Bank behavior and the interbank rate in an oligopolistic market

The well-known Klein-Monti model of bank behavior considers a monopolistic bank. We demonstrate that this model's results on the comparative static effects of a change in the exogenous interbank market interest rate do not necessarily hold in oligopolistic Cournot or Stackelberg generalizations. Introducing asymmetries in the cost functions of the banks, or in their way of conduct, may imply counterintuitive effects on the individual banks' volumes of loans and deposits.

The strategic use of debt reconsidered

We consider a two-stage differentiated goods duopoly model with demand uncertainty linking firms' capital structure choice to their output market decisions. Using a numerical analysis, we study how the equilibrium of the model is affected by demand volatility and the substitutability between products. In doing so, we correct a mistake in earlier papers in this literature. Most importantly, we find that the equilibrium debt level decreases as demand becomes more volatile. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</p

Convergence of pass-through from money market to lending rates in EMU countries Convergence of pass-through from money market to lending rates in EMU countries: New evidence

Abstract This paper examines whether the pass-through of monetary policy measures in 6 EMU countries has become more similar over time. The countries included are: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, and the sample period is 1980-2000. We conclude that major differences in pass-through exist in our sample, notably for the initial response to policy-induced interest rate changes. However, there is some (weak) evidence for convergence of monetary policy transmission

Sound taxation? On the use of self-declared value

In the 16th century, foreign ships passing through the Sound had to pay ad valorem taxes, known as the Sound Dues. To give skippers an incentive to declare the true value of their cargo, the Danish Crown reserved the right to purchase it at the declared value. We show that this rule does not induce truth-telling, but does allow the authorities to effectively implement a given tax rate. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved