Naval Reconstitution, Surge, and Mobilization: Once and Future

In 1919, two things were clear about the entry of the United States into World War I: first, that the contribution of the U.S. to Allied victory had been crucial; second, that the performance of American industry had left a great deal to be desired. The United States had contributed money, food, ammunition, ships, and manpower. It had not, however, contributed aircraft, weapons, and tanks at the speed which the allied powers had expected. To remedy the problems of planning and coordination that had plagued weapons procurement by the services during World War I, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1920. From that time until the passage of the First War Powers Act on 18 December 1941, the legislative and executive branches experimented with what today are termed reconstitution and surge. They did so in an environment much like our own: government spending was very limited, popular support for a large military budget was even more limited, and the future of the economy was uncertain

Fighting on Our Own Ground: The War of Production, 1920-1942

As Alan Milward pointed out in his fascinating study of World War II production, the American economy not only produced the material and food needed to wage war and sustain its allies, it also enlarged during the contlict

Replacing Battleships with Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific in World War II

This is a case study of operational and tactical innovation in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Its purpose is to erase a myth—the myth that Navy tactical and operational doctrine existing at the time of Pearl Harbor facilitated a straightforward substitution of carriers for the battleship force that had been severely damaged by Japanese carrier aviation on 7 December 1941. That is not what happened

The Effectiveness of the Washington Treaty Navy

The Washington Treaty was intended to permit its signatories the minimum force necessary for an effective strategic defense while making strategic victory such a gamble that none would risk war. World War II measured the Navy\u27s effectiveness in treaty-limited force planning