Supervision of local government in Zimbabwe: The travails of mayors

The discourse on decentralisation theoretically supports central government supervision of local government. The exercise of such powers by the central government of Zimbabwe is mired in controversy. Mayors are often suspended and/or dismissed to safeguard so-called “public interests”. In particular, those who are from the opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change, have been greatly affected in this regard. The supervisory interventions of the Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front led national (central) government have raised questions about the very existence of local democracy and the parameters within which supervision should be implemented. The inadequacy of the laws regulating central supervision over local government and, in some cases, the blatant disregard of such laws by the supervising authority have left mayors vulnerable to arbitrary suspensions and/or dismissal. Such interventions have been motivated mainly by sinister political objectives rather than a genuine desire to improve local governance. A case study methodology focusing on the supervision of mayors in Zimbabwe since independence has been adopted

Ministerial directives to local government in Zimbabwe: top-down governance in a decentralized constitution

Urban and rural local authorities constitute the lowest tier of Zimbabwe's multilevel system of government. These local governments have a constitutional "right to govern" that must be exercised within the constitutional, legislative and policy framework. Under the old constitutional order, the national government could supervise urban local authorities, for example by issuing policy directives to ensure that these authorities governed in a manner that enabled them to deliver on national and local goals. This article examines this supervisory instrument, the powers it gives the national government, its use in practice and its relevance under the new constitutional order. The main argument is that supervisory instruments, such as the power to issue policy directives to local governments, are necessary in any multilevel system of government. However, such supervisory powers must be balanced with the need for local autonomy, to allow local governments to deliver on their service delivery obligations and development mandate.IS

Decentralization in Africa and the resilience of traditional authorities: Evaluating Zimbabwe’s track record

Zimbabwe has undergone various phases of institutional reform during colonial and post-colonial times either co-opting, distorting or denying the presence of traditional authorities, but somehow none of these institutional engineering episodes managed to uproot them. What in fact happened is successive waves of political institutions designed and put in place during these reforms withered away. Zimbabwe’s traditional authorities are still there and they continue to play a big role in the daily lives of rural populations.This paper looks at one of the most important endogenous factors influencing the workings of decentralization in Zimbabwe. Successive waves of formal institutional change that took place during Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial history have been unable able to uproot the influence of traditional leaders. Due to their home-grown legitimacy, various traditional authorities continue to play an ever-present role in the lives of people in rural areas. But, as it is the case throughout most of Africa, the powers of traditional leaders have mostly been uncodified under modern law and these power relations tend to be rather informal and culturally inaccessible to most outsiders. Consequently, the scholarly literature has not been able to systematically acknowledge their pervasive influence. The article concludes with a reflection on how the influence of traditional authorities can be translated into the democratic and progressive empowerment of rural populations in the developing world

Multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe after the adoption of the 2013 constitution

Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution in 2013 which, among other objectives, sought to give greater legitimacy to multiparty democracy. This Constitution strengthens the role of an independent electoral commission, entrenches an array of political rights and freedoms, and requires multilevel government elections. The harmonized elections of 2013 and 2018, which were held under its regime, did not seem to have changed the previous patterns of disputed electoral processes and outcome. Both the electoral process and outcomes for these elections were disputed and subjected to court challenges. The main opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), continue to cry foul that elections are stolen in favour of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political party. On the other hand, ZANU-PF argues that it wins elections fairly and squarely as it has always done in the past because it is the most popular political party. This chapter addresses the question of whether the new Constitution has been able to end a culture of disputed elections and, therefore promote effective multiparty democracy. If not, what are the major obstacles and areas of contention? It will do so by examining the harmonized elections that have so far been held under its regime—the 2013 and 2018 harmonized elections