing both the efficiency and the legitimacy of monetary policy in the eurozone. There was however a change in the nature of delegation: the initial principal (EU national governments and/or parliaments) delegated to the agent (the ECB) control over its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. The paper distinguishes two types of constraints for monetary policy: credibility constraints and political constraints. The change in the nature of delegation of monetary policy (tying the hands of the principal) was a means of dealing with credibility constraints. The paper goes on investigating whether, and if so to what extent, the European Parliament (EP) is fit to function as a principal of the ECB as a means of dealing with political constraints. Thus, the paper analyses the European Parliament’s increased involvement in overseeing the Central Bank’s activities, aiming at understanding whether and how that new and special role (an informal institution of dialogue) could affect the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in the conduct of monetary policy in the eurozone.Economic and Monetary Union; monetary policy delegation: efficiency and legitimacy; accountability; responsiveness; principal-agent relations; governance

EMU and EU Governance

This paper argues that a shift from an intergovernmental form of governance to a supranational regulation form of governance, as is the case of EMU, may not only do away with the efficiencylegitimacy trade-off but also enhance the democratic quality and effectiveness of European governance in the monetary sphere. The emerging role of the European Parliament in enhancing the democratic accountability of decision-making in supranational regulation (monetary policy) may prove quite powerful with respect to avoiding such a trade-off and indeed improving efficiency, transparency and accountability in European governance. It is argued that the democratic accountability of governance in the EU increased very much as the direct result of the making of EMU, that is, of the democratic delegation of executive powers to the ECB by the European Council and the EU Council of Ministers. That democratic accountability has also been substantially enhanced thanks to the emerging (and still evolving) role of the European Parliament as a principal of the European Central Bank (ECB). That new role of the EP materialised because of the change in the nature of delegation, i.e. the initial principal (the Council) delegated to an agent (the ECB) in order for the agent to control its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. That led to a change in the assignment between agents and principals. The new principal (still in the making one could argue) has also allowed for increased participation in and deliberation on the discussions about the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB, contributing in this way to its greater transparency.Governance; supranational regulation; monetary policy effectiveness; accountability; delegation; principal-agent relations

The long road to EMU: The Economic and Political Reasoning behind Maastricht

This paper aims to examine whether the economic and political reasoning behind Maastricht is consistent with earlier approaches to monetary integration. In doing so, it revisits the intellectual debate on monetary integration in Europe at different stages. It concludes that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as agreed at Maastricht reflected a compromise between two different but converging preferences, in the context of the experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) and other developments in national and European politics as well as in economic thought, on the role of monetary policy and institutions; the fall of the Berlin Wall may have added a new political dimension that might have made it easier to agree on the blueprint and on the calendar for the realisation of EMU. The various (political and economic) motivations for the convergence of initially different views on the role of monetary policy and successive interpretations of the objectives of EMU are discussed within the wider context of the process of European integration.Economic and Monetary Union; Bretton Woods; European integration; Werner plan; European Monetary System; inflation; convergence of preferences; epistemic communities; currency crisis; monetary sovereignty; Maastricht treaty; convergence requirements.

The long road to EMU: The Economic and Political Reasoning behind Maastricht

This paper aims to examine whether the economic and political reasoning behind Maastricht is consistent with earlier approaches to monetary integration. In doing so, it revisits the intellectual debate on monetary integration in Europe at different stages. It concludes that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as agreed at Maastricht reflected a compromise between two different but converging preferences, in the context of the experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) and other developments in national and European politics as well as in economic thought, on the role of monetary policy and institutions; the fall of the Berlin Wall may have added a new political dimension that might have made it easier to agree on the blueprint and on the calendar for the realisation of EMU. The various (political and economic) motivations for the convergence of initially different views on the role of monetary policy and successive interpretations of the objectives of EMU are discussed within the wider context of the process of European integration.Economic and Monetary Union; Bretton Woods; European integration; Werner plan; European Monetary System; inflation; convergence of preferences; epistemic communities; currency crisis; monetary sovereignty; Maastricht treaty; convergence requirements.

On the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EMU

This paper addresses the question whether the process of European monetary integration implies efficiency-legitimacy trade-off. The paper considers that the process of monetary policy delegation to the European Central Bank (ECB), ratified by all European Union (EU) parliaments, was a non-zero-sum game, increasing both the efficiency and the legitimacy of monetary policy in the eurozone. There was however a change in the nature of delegation: the initial principal (EU national governments and/or parliaments) delegated to the agent (the ECB) control over its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. The paper distinguishes two types of constraints for monetary policy: credibility constraints and political constraints. The change in the nature of delegation of monetary policy (tying the hands of the principal) was a means of dealing with credibility constraints. The paper goes on investigating whether, and if so to what extent, the European Parliament (EP) is fit to function as a principal of the ECB as a means of dealing with political constraints. Thus, the paper analyses the European Parliament’s increased involvement in overseeing the Central Bank’s activities, aiming at understanding whether and how that new and special role (an informal institution of dialogue) could affect the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in the conduct of eurozone.Economic and Monetary Union; monetary policy delegation: efficiency and legitimacy; accountability; responsiveness; principal-agent relations; governance.

Conditions for Primitivity of unital amalgamated full free products of finite dimensional C*-algebras

We consider amalgamated unital full free products of the form $A_1*_DA_2$, where $A_1, A_2$ and $D$ are finite dimensional C*-algebras and there are faithful traces on $A_1$ and $A_2$ whose restrictions to $D$ agree. We provide several conditions on the matrices of partial multiplicities of the inclusions $D\hookrightarrow A_1$ and $D\hookrightarrow A_2$ that guarantee that the C*-algebra $A_1*_DA_2$ is primitive. If the ranks of the matrices of partial multiplicities are one, we prove that the algebra $A_1*_DA_2$ is primitive if and only if it has a trivial center.Comment: 40 pages. No essential changes in second submission. Some misspelled words were corrected and format was change

Application of digital holographic interferometry to pressure measurements of symmetric, supercritical and circulation-control airfoils in transonic flow fields

Six airfoil interferograms were evaluated using a semiautomatic image-processor system which digitizes, segments, and extracts the fringe coordinates along a polygonal line. The resulting fringe order function was converted into density and pressure distributions and a comparison was made with pressure transducer data at the same wind tunnel test conditions. Three airfoil shapes were used in the evaluation to test the capabilities of the image processor with a variety of flows. Symmetric, supercritical, and circulation-control airfoil interferograms provided fringe patterns with shocks, separated flows, and high-pressure regions for evaluation. Regions along the polygon line with very clear fringe patterns yielded results within 1% of transducer measurements, while poorer quality regions, particularly near the leading and trailing edges, yielded results that were not as good

The correlation of visibility noise and its impact on the radiometric resolution of an aperture synthesis radiometer

The correlation between the visibility samples' noise of an aperture synthesis radiometer are required for the computation of the recovered temperature noise of a given pixel and of the improvement introduced by baseline redundance. A general expression for this correlation and noise examples for a linear array are presented.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version