Theory of evaporative cooling with energy-dependent elastic scattering cross section and application to metastable helium

The kinetic theory of evaporative cooling developed by Luiten et al. [Phys. Rev. A 53, 381 (1996)] is extended to include the dependence of the elastic scattering cross section on collision energy. We introduce a simple approximation by which the transition range between the low-temperature limit and the unitarity limit is described as well. Applying the modified theory to our measurements on evaporative cooling of metastable helium we find a scattering length |a| = 10(5) nm

THE CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE BILL 2010: AN ASSESSMENT. ESRI WP371. January 2011

Climate change is an important problem. It would be desirable to have legislation that would put Ireland on a low-cost and equitable trajectory to a zero-carbon economy. The draft Climate Change Response Bill 2010 will not achieve that. The exact emission reduction targets for 2020 are ambiguous, but considerably more ambitious than Ireland’s obligations under EU legislation. EU legislation severely constrains the options for domestic climate policy so that the extra emission reduction would fall almost exclusively on agriculture, households, small and medium enterprises, and transport. The target in the draft bill for 2020 would require draconian policies. It would be better to keep the EU targets for 2020. The targets for 2030 and 2050 would require a further sharpening of climate policy. It would be better to base climate policy on predictably rising carbon prices. The draft bill fails to create a framework that would ensure that policy interventions are effective, as cheap as possible, and fair. Current policy meets none of these criteria. The Regulatory Impact Analysis is a collection of qualitative assertions that shed little light on the impact of the draft bill. The proposed National Climate Change Expert Advisory Body would need to acquire the appropriate expertise and be truly independent to fulfil its envisaged role

Selling State Assets: Three Options. ESRI Research Bulletin 2011/3/1

Under the EU/IMF Programme for Financial Support for Ireland, the government undertook to consider the potential for disposing of State assets. In the 2011 Programme for Government a target of up to €2 billion was set for the sale of non‐strategic State assets, but only after adequate regulatory structures to protect consumers were in place. The State owns important parts of the economy – including the ports, airports, electricity generators, and transmission systems (gas and electricity). It also owns a household waste collector, a tour operator, a horticulture business, and a stud farm. The sale of State assets is nothing new – €8.3 billion has already been raised through the sale of State assets in steel, sugar refining, banks, telecommunication and airlines. Largely as a result, the share of the commercial state sector in total employment fell from 8 per cent of total employment in 1980 to 2 per cent in 2008

WASTE POLICY IN IRELAND: COMMENTS ON RADICAL PROPOSALS ON THE WAY FORWARD. A Submission to the Minister’s Reopening of the Consultation on the Proposed Section 60 Policy Direction Capping Incineration of Municipal Waste and Other Matters and the Consultation New Draft Statement of Waste Policy

We are pleased to respond to two waste policy consultations: first, the reopening of that on the proposed Section 60 Policy Direction on a proposed cap to incineration capacity as a proportion of municipal solid waste arisings (“MSW”) and other matters (“the proposed Section 60 policy direction”); and, second, on the new Draft Statement on Waste Policy (“the Draft Waste Statement”). The proposals subject to consultation, together with a number of other recent waste management proposals,3 mark a radical departure in the direction of waste policy in Ireland

Public Policy Towards the Sale of State Assets in Troubled Times: Lessons from the Irish Experience. ESRI WP356. October 2010

Governments throughout the western world and beyond are in the midst of a severe financial crisis and emerging from a sharp recession. Ireland is no exception. One of the options for strengthening public finances is the sale of state assets. In this paper we draw on the Irish experience to inform the wider debate on this important issue. Debate over the potential saleability of certain tangible and intangible assets owned by the state turns into much more than an exercise in ranking these assets by commercial viability and value. Careful attention needs to be devoted to ensuring that wider public policy considerations are taken into account, such competition, regulation and economic development. Hence it is important to formulate terms of reference for any consideration of the sale of state assets that reflect these wider concerns. In the case of tangible assets – commercial state firms – the debate is around whether these firms should be the public sector and whether the objectives can be better met by alternative arrangements. In privatising these state-owned firms careful attention needs to be paid to ensure that markets are well organised and competitive. This may necessitate for example breaking up a vertically integrated firm into its competitive and monopoly parts. To a considerable degree the debate over privatisation reflects issues related to the regulatory reform agenda. But in both cases what is on offer is a more efficient and competitive economy if reform is conducted sensibly and is not derailed by vested interests as has been the case, on occasion, in the past. In terms of intangible assets such as permits of various kinds such a those relating to carbon, wind turbine and oil exploration as well as radio spectrum licences, the conclusion is much more straightforward: these assets should be auctioned off to the highest bidder, but using a carefully designed auction which needs to take into account the competitive situation amongst the bidders not only to prevent collusion and gaming, but also to encourage entry and competition. Another important reason to auction these assets is that there is a danger, absent auctioning, that government will be unaware that these are valuable assets and hence not properly price them when making public policy decisions

