Osvrt na knjigu o tradicijskoj kulturi zadarskih Arbanasa

Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice, litigants contended that the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, the Wall Street Journal alleged that in 2014, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in 100% of its administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of the cases it brought in federal court. While these statistics have recently come under fire, it is no surprise that potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions who believed the statistics soon challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s new choice. In this Article, we explain why the SEC ALJs’ appointment and removal processes violate the United States Constitution. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States. As such, they must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department. Instead, they are appointed by the head SEC ALJ. Additionally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,(1) the Supreme Court held that dual for cause removal provisions violate separation of powers because such clauses prevent the President from faithfully executing the law. The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections. Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in Free Enterprise—that multiple levels of tenure protection violate separation of powers—to ALJs. However, if the Court meant what it said and if the case is to have any relevance beyond the agency involved in that case, then the multiple for-cause removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically, and all ALJs generally, will need to be reconsidered

The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission’s Administrative Law Judges

Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice, the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, in 2014, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in 100% of its administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of the cases it brought in federal court. With these statistics, it is no surprise that potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions soon challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s new choice. In this Article, we explain why the SEC ALJs’ appointment and removal processes violate the United States Constitution. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States. As such, they must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department. Instead, they are appointed by the head SEC ALJ. Additionally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Supreme Court held that dual for-cause removal provisions violate separation of powers because such clauses prevent the President from faithfully executing the law. The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections. Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in Free Enterprise— that multiple levels of tenure protection violate separation of powers—to ALJs. However, if the Court meant what it said and if the case is to have any relevance beyond the agency involved in that case, then the multiple for-cause removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically, and all ALJs generally, will need to be reconsidered

Timber! The SEC Falls Hard as the Georgia District Court in \u3ci\u3eTimbervest\u3c/i\u3e Finds the Appointment of the SEC ALJs Likely Unconstitutional

The higher you go, the harder you fall. This simple, yet powerful, adage could not be more apt regarding the recent rise and fall in power of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The rise began in 2010 when Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), giving the SEC new power over its administrative proceedings. Using this new power, the SEC brought more insider-trading and highly contested cases before specially hired administrative law judges (ALJs), who conduct these administrative proceedings. This home-court advantage corresponded with the SEC\u27s enforcement division enjoying an 86%, success rate in administrative proceedings over the past five years, compared to only a 70% success rate in federal courts. With this increased success, the SEC has faced strong opposition from various investment advisory groups. Specifically, these groups have raised multiple district court challenges to the SEC\u27s hearing process, including one particularly innovative challenge in Timbervest v. SEC. In this 2015 case, the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the SEC\u27s appointment process for its ALJs is unconstitutional. Judge May of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed and found that the SEC\u27s appointment of ALJs likely violates Article II of the United States Constitution, because ALJs are inferior officers, not mere employees. As inferior officers, ALJs must be appointed by the President, the courts of law, or the heads of departments. The SEC ALJs are not appointed by any of these parties. Therefore, as one of the first cases with which a federal district court judge has agreed regarding constitutional challenges to the SEC ALJ appointment, Timbervest creates significant ramifications for the SEC and, potentially, all other federal agencies that use ALJs

Administrative Law

This Article surveys cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Court of Appeals of Georgia from June 1, 2022 through May 31, 2023, in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. Review of decisions by administrative agencies will be the first topic discussed, followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, followed by cases discussing procedural requirements, with scope of authority to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing statutory constructio

Administrative Law

This Article surveys cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2021 through May 31, 2022, in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. Review of decisions by administrative agencies will be the first topic discussed, followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, followed by cases discussing procedural requirements, with scope of authority to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing statutory construction

The Shadow of Free Enterprise: The Unconstitutionality of the Securities & Exchange Commission\u27s Administrative Law Judges

Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an Article III judge. With this new choice, litigants contended that the SEC realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, the Wall Street Journal alleged that in 2014, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in 100% of its administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of the cases it brought in federal court. While these statistics have recently come under fire, it is no surprise that potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions who believed the statistics soon challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s new choice. In this Article, we explain why the SEC ALJs’ appointment and removal processes violate the United States Constitution. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States. As such, they must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or the head of a department. Instead, they are appointed by the head SEC ALJ. Additionally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,(1) the Supreme Court held that dual for cause removal provisions violate separation of powers because such clauses prevent the President from faithfully executing the law. The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections. Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in Free Enterprise—that multiple levels of tenure protection violate separation of powers—to ALJs. However, if the Court meant what it said and if the case is to have any relevance beyond the agency involved in that case, then the multiple for-cause removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically, and all ALJs generally, will need to be reconsidered

Administrative Law

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2019, through May 31, 2020, in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. Exhaustion of remedies will be the first topic discussed, followed by a review of decisions by administrative agencies, followed by cases discusses administrative scope of authority, with statutory construction to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing the standard of review of decisions by administrative agencies

Mindful attention reduces linguistic intergroup bias

A brief mindfulness intervention diminished bias in favor of one’s in-group and against one’s out-group. In the linguistic intergroup bias (LIB), individuals expect in-group members to behave positively and out-group members to behave negatively. Consequently, individuals choose abstract language beset with character inferences to describe these expected behaviors, and in contrast, choose concrete, objective language to describe unexpected behaviors. Eighty-four participants received either mindful attention instructions (observe their thoughts as fleeting mental states) or immersion instructions (become absorbed in the vivid details of thoughts). After instruction, participants viewed visual depictions of an imagined in-group or out-group member’s positive or negative behavior, selecting the best linguistic description from a set of four descriptions that varied in abstractness. Immersion groups demonstrated a robust LIB. Mindful attention groups, however, exhibited a markedly tempered LIB, suggesting that even a brief mindfulness related instruction can implicitly reduce the propensity to perpetuate stereotypical thinking through language. These results contribute to understanding the mechanisms that facilitate unprejudiced thinking

Administrative Law

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2020, through May 31, 2021, in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case. Review of decisions by administrative agencies will be the first topic discussed, followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, followed by cases discussing procedural requirements, with scope of authority to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing statutory constructio