Women Prefer Larger Governments: Female Labor Supply and Public Spending

The increase in income per capita is accompanied, in virtually all countries, by two changes in the structure of the economy: an increase in the share of government spending in GDP and an increase in female labor force participation. This paper suggests that the changes in female labor force participation and government size are not just coincident in time, they are causally related. We develop a growth model with endogenous fertility, labor force participation and government size to illustrate this causal link. When government consumption and/or subsidies decrease the cost of performing household chores - including, but not limited to child rearing and child care - an increase in the female market wage leads to an increase in labor force participation by women and a demand for higher government spending. As women make the decision to work outside the home, they increase their demand for services typically provided by the government, such as education and health care, which, in turn, decrease the cost of home and family activities that are overwhelmingly performed by women. We show, for a wide cross-section of developed and developing countries, that higher female participation rates in the labor market are positively associated with larger governments. We investigate the causal link by instrumenting for female labor force participation with the prevalence of contraceptive methods and the relative price of household appliances. Female labor force participation is found to cause an increase in government size, with a 10 percent rise in the former leading to a 6.5 to 9 percent rise in the latter. This effect is stronger for government consumption than for government subsidies and is robust to the country sample, time period, and a set of controls in the spirit of Rodrik (1998).N/

Computing General Equilibrium Models with Occupational Choice and Financial Frictions

This paper establishes the existence of a stationary equilibrium and a procedure to compute solutions to a class of dynamic general equilibrium models with two important features. First, occupational choice is determined endogenously as a function of heterogeneous agent type, which is defined by an agent's managerial ability and capital bequest. Heterogeneous ability is exogenous and independent across generations. In contrast, bequests link generations and the distribution of bequests evolves endogenously. Second, there is a financial market for capital loans with a deadweight intermediation cost and a repayment incentive constraint. The incentive constraint induces a non-convexity. The paper proves that the competitive equilibrium can be characterized by the bequest distribution and factor prices, and uses the monotone mixing condition to ensure that the stationary bequest distribution that arises from the agent's optimal behavior across generations exists and is unique. The paper next constructs a direct, non-parametric approach to compute the stationary solution. The method reduces the domain of the policy function, thus reducing the computational complexity of the problem.Existence; Computation; Dynamic general equilibrium; Non-convexity

The Effect of Financial Repression & Enforcement on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two Financial frictions: intermediation costs and financial contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The model shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financial markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financial capital mobility.Financial frictions; Financial reform; Occupational choice; Development

Women Prefer Larger Governments: Female Labor Supply and Public Spending

The increase in income per capita is accompanied, in virtually all countries, by two changes in the structure of the economy: an increase in the share of government spending in GDP and an increase in female labor force participation. This paper suggests that the changes in female labor force participation and government size are not just coincident in time, they are causally related. We develop a growth model with endogenous fertility, labor force participation and government size to illustrate this causal link. When government consumption and/or subsidies decrease the cost of performing household chores - including, but not limited to child rearing and child care - an increase in the female market wage leads to an increase in labor force participation by women and a demand for higher government spending. As women make the decision to work outside the home, they increase their demand for services typically provided by the government, such as education and health care, which, in turn, decrease the cost of home and family activities that are overwhelmingly performed by women. We show, for a wide cross-section of developed and developing countries, that higher female participation rates in the labor market are positively associated with larger governments. We investigate the causal link by instrumenting for female labor force participation with the prevalence of contraceptive methods and the relative price of household appliances. Female labor force participation is found to cause an increase in government size, with a 10 percent rise in the former leading to a 6.5 to 9 percent rise in the latter. This e.ect is stronger for government consumption than for government subsidies and is robust to the country sample, time period, and a set of controls in the spirit of Rodrik (1998).Economic Development, Female Labor Supply, Government Size, Home Activities

ASSESSING THE "ENGINES OF LIBERATION": HOME APPLIANCES AND FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

The secular rise in female labor force participation, highlighted in the recent macroeconomics literature on growth and structural change, has been associated with the declining price and wider availability of home appliances. This paper uses a new and unique country dataset on the price of home appliances to test its impact on female labor supply. We assess the role of the price of appliances in raising participation by comparing it to the impact of fertility and other macroeconomic factors. A decrease in the relative price of appliances - the ratio of the price of appliances to the consumer price index - leads to a substantial and statistically significant increase in female labor force participation. The impact of the price of appliances is quantitatively of the same order of magnitude as that of fertility. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional controls, such as income per capita, government spending, and male and female unemployment rates. To assess causality, we test for exogeneity and use the lagged relative price of appliances and the food price index as instrumental variables, confirming that lower appliance prices lead to increased female participation.