EU Climate Change Policy 2013-2020: Using the Clean Development Mechanism More Effectively. ESRI WP299. May 2009

Under European Union proposals for CO2 emission reduction between 2013 and 2020, a Member State can transfer to another Member State the right to use its unused Clean Development Mechanism (“CDMs”) credits. The paper addresses three issues in relation to these CDM Warrants (“CDMW”). First, how should the Member State treat the CDMW in making decisions concerning emission reduction? The price of the property right is an important signal for a Member State in deciding the level of domestic abatement compared to trading in CDMWs. In other words, a shadow price for CDMWs should be used in formulating the emission strategy in order to determine whether or not a member State is a buyer or seller of CDMWs. Second, what mechanism should be used to facilitate the exchange of CDMWs? The preferred mechanism depends on the market size, over which there appears to be some ambiguity: market intermediaries such as Over-the-Counter trades and exchanges are preferred if market size is small; auctions if the market size is large. Third, who should realise the value of CDMWs – the State, existing polluters etc? The value of CDMWs should accrue to the State

EU Climate Change Policy 2013-2020: Thoughts on Property Rights and Market Choices. ESRI WP292, April 2009

Under 2013 to 2020 European Union proposals for CO2 emission reduction, a Member State can transfer to another Member State ‘part’ of their allowed emission allocation in the non-Emission Trading Sector (“ETS”). The paper addresses three questions in relation to these Transfer Emission Units or TEUs. First, what mechanism should be used to facilitate the exchange of TEUs? The preferred mechanism is a uniform price auction, preferably EU-wide. Second, what ‘part’ of the non-ETS emission limit of a Member State should be classed as TEUs – 10%, 20% or no limit? The proportion of the non-ETS emission limit that should be traded should be maximised. Third, who should realise the value of TEUs – the State, existing polluters? The value of TEUs should accrue to the State

Long distance biotic dispersal of tropical seagrass seeds by marine mega-herbivores

Terrestrial plants use an array of animals as vectors for dispersal, however little is known of biotic dispersal of marine angiosperms such as seagrasses. Our study in the Great Barrier Reef confirms for the first time that dugongs (Dugong dugon) and green sea turtles (Chelonia mydas) assist seagrass dispersal. We demonstrate that these marine mega-herbivores consume and pass in faecal matter viable seeds for at least three seagrass species (Zostera muelleri, Halodule uninervis and Halophila decipiens). One to two seagrass seeds per g DW of faecal matter were found during the peak of the seagrass reproductive season (September to December), with viability on excretion of 9.13% ± 4.61% (SE). Using population estimates for these mega-herbivores, and data on digestion time (hrs), average daily movement (km h) and numbers of viable seagrass seeds excreted (per g DW), we calculated potential seagrass seed dispersal distances. Dugongs and green sea turtle populations within this region can disperse >500,000 viable seagrass seeds daily, with a maximum dispersal distance of approximately 650 km. Biotic dispersal of tropical seagrass seeds by dugongs and green sea turtles provides a large-scale mechanism that enhances connectivity among seagrass meadows, and aids in resilience and recovery of these coastal habitats

Effect of atomic transfer on the decay of a Bose-Einstein condensate

We present a model describing the decay of a Bose-Einstein condensate, which assumes the system to remain in thermal equilibrium during the decay. We show that under this assumption transfer of atoms occurs from the condensate to the thermal cloud enhancing the condensate decay rate