17 research outputs found
Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Accepted for publication in the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism.Russellian monist positions such as panpsychism are widely believed to have crucial advantages over mainstream physicalist and dualist positions. Physicalism disregards or distorts the distinctive features of consciousness, while dualism fails to integrate consciousness sufficiently into the natural causal order. We consider whether Russellian monism has the advantages just described. More specifically, we discuss two significant challenges to the claim that it does: one developed by Robert J. Howell and one by Amy Kind. Howell argues that Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion argument can be modified to show that Russellian monism is untenable. And Kind argues that it is “simply an illusion” that Russellian monism “transcend[s] the dualist/physicalist divide.” We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable, and on the way develop detailed new variants of the general Russellian monist position. Most notable among these are 'compatibilist' and 'necessitarian' Russellian monism. We conclude that Russellian monism remains a contender position, and plausibly retains its advertised advantages over the mainstream positions. In particular, compatibilist and necessitarian versions of the view seem worthy of further attentionPeer reviewe
Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies
The claim that zombies are conceivable is a premise of one of
the most important anti-physicalist arguments. Eric Marcus (2004) challenges
that premise in two novel ways. He observes that conceiving of
zombies would require imagining total subjective absence. And this, he
argues, we cannot do. However, his argument turns on the assumption
that absence is imaginable only against a background of presence and, I
argue, that assumption is dubious. Second, he proposes that the premise�s
intuitive plausibility derives from a scope confusion. However, I
argue, on reflection that proposal is untenable
Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument
According to social externalism, it is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one’s intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one’s linguistic community. Derek Ball (2009) argues, in effect, that (i) social externalism extends to our concepts of colour experience and (ii) this fact undermines both the knowledge argument against physicalism and the most popular physicalist response to it, known as the phenomenal concept strategy. I argue that Ball is mistaken about (ii) even granting (i). The knowledge argument and the phenomenal concept strategy might have to be modified to make them consistent with social externalism, but not in fundamental or detrimental way
Народное слово. 2018. № 14
: Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it
need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without
seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett
(2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related
considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism.
If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their
argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism—
the view that there are phenomenal properties, or qualia, that are not
conceptually reducible to physical or functional properties. I will argue
that this threat is illusory. Explaining why will clarify what is and is not at
issue in discussions of the knowledge argument and phenomenal realism.
This will strengthen the case for physically and functionally irreducible
qualia.
2
Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. For example, I know
what it’s like to see red because I have done so. Does knowing what it’s like to
have an experience with phenomenal character X require having an experience
with X? No. A famous counterexample is Hume’s missing shade of blue, in
which one can extrapolate from phenomenally similar experiences (A Treatise of
Human Nature, Bk. I, Pt. I, Sec. I).1 One might think that a weaker version of the
no‐phenomenal‐knowledge‐without‐experience thesis remains tenable, e.g., that
knowing what it’s like to see in color requires having or having had color
experiences. But this thesis also seems doubtful. Peter Unger (1966) devised
plausible counterexamples over four decades ago, and since then others (e.g.,
Lewis 1988, Alter 1998, Stoljar 2005) have done the same. One could have
phenomenal knowledge of color experiences without having such experiences.
Indeed, one could have such knowledge without having experiences that are
remotely like color experiences.
What is the significance of this observation for contemporary debates
about consciousness and physicalism? Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik
(forthcoming) suggest that it undermines the knowledge argument against
physicalism.2 That is because they take the claim that someone who has never
seen in color could not know what it’s like to see in color to be the basis of the
knowledge argument’s main epistemic premise: the premise that (roughly put)
3
no amount of physical knowledge is sufficient for phenomenal knowledge of
color experiences. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐
physicalists. Many physicalists (e.g., Loar 1990/97, Papineau 2002, 2007) accept
the knowledge argument’s epistemic premise. Dennett’s and Mandik’s
arguments threaten all versions of what David Chalmers (2003) calls phenomenal
realism, the view that there are phenomenal properties, or qualia, that are not
conceptually reducible to physical or functional properties.3
I will argue that this threat is illusory. Explaining why will clarify what is
and is not at issue in discussions of the knowledge argument and phenomenal
realism. The net result will be to strengthen the case for physically inexplicable
quali
Russellian Physicalism and Protophenomenal Properties
© 2020 Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record [Torin Alter, Sam Coleman, Russellian physicalism and protophenomenal properties, Analysis, anaa006, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa006] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa006.We consider an argument from Morris and Brown that there cannot be a genuinely physicalist version of Russellian monism, and rebut that argument. The rebuttal involves making a distinction between ways protophenomenal properties can be individuated: i). in terms of roles they play (e.g. grounding physical dispositions, constituting consciousness) and ii). in terms of their intrinsic nature. The Morris-Brown objection depends on individuating protophenomenal properties in way i), and can be sidestepped by individuating them in way ii, which, we argue, is anyway more in line with existing formulations of Russellian physicalism in the literature.Peer reviewe