Explaining and trusting expert evidence: What is a ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’?

Through a series of judicial decisions and Practice Directions, the English courts have developed a rule that expert evidence must have ‘a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to be admitted’. There is a dearth of case-law as to what degree of reliability is ‘sufficient’. This article argues that the test should be interpreted as analogous to one developed in the law of hearsay: expert evidence (scientific or otherwise) must be ‘potentially safely reliable’ in the context of the evidence as a whole. The implications of this test will vary according to the relationship between the expert evidence and the other evidence in the case. The article identifies three main patterns into which this relationship falls. Whether the jury relies upon the evidence will depend upon what they regard as the best explanation of the evidence and how far they trust the expert. Whether their reliance is safe (as a basis for conviction) depends on whether they could rationally rule out explanations consistent with innocence, and whether the degree to which they take the expert’s evidence on trust is consistent with prosecution’s burden of proving the essential elements of its case, including the reliability of any scientific techniques on which it relies

Expert evidence and the Law Commission : implementation without legislation?

Argues that, despite a failure to implement the recommendations in the Law Commission's 2011 report entitled "Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings", many of its proposals on the exclusion of such evidence might be introduced by the judiciary's appropriate exercise of common law powers. Reviews the Commission's proposals, the common law principles determining when expert evidence is not admitted, and how such discretion could be used to exclude evidence failing the Commission's core test. Discusses the drawbacks of such an approach and whether the Commission proposals were too timid

Expert testimony, law and epistemic authority

© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2016 This article discusses the concept of epistemic authority in the context of English law relating to expert testimony. It distinguishes between two conceptions of epistemic authority (and epistemic deference), one strong and one weak, and argues that only the weak conception is appropriate in a legal context, or in any other setting where reliance on experts can be publicly justified. It critically examines Linda Zagzebski's defence of a stronger conception of epistemic authority and questions whether epistemic authority is as closely analogous to practical authority as she maintains. Zagzebski elucidates a kind of deference that courts generally, and rightly, try to avoid. Her concept of ‘first person reasons’, however, does capture an important aspect of the deliberations of conscientious legal actors

Where has all the psychology gone? A critical review of evidence-based psychological practice in correctional settings

Evidence-Based Practice (EBP) represents the gold standard for effective clinical psychological practice. In this review, we examine ways in which EBP tenets are being neglected by correctional psychologists worldwide. We examine three key aspects of EBP currently being neglected: (a) individualized and flexible client focus, (b) the therapeutic alliance, and (c) psychological expertise. We also highlight two highly related issues responsible for correctional psychologists' neglect of EBP. The first relates to policy makers' and correctional psychologists' overreliance on the Risk–Need–Responsivity Model to guide correctional practice. We argue that the narrow focus and implementation of this model has resulted in a severe identity problem for correctional psychologists that has severely exacerbated the dual relationship problem. That is, the tension psychologists experience as a result of engaging in psychological practice while also obliging the risk and security policies of correctional systems. The second issue concerns psychologists' response to the dual relationship problem. In short, psychology, as a discipline appears to have acquiesced to the dual-relationship problem. In our view, this constitutes a ‘crisis’ for the discipline of correctional psychology. We offer several recommendations for injecting EBP back into correctional psychology for the individual, psychology as a discipline, and correctional policy makers

Alternative objectives : time extensions and less stringent objectives

The Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) (WFD) establishes a suite of environmental objectives for groundwater. In implementing the Directive and producing the first River Basin Management Plans, Member States have had to identify whether the these objectives are being met. If this assessment has shown that one or more of the objectives for groundwater is not being met, or is at risk of being failed, programmes of measures must be implemented to ensure that all relevant environmental objectives are met within six years – the publication date of the next River Basin Management Plan (22nd December, 2015). In reality, especially for groundwater, achieving all the relevant objectives in such a short timescale may not be possible or practical. The WFD recognises this and allows for an extension of the deadline (beyond 2015) for the purposes of a phased achievement of the environmental objectives. This is provided that there is no further deterioration in status (Article 4.4). Any such extension is limited to a maximum of two further river basin cycles (12 years) except where natural conditions mean that objectives can still not be achieved. A further provision is made for the situation where a water body is so badly affected by human activity or where natural conditions mean that achievement of the objectives(s) would be infeasible or disproportionally expensive. In these cases less stringent objectives (relative to those defined in Article 4.1) can be set, provided that there is the least possible deviation from good status conditions. Where extended deadlines or less stringent objectives have been proposed, Member States must provide an explanation and justification in the River Basin Management Plan. In the case of extended deadlines, a timetable for implementation of measures and the achievement of objectives must also be provided. This paper provides an overview of the approach used in England and Wales for identifying programmes of measures for groundwater, predicting outcomes and setting alternative objectives in relation to groundwater quality. Similar approaches were used for quantitative (water resource) aspects and also for surface water bodies

Human rights and dignity in offender rehabilitation

The concept of human rights is a moral (and legal) one that that is intended to safeguard provision of the social, economic, environmental, and psychological goods necessary for a dignified human life. Over the last 3 years, several papers on the implications of rights-based thinking for the assessment and treatment of offenders have appeared. In this paper, I draw from this work—in particular, the conceptual model developed by Ward and Birgden (2007)—and examine its practice recommendations and implications. First, I analyze the concept of dignity and its role in human rights thinking. Then the Ward and Birgden model of human rights is outlined and ethically justified. Finally, I discuss some of the major assessment and treatment consequences of this human rights approach

Expert Evidence, “Naked Statistics” and Standards of Proof

In the context of the UK Supreme Court decision in Sienkiewicz v Greif (2011) this article discusses the question whether so-called “naked statistical evidence” can satisfy the civil standard of proof in English law, the “balance of probabilities”. It argues that what is required to satisfy the standard is a judicial belief that causation is more likely than not, rather than a categorical belief that causation occurred. Whether such a belief is justified depends on the weight of the evidence as well as the degree of probability it purports to establish, but there is no reason of principle why epidemiological evidence alone should not satisfy this standard

Dignity and human rights in correctional practice

Interventions with offenders have a normative layer as well as a scientific basis and therefore it is not possible to quarantine ethical questions from discussions of best practice. My aim in this paper is to provide an expanded ethical canvass from which to approach correctional practice with offenders. The cornerstone of this broader ethical perspective will be the concept of human dignity and its protection by human rights norms and theories. I also explore the relationship between responses to crime and offender rehabilitation based on an enriched theory of punishment that is sensitive to offenders’ moral equality and their attendant rights

Commentary: Between Kant and Al-Shabaab

This is a commentary on the two previous chapters in the same book. It draws on the author's and colleagues' research in Kenya to comment on the other contributors' arguments about the 'right to democratise'. It considers the arguments of an Islamist scholar interviewed in the research for a right to reject democracy, and interprets Kant as rejecting a right of states to impose a republican (or democratic) constitutions on other states. It argues that Kant's position, so interpreted, remains essentially sound

Punishment or therapy? The ethics of sexual offending treatment

The claim that sex offender treatment is a form of punishment and as such cannot be covered by traditional ethical codes is a controversial one. It challenges the ethical basis of current practice and compels clinicians to rethink the work they do with sex offenders. In this paper I comment on Bill Glaser\u27s defence of that idea in a challenging and timely paper and David Prescott and Jill Leveson\u27s rejection of his claims. First, I consider briefly the nature of both punishment and treatment and outline Glaser\u27s argument and Prescott and Levenson\u27s rejoinder. I then investigate what a comprehensive argument for either position should look like and finish with a few comments on each paper