When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently

Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence in one’s own reasoning. Finally we will explore how agents who employ distinct yet equally rational methods of reasoning should respond to interactions with the products of each others’ reasoning. We find that the epistemology of multiple reasoning methods has been misunderstood by a number of authors writing on epistemic permissiveness and peer disagreement

In Defense of Right Reason

Starting from the premise that akrasia is irrational, I argue that it is always a rational mistake to have false beliefs about the requirements of rationality. Using that conclusion, I defend logical omniscience requirements, the claim that one can never have all-things-considered misleading evidence about what's rational, and the Right Reasons position concerning peer disagreement

Deference Done Right

There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential (or logical) probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds of epistemic experts mentioned above. Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of the options face insuperable difficulties. The third, on the other hand, fares well|at least when it is applied in a particular way

Plausible Permissivism

Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. We argue that each of these motivations either misunderstands the commitments of permissivism or is question-begging. Better understanding permissivism makes it a much more plausible position

Normative Modeling

By now we are familiar with scientific models of descriptive domains. But might we also model clusters of normative truths? In this piece I first identify elements central to all modeling efforts: modeling frameworks, interpretations, and domains of applicability. Then I consider some advantages and disadvantages of normative modeling

Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths

According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support grounds propositional justification. The principle is mistaken. There are permissible steps you may take that others may not even if you have the very same evidence. There are permissible steps that you cannot take that others can even if your beliefs receive the same type of evidential support. Because we have to assume almost nothing about the nature of evidential support to establish these results, we should reject evidentialism

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism

This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent’s perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements will correspond to the demands generated by normative reasons. While this proposal is prima facie plausible, it cannot ultimately unify reasons and rationality. There is no epistemic constraint that can do what reasons perspectivists would need it to do. Some constraints are too strict. The rest are too slack. This points to a general problem with the reasons-first program. Once we recognize that the agent’s epistemic position helps determine what she should do, we have to reject the idea that the features of the agent’s situation can help determine what we should do. Either rationality crowds out reasons and their demands or the reasons will make unreasonable demands

Central nervous system demyelination associated with etanercept in a 51 years old woman

There are few case reports documenting a new onset of demyelinating processes in patients receiving anti-tumour necrosis factor alpha therapy (anti-TNF alpha) for chronic inflammatory arthropathies. Whether anti-TNF alpha therapy induces new onset demyelination or just exacerbates pre-existing latent multiple sclerosis is not fully understood. We are reporting a 51-year-old woman without a prior history of multiple sclerosis, who developed demyelinating brain lesions three months after starting Etanercept. Her symptoms partially resolved on cessation of the drug. Our case was unusual compared to some previous case reports, as the patient's age at presentation was beyond that for idiopathic multiple sclerosis. This may strengthen the hypothesis of a causal relationship between new onset demyelination and Etanercept; however, exacerbation of pre-existing demyelinating process by Etanercept in this patient still cannot be totally excluded. We recommend doing magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain before starting patients on anti-TNF alpha therapy to exclude latent demyelination. In addition, new onset demyelination following anti-TNF alpha therapy should be reported and studied thoroughly as this may yield a significant advancement in our understanding of the pathogenesis of multiple sclerosis. Long-term follow-up of these cases is also important to determine the long-term prognosis and the rate of relapse of demyelinating process in this group of patients