Together forever? Explaining exclusivity in party-firm relations

Parties and firms are the key actors of representative democracy and capitalism respectively and the dynamic of attachment between them is a central feature of any political economy. This is the first article to systematically analyse the exclusivity of party-firm relations. We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time. Does a firm have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more than one party? Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or does it switch between parties? Most important, how do patterns of exclusivity impact on a firm’s ability to lobby successfully? We propose a general theory, which explains patterns of party-firm relations by reference to the division of institutions and the type of party competition in a political system. A preliminary test of our theory with Polish survey data confirms our predictions, establishing a promising hypothesis for future research

Spatial Dynamics Of Vertical And Horizontal Intergovernmental Collaboration

Although researchers have made progress in understanding motivations behind local government collaboration, there is little research that explores the spatial dynamics of such interactions. Does the idea of collaboration travel horizontally, passed from neighbor to neighbor, or is vertical leadership from state, county, or regional actors more important in influencing local governments’ decisions to share resources and functions? What factors influence local governments’ choices to collaborate with their neighbors versus a regional entity, county, or state government? In this article, we investigate the importance of vertical and horizontal influences when local governments decide to collaborate around land use planning. Using data from a survey of Michigan local government officials, we take a spatial statistical approach to answering this question. We find widespread evidence of collaboration at multiple scales, and observe patterns of both horizontal and vertical influence. We also find that contextual factors help to explain these patterns of collaboration.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/112248/1/juaf12139.pd

The motivations for the adoption of management innovation by local governments and its performance effects

This article analyses the economic, political and institutional antecedents and performance effects of the adoption of shared Senior Management Teams (SMTs) – a management innovation (MI) that occurs when a team of senior managers oversees two or more public organizations. Findings from statistical analysis of 201 English local governments and interviews with organizational leaders reveal that shared SMTs are adopted to develop organisational capacity in resource‐challenged, politically risk‐averse governments, and in response to coercive and mimetic institutional pressures. Importantly, sharing SMTs may reduce rather than enhance efficiency and effectiveness due to redundancy costs and the political transaction costs associated with diverting resources away from a high‐performing partner to support their lower‐performing counterpart