Seroprevalence of 34 Human Papillomavirus Types in the German General Population

The natural history of infections with many human papillomavirus (HPV) types is poorly understood. Here, we describe for the first time the age- and sex-dependent antibody prevalence for 29 cutaneous and five mucosal HPV types from 15 species within five phylogenetic genera (alpha, beta, gamma, mu, nu) in a general population. Sera from 1,797 German adults and children (758 males and 1,039 females) between 1 and 82 years (median 37 years) were analysed for antibodies to the major capsid protein L1 by Luminex-based multiplex serology. The first substantial HPV antibody reactions observed already in children and young adults are those to cutaneous types of the genera nu (HPV 41) and mu (HPV 1, 63). The antibody prevalence to mucosal high-risk types, most prominently HPV 16, was elevated after puberty in women but not in men and peaked between 25 and 34 years. Antibodies to beta and gamma papillomaviruses (PV) were rare in children and increased homogeneously with age, with prevalence peaks at 40 and 60 years in women and 50 and 70 years in men. Antibodies to cutaneous alpha PV showed a heterogeneous age distribution. In summary, these data suggest three major seroprevalence patterns for HPV of phylogenetically distinct genera: antibodies to mu and nu skin PV appear early in life, those to mucosal alpha PV in women after puberty, and antibodies to beta as well as to gamma skin PV accumulate later in life

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The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons

Open Access: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License.In this paper, we present a first survey of the literature regarding whether the strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, leads to different experimental results than does the more standard direct-response method, in which the responder learns the action of the first mover and then chooses a response. Of the twenty-nine existing comparisons, sixteen find no difference, while four do find differences, and nine comparisons find mixed evidence. We also find some indications about the underlying determinants of when the two methods lead to different responses. For example, it appears that levels of punishment are substantially lower with the strategy method. In addition, it also appears that difference across these elicitation methods are more likely when people make fewer contingent choices. Finally, in no case do we find that a treatment effect found with the strategy method is not observed with the direct-response methodFinancial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, the Barcelona GSE Research Support Program and Consolider-Ingenio is gratefully acknowledged.Peer reviewe

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau. An Experiment on Voting and Redistribution." Experimental Economics 15

Abstract We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau

given to the source. Explaining Home Bias in Consumption: The Role of Intermediate Input Trade

participants at Purdue University for helpful comments; Cathy Buffington and Arnold Rezneck at the Center for Economic Analysis for data assistance; and Purdue CIBER for financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research, th