The Role of Body-Related Afferent Signals in Human Sense of Agency

At present, most of the neurocognitive models of human sense of agency (ie, “this action is due to my own will”) have been traditionally rooted in a variety of internal efferent signals arising within the motor system. However, recent neuroscientific evidence has suggested that also the body-related afferent signals that subserve body ownership (ie, “this body is mine”) might have a key role in this process. Accordingly, in the present review paper, we briefly examined the literature investigating how and to what extent body ownership contributes to building up human motor consciousness. Evidence suggests that, if required by the context, body ownership per se can act on agency attribution (ie, independently from efferent signals). Hence, a unitary and coherent subjective experience of willed actions (ie, “this willed action is being realized by my own body”) requires both awareness of being an agent and of owning the body

The bilocated mind: new perspectives on self-localization and self-identification

Does the human mind allow for self-locating at more than one place at a time? Evidence from neurology, cognitive neuroscience, and experimental psychology suggests that mental bilocation is a complex, but genuine experience, occurring more frequently than commonly thought. In this article, we distinguish between different components of bilocated self-representation: self-localization in two different places at the same time, self-identification with another body, reduplication of first-person perspective. We argue that different forms of mental bilocation may result from the combination of these components. To illustrate this, we discuss evidence of mental bilocation in pathological conditions such as heautoscopy, during immersion in virtual environments, and in everyday life, during social interaction. Finally, we consider the conditions for mental bilocation and speculate on the possible role of mental bilocation in the context of social interaction, suggesting that self-localization at two places at the same time may prove advantageous for the construction of a shared space

Effects of arm crossing on spatial perspective-taking.

Human social interactions often require people to take a different perspective than their own. Although much research has been done on egocentric spatial representation in a solo context, little is known about how space is mapped in relation to other bodies. Here we used a spatial perspective-taking paradigm to investigate whether observing a person holding his arms crossed over the body midline has an impact on the encoding of left/right and front/back spatial relations from that person's perspective. In three experiments, we compared performance in a task in which spatial judgments were made from the perspective of the participant or from that of a co-experimenter. Depending on the experimental condition, the participant's and the co-experimenter's arms were either crossed or not crossed over the midline. Our results showed that crossing the arms had a specific effect on spatial judgments based on a first-person perspective. More specifically, the responses corresponding to the dominant hand side were slower in the crossed than in the uncrossed arms condition. Crucially, a similar effect was also found when the participants adopted the perspective of a person holding his arms crossed, but not when the other person's arms were held in an unusual but uncrossed posture. Taken together these findings indicate that egocentric space and altercentric space are similarly coded in neurocognitive maps structured with respect to specific body segments

Altercentric Intrusions from Multiple Perspectives: Beyond Dyads

<div><p>Recent findings suggest that in dyadic contexts observers rapidly and involuntarily process the visual perspective of others and cannot easily resist interference from their viewpoint. To investigate whether spontaneous perspective taking extends beyond dyads, we employed a novel visual perspective task that required participants to select between multiple competing perspectives. Participants were asked to judge their own perspective or the visual perspective of one or two avatars who either looked at the same objects or looked at different objects. Results indicate that when a single avatar was present in the room, participants processed the irrelevant perspective even when it interfered with participants’ explicit judgments about the relevant perspective. A similar interference effect was observed when two avatars looked at the same discs, but not when they looked at different discs. Indeed, when the two avatars looked at different discs, the interference from the irrelevant perspective was significantly reduced. This is the first evidence that the number and orientation of agents modulate spontaneous perspective taking in non-dyadic contexts: observers may efficiently compute another’s perspective, but in presence of more individuals holding discrepant perspectives, they may not spontaneously track multiple viewpoints. These findings are discussed in relation to the hypothesis that perspective calculation occurs in an effortless and automatic manner.</p></div

Schematic representation of the set-up and stimuli of Experiment 1.

<p>Left and right panels represent uncrossed and crossed arm posture conditions, respectively. Please note that the objects shown and their displacement are illustrative and do not reflect those actually used.</p

Graphical representation of the interaction <i>number</i> (one avatar, two avatars) by <i>orientation</i> (centered, off-centered) on Inconsistency Ratios.

<p>Error bars represent standard errors of the means.</p