Revisiting Public Debt and Inflation: Fiscal Implications of an Independent Central Banker

The mainstream literature on monetary policy games under output persistence posits that: a) monetary regimes do not affect real variables in the steady state; b) optimal institutional design should entirely remove the inflation bias. We show that neither result necessarily holds if output persistence originates from debt dynamics and distortionary taxation. First, monetary delegation induces a strategic use of debt policy affecting steady-state distortions. Second, the reduction of such distortions may require monetary institutions that tolerate an inflation rate above the socially optimal level.

Income Taxation when Markets are Incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on, second order, relative spot prices effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as for example in Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos- Magill-Quinzii-Drèze (1990), or in Citanna-Polemarchakis-Tirelli (2001).Incomplete Markets; Efficiency; Tax Reforms; Personal and Capital Income Taxes

Dynamic Seigniorage Models Revisited. Should Fiscal Flexibility and Conservative Central Bankers Go Together?

This paper presents a dynamic seigniorage model where excessive debt levels persist in steady state, causing a permanent inflation bias. Discretionary monetary responses to shocks are too interventionist because they do not take into account the role of debt policy, which spreads part of the adjustment onto future periods. Institutional design should contemplate the appointment of weight-conservative central bankers. The central bank preferences should be more conservative the more the government is willing to delay the adjustment of expenditures following a supply shock. The combination of fiscal intervention and a zero inflation rule describes how members of a monetary union might react to asymmetric shocks. The costs of this regime are negligible if the discount factor is small and seigniorage losses are limited.

Optimal Simple Monetary and Fiscal Rules under Limited Asset Market Participation

The combination of limited asset market participation and consumption habits generates indeterminacy for empirically plausible calibrations of a business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities. Equilibrium determinacy is restored by demand management policies based on simple fiscal rules. In this regard, fiscal control of nominal income growth is particularly effective. In addition the complementarity between the Taylor rule and the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth produces relatively large welfare gains, limiting both aggregate and intragroup volatilities

Institutions, policies and economic development. What are the causes of the shadow economy?

What are the causes of the shadow economy? We provide new answers to this old question. The sharp distinction between theoretical priors on the institutional determinants of the shadow economy and the technique used for its measurement is the first novel contribution of the paper. The second innovation is that, unlike previ- ous contributions, we document a specific role for institutional variables in shaping economic incentives to "go underground", irrespective of the stage of economic de- velopment. The third innovation is that - after controlling for institutional quality and for the level of development - public expenditures have a negative impact on the shadow economy.Institutional quality, shadow economy.

Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets ?

We reconsider the merits of fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union distinguishing between and inflation targeting regime and delegation to a weight conservative central bank. We argue that a contractualist approach a la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.EMU, Fiscal Leadership, ECB, Fiscal Co-ordination, Inflation Targets

Money Targeting, Heterogeneous Agents and Dynamic Instability

Christiano et al. (2005) have shown that a standard medium-sized DSGE model can successfully replicate VAR IRFs to a money supply shock. This important result vanishes under limited asset market partic- ipation. Further, even a moderate fraction of constrained consumers is su¢ cient to dampen the real interest rate reaction to inflation, thereby causeing instability. The introduction of a simple fiscal automatic sta- bilizer restores stability and improves the dynamic performance of the model.Rule of Thumb Consumers, DSGE, Determinacy, Limited Asset, Market Participation

A social welfare function characterizing competitive equilibria of incomplete financial markets

A classic characterization of competitive equilibria views them as feasible allocations maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. It has been applied to establish fundamental properties of the equilibrium notion, such as existence, determinacy, and computability. However, it fails for economies with missing financial markets. We give such a characterization for economies with missing financial markets, by an amended social welfare function. Its parameters capture both the relative importance of households’ welfare–the classic weights–as well as the disagreements among them as to the value of the missing markets. As a by-product, we identify the dimension of the set of interior equilibrium allocations.incomplete markets, social welfare function, manifold

Indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium with risk of default

We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann [3]). In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in between autarchy and (constrained) optimality, there exists an equilibrium attaining that value. Our method consists in restoring Welfare Theorems for a weak notion of (constrained) optimality. The latter, inspired by Malinvaud [15], corresponds to the absence of Pareto improving feasible redistributions over nite (though inde nite) horizons.imited commitment; solvency constraints; Malinvaud efficiency Welfare Theorems; indeterminacy; Welfare Theorems; indeterminacy; Welfare Theorems indeterminacy;financial fragility; market collapse