KK-anonymous Signaling Scheme

We incorporate signaling scheme into Ad Auction setting, to achieve better welfare and revenue while protect users' privacy. We propose a new \emph{$K$-anonymous signaling scheme setting}, prove the hardness of the corresponding welfare/revenue maximization problem, and finally propose the algorithms to approximate the optimal revenue or welfare

Characterizing the Dynamic Response of a Chassis Frame in a Heavy-Duty Dump Vehicle based on an Improved Stochastic System Identification

This paper presents an online method for the assessment of the dynamic performance of the chassis frame in a heavy-duty dump truck based on a novel stochastic subspace identification (SSI) method. It introduces the use of an average correlation signal as the input data to conventional SSI methods in order to reduce the noisy and nonstationary contents in the vibration signals from the frame, allowing accurate modal properties to be attained for realistically assessing the dynamic behaviour of the frame when the vehicle travels on both bumped and unpaved roads under different operating conditions. The modal results show that the modal properties obtained online are significantly different from the offline ones in that the identifiable modes are less because of the integration of different vehicle systems onto the frame. Moreover, the modal shapes between 7Hz and 40Hz clearly indicate the weak section of the structure where earlier fatigues and unsafe operations may occur due to the high relative changes in the modal shapes. In addition, the loaded operations show more modes which cause high deformation on the weak section. These results have verified the performance of the proposed SSI method and provide reliable references for optimizing the construction of the frame

A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory, and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013