How to circumvent parochial interests without excluding stake-holders: the rationalizing power of functionally differentiated decision-making

"While the ubiquity of communication in European, and international, governance may be empirically observed, its relevance for collective decision processes is still subject to dispute. The question is whether communication constitutes a factor influencing outcomes separately from other important explanatory factors like established interests (preferences) and power. On this issue, a new line of conflict has developed in recent years (e.g. Eriksen/Weigard 1997, Risse 2000) along the firmly established divide between rationalists and constructivists (Keohane 1988, Lapid 1989). For rationalists, communication plays an inferior role compared to other explanatory factors. Empirically observed communication among actors is frequently treated as unimportant 'noise'. After all, coordination, even cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma situations, may 'evolve' without communication (Axelrod 1984). If rational choice theory recognizes that communication may matter even for rational utility maximizers, it does so in the forms of cheap talk (Farrell/Rabin 1996) and signalling (Morrow 1994). The constructivist side of the meta-theoretical divide, having been concerned in the past basically with the role of norms and institutions for the formation and development of actors' preferences and having complemented the rationalist 'logic of consequentialism' with a norm-oriented 'logic of appropriateness' (March/Olsen 1998), witnesses a 'cognitive turn' (Checkel 1996). Communication has been introduced into the analysis of European and international politics in the forms of epistemic communities (Haas 1989, 1992), speech act theory (see Kratochwil 1989: 30-39, 1993) and communicative action (Müller 1994, Risse-Kappen 1996, Risse 2000). Drawing on the Theory of Communicative Action developed by Jürgen Habermas (1981), it is argued that neither European nor international governance are limited to the balancing of fixed preferences. Through communication, actors may convince each other, and thereby affect each others' preferences. Reasons are identified, in addition to power, as a second source of influence on the outcomes of co-ordination processes." (excerpt)Im Kontext der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union (EU) beschäftigt sich der Beitrag mit der Frage, ob der komplexe Entscheidungsapparat der EU ein höheres Potential zur Schaffung 'guter' Entscheidungen besitzt als gewöhnliche Verhandlungssysteme. Dem gemäß gliedern sich die Ausführungen wie folgt: In einem ersten Schritt wird die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns nach J. Habermas erläutert. Sie liefert nach Ansicht des Autors eine berücksichtigenswerte Interaktionsform der Argumentation sowie einen sinnvollen normativen Standard zur Bewertung der Qualität von kollektiven Entscheidungen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden die Bedingungen untersucht, unter denen rationale Nützlichkeitsmaximierungen zu erwarten sind, wenn man auf der Basis von Begründungen kommuniziert anstatt Einigungen aufgrund der Machtverhältnisse zu erzielen. Die vorherrschenden Bedingungen internationaler Verhandlungen differieren deutlich von den bestehenden komplexeren Systemen der Entscheidungsfindung innerhalb der EU. Es zeigt sich, dass bei Verhandlungen nur ein begrenzter Raum für begründungsbasierte Interaktionen besteht, während die institutionellen Vereinbarungen umfangreicher Entscheidungssysteme die rationale Nützlichkeitsmaximierung sogar forcieren könnte, was schließlich Kommunikationsverläufe mit rationalen Ergebnissen im Habermaschen Sinne ermöglicht. Auf dieser Grundlage wird im dritten Schritt das Prinzip der rationalen Kommunikation auf die Marktpolitik des einzelnen Staates im Kontext der gemeinschaftlich entschiedenen EU-Erweiterung angewendet. In einem Fazit merkt der Verfasser an, dass die Relevanz einer formalen Entscheidungsfindung sich mit dem Grad verringert, in dem die Teilung der Funktionen einen Schleier der Ignoranz auf der normativen Ebene schafft und die teilnehmenden Akteure dazu veranlasst, eine diskursive Suche nach der angemessensten, 'besten' Lösung zu beginnen. (ICG2

The consequences of delegation to independent agencies: separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications in Germany

"Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an (almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. Second, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deliberative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence." (author's abstract

Governing in nested institutions: environmental policy in the European Union and the case of packaging waste

"The environmental policy of the European Community is nested within a broader institution devoted predominantly to market integration. It also co-exists with the domestic environmental policies of the member states. This institutional arrangement has important consequences for environmental governance in the present Union. Not only does the wide scope for domestic environmental action generate different logics of harmonization for the regulation of products and processes, it also creates an institutional preference for European product standards because this type of regulation allows a trade-off between environmental and single market concerns. This effect is demonstrated by the development of the originally purely environmentally motivated and processrelated directive on packaging and packaging waste adopted in 1994. During its preparation, this legislative project was supplemented with a strong product-related component that made a trade-off between policies possible and facilitated majority support in the Council." (author's abstract

Bargaining, arguing and functional differentiation of decisionmaking: the role of committees in European environmental process regulation

"Committees play an important role in the European Community. In quantitative terms, the estimated number of committees existing under the auspices of the Community institutions ranges between several hundred to a thousand. The committees are regularly attended by more than 50,000 people: scientists, civil servants and representatives of interest groups. In qualitative terms, committees provide the foundation for 'bureaucratic' integration theories that emphasise the emergence of a European bureaucratic elite or envisage the 'fusion' of national and European state bureaucracies. Based on empirical investigations into committee decisionmaking in the foodstuffs sector, the members of the Bremen research project have not only claimed that governance by committees is located somewhere between intergovernmentalism and supranationalisirp but they also believe that some core institutional features of the EC should be read as 'supranational versions of deliberationist ideals'. In combination with European law, committees are expected to transform 'strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving'. In this way, a form of governance by committees emerges that need not necessarily reflect an awkward political compromise - in fact, it may approach a normative ideal that is not even attained within the political systems of the Member States. Committees therefore represent a particular form of institutionalised decision-making for European governance which is only just beginning to be understood. However, it remains largely unclear whether, and why, committees matter for European governance. They will generally be meaningful if they influence the outcomes of decision-making processes. Thus, the question arises, how can committees affect decisions in ways that non-committee decision-making processes cannot, and in what kind of mechanism is their influence rooted? In particular, do the participating actors behave differently in committees than outside, and if so, why and under which conditions? This last question cannot be tackled without a distinct concept of interaction among the participating actors." (excerpt

Integrating integration theory: neo-functionalism and international regimes

"It is common to juxtapose inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism as the two most important, and seemingly mutually exclusive, frameworks to interpret the phenomenon of 'European integration' and its institutional dimension, the European Community. Inter-governmentalism promises to offer a broadly applicable concept for the analysis of international cooperative institutions. It recognises that the Community emerged from the self-help based international system and emphasises the continuing central role of the member states. However, conceiving of the Community as one international institution among many others it tends to disregard the specificities of this particular institution. Moreover, inter-governmentalism is conceptionally founded on a state-centred and static approach to institutions and cannot, therefore, cope with integration as a process of development over time, nor does it readily accommodate the role of non-state actors within the Community system." (author's abstract

Supranational regulatory agencies between independence and control: the EMEA and the authorization of pharmaceuticals in the European Single Market

"The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) represents a new type of supranational regulation. Formally, it merely advises the Commission and a member state committee on the authorization of pharmaceuticals. In practice, however, it dominates decision-making and operates much like an independent agency. Based upon a brief discussion of the merits of independent regulation and the necessity to control regulatory activities, the article explores the institutional arrangement in which the EMEA is embedded and seeks to explain how tight oversight is compatible with quasi-independent action. It argues that the multi-tiered oversight mechanism restricts the non-scientific actors involved in the authorization of pharmaceuticals more than the agency – as long as the agency adheres to its mandate of producing scientifically convincing decisions." (author's abstract