Obama's Ethics Agenda: The Challenge of Coordinated Change

Obama's "ethics agenda" is the most ambitious ever set out by a new administration. It promises a tougher approach not only to the usual problems such as conflict of interest and the revolving door, but also to broader challenges such as political influence on career officials and lack of transparency in government. The goals of the agenda are a step forward insofar as they focus more on improving the democratic process than disciplining political miscreants. But the means relied on to carry out the goals are less impressive. They perpetuate a major deficiency of the current ethics regime—its disjointedness, which undermines the transparency and accountability necessary for a robust democracy. What is needed is a coordinated approach, led from the White House itself, that takes a more comprehensive view of ethics regulation throughout the government.Governmen

Representing Future Generations: Political Presentism and Democratic Trusteeship

Democracy is prone to what may be called presentism—a bias in the laws in favour of present over future generations. I identify the characteristics of democracies that lead to presentism, and examine the reasons that make it a serious problem. Then I consider why conventional theories are not adequate to deal with it, and develop a more satisfactory alternative approach, which I call democratic trusteeship. Present generations can represent future generations by acting as trustees of the democratic process. The general principle is that present generations should act to protect the democratic process itself over time. They should try to make sure that future citizens continue to have competent control over their collective decision making.Governmen

Constitutional Character: Virtues and Vices in Presidential Leadership

Presidents and presidential candidates should be assessed more than they usually are on the basis of what may be called constitutional character. This refers to the disposition to act, and motivate others to act, according to principles that constitute the democratic process. Its virtues and vices are distinct from personal or private morality. Constitutional character includes such qualities as sensitivity to basic rights, respect for due process in the broad sense, willingness to accept responsibility, tolerance of opposition, and most importantly a commitment to candor.Governmen

The Primary Purpose of Presidential Primaries

Dennis F. Thompson analyzes the capacity of presidential primaries to provide a test of the constitutional character of candidates. He argues that the primary process should be judged to be more or less democratic on the basis of the effective opportunities it gives voters to assess the democratic commitments of the candidates.Governmen

Responsibility for Failures of Government: The Problem of Many Hands

The problem of many hands—the difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different individuals contribute to decisions and policies—stands in the way of investigating and correcting the failures of government. The problem can be mitigated by giving greater attention to the design of processes of organizational responsibility. An independent investigation can identify both the individual actions and the structural defects that contributed to an organizational failure. Then, specific individuals can be designated as overseers, who are held responsible for monitoring the structure and making changes as necessary. Three cases—the official responses to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the financial crisis that began in 2007—illustrate how this prospective approach of designing responsibility could work in practice.Governmen

The Challenge of Conflict of Interest in Medicine

The expanding relationships between industry and medicine have produced great benefits. Industry support for medical research has led to important therapeutic breakthroughs. Such support has helped medical education at all levels. Academic research, in turn, has provided industry with many basic ideas that lead to the development of new drugs and medical devices. However, as these relationships have grown, the conflict between the financial goals of industry and the professional goals of medicine is creating significant risks for not only the profession but also the public. What should be the primary goals of medicine—high quality research, responsible patient care and excellent medical education—may be compromised by the undue pursuit of financial gain. That tension is what policies for regulating conflicts of interests should be designed to control.Governmen

Hume\u27s skepticism.

David Hume has traditionally been regarded as a skeptic, perhaps the most formidable in the history of Western philosophy. Since the publication of Norman Kemp Smith\u27s Philosophy of David Hume in 1941, however, there has been an increasing tendency to downplay the skeptical dimension of Hume\u27s philosophy, in some cases to the point of denying that Hume is a serious skeptic, or even a skeptic at all. Much of the motivation for a nonskeptical reading of Hume comes from recognition of his endorsement of empirical science and his own project of founding a science of man. Recent scholarship has, in my opinion correctly, recognized Hume as a constructive rather than a purely destructive thinker. Yet this recognition has, in my opinion incorrectly, gone hand in hand with a tendency to overlook or deny the skeptical side of Hume\u27s thought. In this work, I address the issue of Hume\u27s skepticism. I believe that though the issue of Hume\u27s skepticism is more complicated than is suggested by some of those who interpret him as a skeptic, nevertheless the traditional view is more true to Hume\u27s texts than is a nonskeptical interpretation. I argue, on the basis of a reading of the Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic with regard to much of our alleged knowledge. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that (i) Hume\u27s skeptical pronouncements are in general sincere, not ironic, (ii) Hume\u27s skepticism extends to a large part of our alleged knowledge, and (iii) Hume\u27s skepticism is a result of his substantive philosophical views. In saying that Hume is a serious theoretical skeptic I mean that though Hume doesn\u27t prescribe eschewal of beliefs that are not rationally justified, he thinks that much of our alleged knowledge essentially involves beliefs that cannot be rationally justified and that hence much of our alleged knowledge is not knowledge at all

Valuing Compromise for the Common Good

Pursuing the common good in a pluralist democracy is not possible without making compromises. Yet the spirit of compromise is in short supply in contemporary American politics. The permanent campaign has made compromise more difficult to achieve, as the uncompromising mindset suitable for campaigning has come to dominate the task of governing. To begin to make compromise more feasible and the common good more attainable, we need to appreciate the distinctive value of compromise and recognize the misconceptions that stand in its way. A common mistake is to assume that compromise requires finding the common ground on which all can agree. That undermines more realistic efforts to seek classic compromises, in which each party gains by sacrificing something valuable to the other, and together they serve the common good by improving upon the status quo. Institutional reforms are desirable, but they, too, cannot get off the ground without the support of leaders and citizens who learn how and when to adopt a compromising mindset

Designing Responsibility: The Problem of Many Hands in Complex Organizations

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