The Output Cost of Gender Discrimination: A Model-Based Macroeconomic Estimate

Gender-based discrimination is a pervasive and costly phenomenon. To a greater or lesser extent, all economies present a gender wage gap, associated with lower female labor force participation rates and higher fertility. This paper presents a growth model where saving, fertility and labor market participation are endogenously determined, and there is wage discrimination. The model is calibrated to mimic the performance of the U.S. economy, including the gender wage gap and relative female labor force participation. We then compute the output cost of an increase in discrimination, to find that a 50 percent increase in the gender wage gap leads to a decrease in income per capita of a quarter of the original output. We then compile independent estimates of the female to male earnings ratio for a wide cross-section of countries to construct a new economy, in line with the benchmark U.S. economy, except for the degree of discrimination. We compare the level of output per capita predicted by this model economy with the actual output per capita for each country. Higher discrimination leads to lower output per capita for two reasons: a direct decrease in female labor market participation and an indirect effect through an increase in fertility. We find that for several countries a large fraction of the actual difference in output per capita between the U.S. and the different economies is due to gender inequality. For countries such as Ireland and Saudi Arabia, wage discrimination actually explainsall of the output difference with the U.S. Moreover, we find that the increase in fertility due to discrimination is responsible for almost half of the decrease in output per capita, and equivalent to the direct decrease in output due to lower female participation. Our basic model suggests the costs of gender discrimination are indeed quite substantial and should be a central concern in any macroeconomic policy aimed at increasing output per capita in the long-run. --Economic Development,Gender Inequality,Female Labor Force Participation,Fertility

Accounting for the Hidden Economy: Barriers to Legality and Legal Failures

This paper examines how much of the difference in the size of the informal sector and in per capita income across countries can be accounted by regulation costs (barriers to legality) and contractual imperfections in financial markets (legal failures). It constructs and solves numerically a general equilibrium model with credit constrained heterogeneous agents, occupational choices over formal and informal businesses, contractual imperfections and a government sector which imposes taxes and regulations on formal firms. The premium from formalization is better access to outside finance. differences in regulation costs and the degree of enforcement in financial contracts endogenously generate differences in the size of the informal sector and in total factor productivity (TFP). The numerical exercises suggest that: (i) regulation costs and not financial market imperfections account for the difference in the size of the informal sector between United States and Mediterranean Europe; (ii) this is not the case for countries with very weak enforcement systems, such as Peru, as both contractual imperfections and regulation costs account for the observed difference in the size of the informal sector. Regarding output per capita, regulation costs and the strength of enforcement explain roughly 60% of the difference in observed international incomes.

Institutions and Economic Development: How Strong is the Relation?

This paper investigates the relationship between institutions and economic development (output per worker). As in Hall and Jones (1999), we find that a 1% improvement in institutions (as we measure them) generates on average a 5% increase in output per worker. However, this relationship is not linear and the data have important heterogeneity. Countries with the same value of institutions have different levels of income per worker. We ask whether the "returns to institutions" are the same across countries conditional on the level of institutions. Using quantile regression methods, we show that for countries at the top of the conditional distribution of international incomes, the "returns to institutions" are lower (around 3.8%), than for countries at the bottom of this distribution (around 6.2%). We show that this result is robust for different model specifications and definitions of institutions. We also provide evidence that, conditional on the level of institutional development, the distribution of output per worker tends to become less disperse as countries improve their institutional framework. In other words, better institutions are fundamental to close the output per worker gap across countries. Finally, we provide the rationale behind the results through a modified version of a Neoclassical Growth Model with time varying wedges, representing policy distortions and institutions.