771 research outputs found
Aristotle on virtue: a response to Thomas Hurka
I defend Aristotle's account of the motivations of the virtuous agent from criticisms made by Thomas Hurka
Partiality and Weighing Harm to Non-Combatants
The author contests the claim made independently by F.M. Kamm and Thomas Hurka that combatants ought to assign greater weight to collateral harm done to their compatriot noncombatants then they assign to collateral harm done to enemy non-combatants. Two arguments by analogy offered in support of such partiality, one of which appeals to permissible self/other asymmetry in cases of harming the few to save the many, and the second of which appeals to parents\u27 justifiable partiality to their children, are found wanting. The author also rebuts Kamm\u27s argument that combatants should assign greater weight to collateral harm done to neutrals than to compatriot non-combatants. However, he contends that in some cases a neutral state\u27s right to sovereignty may entail that a combatant ought to choose the act that will collaterally kill a greater number of compatriot non-combatants over one that involves collaterally killing a lesser number of neutrals
Beyond the State: The Early Nietzsche\u27s Post-Political Rhetoric
A small subsection of the literature on Nietzscheâs political philosophy focuses on a key passage that appears in the sixth section of âSchopenhauer as Educator.â In this passage, Nietzsche claims that the individualâs life attains its highest value by living for the benefit of humanityâs rarest and most valuable specimens. Some philosophers, like John Rawls and Thomas Hurka, take this passage to be sufficient evidence of a larger commitment on Nietzscheâs part to aristocracy. Others oppose Rawlsâ and Hurkaâs interpretations, claiming that this key passage is evidence of a commitment to democracy. However, both sides are incorrect. This particular section of âSchopenhauer as Educatorâ is actually evidence of Nietzscheâs commitment to divorcing cultural institutions from the influence of states in toto. I explain why Nietzsche is committed neither to aristocracy nor to democracy, and how the passage from âSchopenhauer as Educatorâ commits Nietzsche to a post-political position
Review of Thomas Hurka's Drawing Morals - Essays in Ethical Theory, The Best Things in Life, and Underivative Duty - British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing
Patient-Relativity in Morality
It is common to distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are agent-relative from those that are agent-neutral. One can also distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are moment-relative from those that are moment-neutral. In this article, I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinctionsâthe distinction between moral rules, reasons, or values that are patient-relative and those that are patient-neutral. I then show how patient-relativity plays an important role in several moral theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-relativity and moment-relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parfitâs âappeal to full relativityâ argument
The teleological account of proportional surveillance
This article analyses proportionality as a potential element of a theory of
morally justified surveillance, and sets out a teleological account. It draws on
conceptions in criminal justice ethics and just war theory, defines teleological
proportionality in the context of surveillance, and sketches some of the central
values likely to go into the consideration. It then explores some of the ways in
which deontologists might want to modify the account and illustrates the
difficulties of doing so. Having set out the account, however, it considers whether
the proportionality condition is necessary to a theory of morally justified
surveillance. The article concludes that we need and should apply only a necessity
condition, but notes that proportionality considerations may retain some use in in
practice, as a form of coarseâgrained filter applied before assessing necessity when
deliberating the permissibility of potential forms of surveillance
Risk Taking and Force Protection
This paper addresses two questions about the morality of warfare: (1) how much risk must soldiers take to minimize unintended civilian casualties caused by their own actions (âcollateral damageâ), and (2) whether it is the same for the enemy\u27s civilians as for one\u27s own.The questions take on special importance in warfare where one side is able to attack the other side from a safe distance, but at the cost of civilian lives, while safeguarding civilians may require soldiers to take precautions that expose them to greater risk. In a well-known article, Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin argue that while soldiers must rank the protection of their own civilians above their own protection, they must rank their own protection above that of enemy civilians. Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer responded that the only morally relevant distinction is between combatants and non-combatants, not the identity of the non-combatants. The present paper concludes that Margalit and Walzer are correct. Although soldiers may take extra risks on behalf of their own civilians, the minimally acceptable risk for enemy civilians is the same as the minimally acceptable risk for their own.In response to the first question, the paper emphasizes two chief points. First is the equal worth of military and civilian lives, which implies a weak form of ârisk egalitarianismâ: even if morality often permits people to transfer risk from themselves to others, transferring large risks to others in order to spare oneself from smaller risks is morally wrong, because indirectly it treats oneself as more valuable than the other. Second, I explore the possibility that soldiers belong to a profession in which honor may require them to take risks for civilians. This is particularly true when the risks to civilians come from the soldiersâ own violence. The second question is whether soldiersâ special obligation to protect their own people (not other people) creates a higher minimum standard of care for their own people (and not other people). I answer no, because the special obligation is to protect their people from enemy violence, while the dilemma is whether to protect civilians from the soldiersâ own violence. The responsibility to protect the innocent from violence of oneâs own making is a universal, not a special, obligation. Thus, in both questions 1 and 2, the fact that soldiers themselves create the violence that endangers civilians plays a crucial role in the answers.The concluding sections address two crucial loose ends. First is the question of whether soldiers might in fact be more valuable than civilians (including their own civilians) because they are not only human beings, but also âmilitary assets.â The paper answers no, because this way of thinking involves illegitimate double counting of the soldierâs value, coupled with a refusal to double count the value of anyone else. Second is the related question of whether minimizing military casualties might turn out to be a military necessity because the civilian population is deeply casualty-averse, and the war effort requires their political support. Again the answer is no: otherwise, the less will to fight a country has, the less moral and legal obligation it has to fight well
Climate Change, Flood Risk and Property Value: Assessment of vulnerability and equity in the Boston Metro Area
The general consensus is that global climate change will result in increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Coastal urban communities are likely to suffer more flood damages as a result of this change, with potential social justice implications regarding how burdens are shared. Current decision-making approaches, mostly based on scientific knowledge and economic efficiency, do not take into account several ethical aspects associated with climate change, including equity concerns. In this paper, the author addresses a number of questions with justice implications. His findings show a differential exposure to hazards arid uneven capability to cope with them, which places higher risk on the most vulnerable sectors of the population. The religious community can contribute in raising awareness and helping to explore adaptive measures designed to reduce the economic and social impacts of extreme events in an equitable way
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