33 research outputs found
Visual arguments in film
Nuestro objetivo es señalar algunas diferencias entre los argumentos verbales y visuales, y promover la perspectiva retórica de la argumentación, yendo más allá de la relevancia de la lógica y de la pragmática. En nuestra opinión, si ha de ser racional y aceptable como argumentación (visual), un film debe dirigirse a espectadores que tienen creencias informadas sobre el tema visto en la pantalla y sobre las limitaciones y las convenciones del medio. En nuestras reflexiones, aplicamos el análisis retórico al cine como un acto simbólico, humano y comunicativo que a veces puede entenderse como un argumento trazado visualmente. Como mezcla de estímulos visuales, auditivos y verbales, el film exige una interpretación y una (re)construcción activas y complejas. Nuestra sugerencia es concentrarse en cinco elementos diferentes, pero relacionados entre sí. La reconstrucción y la evaluación del argumento visual se basarán en esos elementos, y todo el proceso constituirá una argumentación visual.Our aim is to point out some differences between verbal and visual
arguments, promoting the rhetorical perspective of argumentation beyond the relevance
of logic and pragmatics. In our view, if it is to be rational and successful,
film as (visual) argumentation must be addressed to spectators who hold informed
beliefs about the theme watched on the screen and the medium’s constraints and
conventions. In our reflections to follow, we apply rhetorical analysis to film as a
symbolic, human, and communicative act that may sometimes be understood as a
visually laid out argument. As a mixture of visual, auditory, and verbal stimuli, film
demands active and complex interpretation and (re)construction. Our suggestion is
to focus on five different but interrelated elements. The reconstruction and evaluation
of the visual argument will be based on those elements, and the whole process
will be one of visual argumentation
Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change
Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., “If cannabis is ever legalized, then eventually cocaine will be legalized, too”). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. Here, we present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences about the speaker’s (or writer’s) attitudes. Study 1 confirmed the common intuition that a SSA is perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), whereas Study 2 showed that the subjective strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). Because arguments are rarely made out of context, in Studies 3 and 4 we examined how one important contextual factor, the speaker’s known beliefs, influences the perceived coherence, strength, and persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading), in Study 3 we showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker’s beliefs and the implied meaning of the argument. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore, SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and conversationally relevant when the speaker’s attitudes match this inference
Making the Black Box of Collaborative Learning Transparent: Combining Process-Oriented and Cognitive Load Approaches
Standing Standpoints and Argumentative Associates: What is at Stake in a Public Political Argument?
Exploiting the room for strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse: Dealing with audience demand in the European Parliament
Outrageous, inescapable? Debating historical analogies in the coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Ignorance
Ignorance is an inherently broad and comprehensive notion, which, ironically, can refer to both the worst enemy of science and knowledge-related efforts and, in its Socratic form, their best ally. Indeed, by understanding the concept of ignorance, one can discuss a variety of topics, such as error, falsity, and prejudice but also surprise, wonder, and creativity. Unsurprisingly, so, the current research about ignorance is varied and interconnected. Thus, this chapter will be divided into two main sections: the first will be dedicated to a brief presentation of the different research areas that shape current ignorance studies; in the second section, a few questions will be asked: What can we do about our ignorance? How can ignorance be exploited and become useful? How can ignorance define the limits of our possibilities? Even if the answers presented in this chapter will not provide an exhaustive picture of how ignorance interacts with human chances, they will hopefully offer suggestions for further steps in its analysis and investigation