212 research outputs found

    Rent extraction with securities plus cash

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    Auctions employing steeper securities generate greater revenues when bidders have equal opportunity costs. However, when opportunity costs rise sufficiently quickly with valuations, security bids decrease in NPV and steeper securities reduce seller revenues. We show that when such adverse selection obtains, using combinations of securities with differing steepness can generate higher revenues than using securities of the same steepness. We determine the optimal combination of cash plus equity; identify a novel way of implementing the optimal mechanism via decreasing royalty rates; establish the robustness of the mechanism; and identify when auction designs combining cash with steeper-than-equity securities increase seller revenues

    Targeting target shareholders

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    We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers. Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in firms they value more highly, and a successful offer must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the consequences for an acquiring firm's takeover offer -- its size and cash/equity structure -- and implications for takeover premia and firm returns. Cash offers are best for the acquirer when the acquirer's own valuation exceeds the median target shareholder's. Equity offers are best given the reverse. The acquirer's share price always rises following cash acquisitions, but can fall following equity offers. The combined target-acquirer return is always higher after cash acquisitions than equity acquisitions (which can be negative). We characterize how synergies and uncertainty about target shareholder valuations affect the optimal offer and probability a takeover succeeds

    Endogenous entry to security-bid auctions

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    We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation is costly and bidders must decide given their private valuations whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset's value when retained by the seller. DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterintuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions. We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues

    Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

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    We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates—which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations—increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction design, further raising revenues. When bidders differ ex-ante in entry costs, the seller favors the low cost entrant; whereas when bidders have different valuation distributions, the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low, but not if they are high. Higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less, and the strong bidder by more

    Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types

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    We analyze the design and performance of equity auctions when bidder's valuations and opportunity costs are private information, distributed according to an arbitrary joint density that can differ across bidders. We identify, for any incentive compatible mechanism, an equivalent single-dimensional representation for uncertainty. We then characterize the revenue-maximizing and surplus-maximizing equity mechanisms, and compare revenues in optimal equity and cash auctions. Unlike in cash auctions, the adverse selection arising from bidders' two-dimensional types in equity auctions can lead to a global violation of the regularity condition, which represents a maximal mismatch between incentive compatibility and maximization of revenue or surplus. Such mismatch can lead a seller to exclude bidders and demand a bidder-specific stake from a non-excluded bidder, providing insights into when a firm should employ an auction and when it should just negotiate with a single bidder

    Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

    Get PDF
    We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates—which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations—increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auction design, further raising revenues. When bidders differ ex-ante in entry costs, the seller favors the low cost entrant; whereas when bidders have different valuation distributions, the seller favors the weaker bidder if entry costs are low, but not if they are high. Higher royalty rates cause the seller to favor the weaker bidder by less, and the strong bidder by more

    Progresses and Perspectives of Anti-PD-1/PD-L1 Antibody Therapy in Head and Neck Cancers

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    Head and neck cancer is the 6th most common malignancy worldwide and urgently requires novel therapy methods to change the situation of low 5-years survival rate and poor prognosis. Targeted therapy provides more precision, higher efficiency while lower adverse effects than traditional treatments like surgery, radiotherapy, and chemotherapy. Blockade of PD-1 pathway with antibodies against PD-1 or PD-L1 is such a typical targeted therapy which reconstitutes anti-tumor activity of T cell in treatments of cancers, especially those highly expressing PD-L1, including head and neck cancers. There are many clinical trials all over the world and FDA has approved anti-PD-1/PD-L1 drugs for head and neck cancers. However, with the time going, the dark side of this therapy has emerged, including some serious side effects and drug resistance. Novel materials like nanoparticles and combination therapy have been developed to improve the efficacy. At the same time, standards for evaluation of activity and safety are to be established for this new therapy. Here we provide a systematic review with comprehensive depth on the application of anti-PD1/PD-L1 antibodies in head and neck cancer treatment: mechanism, drugs, clinical studies, influencing factors, adverse effects and managements, and the potential future developments

    Generative AI for Controllable Protein Sequence Design: A Survey

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    The design of novel protein sequences with targeted functionalities underpins a central theme in protein engineering, impacting diverse fields such as drug discovery and enzymatic engineering. However, navigating this vast combinatorial search space remains a severe challenge due to time and financial constraints. This scenario is rapidly evolving as the transformative advancements in AI, particularly in the realm of generative models and optimization algorithms, have been propelling the protein design field towards an unprecedented revolution. In this survey, we systematically review recent advances in generative AI for controllable protein sequence design. To set the stage, we first outline the foundational tasks in protein sequence design in terms of the constraints involved and present key generative models and optimization algorithms. We then offer in-depth reviews of each design task and discuss the pertinent applications. Finally, we identify the unresolved challenges and highlight research opportunities that merit deeper exploration.Comment: 9 page

    Minimal Cut Sets-Based Reliability Evaluation of the More Electric Aircraft Power System

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    The More Electric Aircraft (MEA) stands for the direction of aviation development in the new era, and the reliability of power systems on the MEA has attracted widespread attention. Based on the characteristics of MEA power systems, an equivalent method of electrical topology structure is presented in this article, and evaluation method is proposed which shows the reliability of the overall system with the reliability of specific nodes. Firstly, electrical topology structure of a MEA power system is converted into a network node diagram according to the proposed equivalent method. Then, the minimal path sets of specific nodes are obtained by the adjacent matrix algorithm, and the low-order minimal cut sets of disjointed are obtained. After that, the actual failure rate of components is converted to node failure rate, and the reliability of the overall system is evaluated by operational reliability indexes of specific nodes. Finally, taking the MEA A380 as an example, this paper compares and analyzes the reliability of AC loads, DC loads, and key loads to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed evaluation method. This evaluation system can predict the weak points existing in the MEA power system, as well as providing theoretical support for maintenance schedule
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