Means of token-sent under 3 conditions comparison of Round 3–5 with Rounds 1 and 2.

<p>Means of token-sent under 3 conditions comparison of Round 3–5 with Rounds 1 and 2.</p

Norm, gender, and bribe-giving: Insights from a behavioral game

<div><p>Previous research has suggested that bribery is more normative in some countries than in others. To understand the underlying process, this paper examines the effects of social norm and gender on bribe-giving behavior. We argue that social norms provide information for strategic planning and impression management, and thus would impact participants’ bribe amount. Besides, males are more agentic and focus more on impression management than females. We predicted that males would defy the norm in order to win when the amount of their bribe was kept private, but would conform to the norm when it was made public. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two studies using a competitive game. In each game, we asked three participants to compete in five rounds of creative tasks, and the winner was determined by a referee’s subjective judgment of the participants’ performance on the tasks. Participants were allowed to give bribes to the referee. Bribe-giving norms were manipulated in two domains: norm level (high vs. low) and norm context (private vs. public), in order to investigate the influence of informational and affiliational needs. Studies 1 and 2 consistently showed that individuals conformed to the norm level of bribe-giving while maintaining a relative advantage for economic benefit. Study 2 found that males gave larger bribes in the private context than in the public, whereas females gave smaller bribes in both contexts. We used a latent growth curve model (LGCM) to depict the development of bribe-giving behaviors during five rounds of competition. The results showed that gender, creative performance, and norm level all influence the trajectory of bribe-giving behavior.</p></div

Token-sent in 5 rounds under 4 conditions for male participants.

<p>Token-sent in 5 rounds under 4 conditions for male participants.</p

Latent growth curve model with significant standardized path coefficients.

<p>Latent growth curve model with significant standardized path coefficients.</p

Fragility-Confinement Effects: Apparent Universality as a Function of Scaled Thickness in Films of Freely Deposited, Linear Polymer and Its Absence in Densely Grafted Brushes

Ellipsometry measurements as a function of cooling rate are used to study nanoscale confinement effects on dynamic fragility (kinetic fragility), <i>m</i>, in supported films of freely deposited, linear polymer. Polymers include neat polystyrene (PS), neat polycarbonate (PC), and PS + 2 wt % 1,10-bis­(1-pyrene)­decane (BPD) as small-molecule diluent; in each case, the substrate/polymer interface lacks significant attractive interactions. In terms of both the length scale at which confinement effects become evident and the percentage reduction in <i>m</i> from its bulk value, the magnitude of the <i>m</i>-confinement effect increases with increasing bulk polymer system <i>m</i>. Additionally, for films of linear polymer lacking significant attractive interactions with the substrate surface, <i>m</i>-confinement effects are evident at larger onset thicknesses than those commonly reported in the literature for the glass transition temperature (<i>T</i>_g)-confinement effect. Evans et al. [Macromolecules 2013, 46, 6091] found that the <i>T</i>_g-confinement effect in related films exhibits a universal nature as a function of scaled thickness. Fragility-confinement effects of films of freely deposited, linear polymer chains exhibit a similar universal nature as a function of scaled thickness using shift factors consistent with those used by Evans et al. However, when PS is confined in a dense brush with one end of each chain covalently attached to the substrate surface, both <i>m</i> and <i>T</i>_g are independent of brush thickness. The strong correlation of fragility-confinement and <i>T</i>_g-confinement effects has important implications for understanding the fundamental natures of both the <i>T</i>_g-confinement effect and the glass transition itself

Mean difference of bribe-giving under three conditions.

<p>Mean difference of bribe-giving under three conditions.</p

Bribe-giving utility optimization curve: RI ratio = (150—bribe-giving) / bribe-giving, represents the input-output efficiency of absolute net profit built from bribe.

<p>Point A: Low Norm Level, bribe-giving = 15 profit-ratio = 9; Point B: High Norm Level, bribe-giving = 85 profit-ratio = 0.76.</p

Mean difference in bribe-giving under four conditions.

<p>Mean difference in bribe-giving under four conditions.</p

Token-sent in 5 rounds under 4 conditions for female participants.

<p>Token-sent in 5 rounds under 4 conditions for female participants.</p