858 research outputs found
How to circumvent parochial interests without excluding stake-holders: the rationalizing power of functionally differentiated decision-making
"While the ubiquity of communication in European, and international, governance may be
empirically observed, its relevance for collective decision processes is still subject to dispute. The question is whether communication constitutes a factor influencing outcomes separately from other important explanatory factors like established interests (preferences) and power. On this issue, a new line of conflict has developed in recent years (e.g. Eriksen/Weigard 1997, Risse 2000) along the firmly established divide between rationalists and constructivists (Keohane 1988, Lapid 1989). For rationalists, communication plays an inferior role compared to other explanatory factors. Empirically observed communication among actors is frequently treated as unimportant 'noise'. After all, coordination, even cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma situations, may 'evolve' without communication (Axelrod 1984). If rational choice theory recognizes that communication may matter even for rational utility maximizers, it does so in the forms of cheap talk (Farrell/Rabin 1996) and signalling (Morrow 1994). The constructivist side of the meta-theoretical divide, having been concerned in the past basically with the role of norms and institutions for the formation and development of actors' preferences and having complemented the rationalist 'logic of consequentialism' with a norm-oriented 'logic of appropriateness' (March/Olsen 1998), witnesses a 'cognitive turn' (Checkel 1996). Communication has been introduced into the analysis of European and international politics in the forms of epistemic communities (Haas 1989, 1992), speech act theory (see Kratochwil 1989: 30-39, 1993) and communicative action (Müller 1994, Risse-Kappen 1996, Risse 2000). Drawing on the Theory of Communicative Action developed by Jürgen Habermas (1981), it is argued that neither European nor international governance are limited to the balancing of fixed preferences. Through communication, actors may convince each other, and thereby affect each others' preferences. Reasons are identified, in addition to power, as a second source of influence on the outcomes of co-ordination processes." (excerpt)Im Kontext der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union (EU) beschäftigt sich der Beitrag mit der Frage, ob der komplexe Entscheidungsapparat der EU ein höheres Potential zur Schaffung 'guter' Entscheidungen besitzt als gewöhnliche Verhandlungssysteme. Dem gemäß gliedern sich die Ausführungen wie folgt: In einem ersten Schritt wird die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns nach J. Habermas erläutert. Sie liefert nach Ansicht des Autors eine berücksichtigenswerte Interaktionsform der Argumentation sowie einen sinnvollen normativen Standard zur Bewertung der Qualität von kollektiven Entscheidungen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden die Bedingungen untersucht, unter denen rationale Nützlichkeitsmaximierungen zu erwarten sind, wenn man auf der Basis von Begründungen kommuniziert anstatt Einigungen aufgrund der Machtverhältnisse zu erzielen. Die vorherrschenden Bedingungen internationaler Verhandlungen differieren deutlich von den bestehenden komplexeren Systemen der Entscheidungsfindung innerhalb der EU. Es zeigt sich, dass bei Verhandlungen nur ein begrenzter Raum für begründungsbasierte Interaktionen besteht, während die institutionellen Vereinbarungen umfangreicher Entscheidungssysteme die rationale Nützlichkeitsmaximierung sogar forcieren könnte, was schließlich Kommunikationsverläufe mit rationalen Ergebnissen im Habermaschen Sinne ermöglicht. Auf dieser Grundlage wird im dritten Schritt das Prinzip der rationalen Kommunikation auf die Marktpolitik des einzelnen Staates im Kontext der gemeinschaftlich entschiedenen EU-Erweiterung angewendet. In einem Fazit merkt der Verfasser an, dass die Relevanz einer formalen Entscheidungsfindung sich mit dem Grad verringert, in dem die Teilung der Funktionen einen Schleier der Ignoranz auf der normativen Ebene schafft und die teilnehmenden Akteure dazu veranlasst, eine diskursive Suche nach der angemessensten, 'besten' Lösung zu beginnen. (ICG2
The consequences of delegation to independent agencies: separation of powers, discursive governance and the regulation of telecommunications in Germany
"Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's
perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory
output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led
to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an
(almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized
functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of
independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social
systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. Second, drawing
on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation
supports the transformation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deliberative
arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are
made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence." (author's abstract
Supranational regulatory agencies between independence and control: the EMEA and the authorization of pharmaceuticals in the European Single Market
"The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) represents a new type of
supranational regulation. Formally, it merely advises the Commission and a member
state committee on the authorization of pharmaceuticals. In practice, however, it
dominates decision-making and operates much like an independent agency. Based
upon a brief discussion of the merits of independent regulation and the necessity
to control regulatory activities, the article explores the institutional arrangement in
which the EMEA is embedded and seeks to explain how tight oversight is compatible
with quasi-independent action. It argues that the multi-tiered oversight mechanism
restricts the non-scientific actors involved in the authorization of pharmaceuticals
more than the agency – as long as the agency adheres to its mandate of producing
scientifically convincing decisions." (author's abstract
Making an administrative trustee agent accountable: reason-based decision making within the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism
"Decisions within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol are made by an expert body that acts as a trustee agent
of the member states. Trustee agents help overcome the credible commitment
problems of their principals and promise reason-based decisions.
In contrast to traditional principal-agent settings, trusteeship
relations are typically triadic. Beside the preferences of the principals
and the trustee, decision criteria provide an external point of reference.
They reflect the principals' long-term interest and define the trustee's
decision rationale. The triadic structure helps protect the autonomy of
trustees and allows for making them accountable for their decisions.
Accountability mechanisms intend to ensure that a trustee's decisions
are in line with established decision criteria. Against this backdrop, we
explore the incentives created by the existing institutional arrangement
for the making of CDM decisions and examine selected cases. We
conclude that CDM arrangements provide a model for nonpartisan
international regulation." (author's abstract
Interplay: Exploring Institutional Interaction
"Since the development of the Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change (IDGEC) Science Plan in 1998 has become an important subject of inquiry. The Science Plan put institutional interaction on the agenda of global change research when only a handful of scholars had raised the general issue. Their work drew attention to the risk of 'treaty congestion' [...] and to an increasing 'regime density' [...] in the international system. Today it is widely recognized that 'the effectiveness of specific institutions often depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions with other institutions' [...]. Many environmental issue areas are cocoverned by several international institutions with governance also involving institutions at lower levels of societal and administrative organization (regional, national, local) [...]." (excerpt
Single market regulation between technocratic independence and political control: the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products and the authorisation of pharmaceuticals
"The paper explores the successful European scheme for the authorisation of
pharmaceuticals within the Single Market. Theoretically, it argues that successful regulation requires the exclusion of parochial interests from the decision process and the strict limitation of the agency's opportunities to adopt arbitrary decisions. Empirically, it holds that these conditions are fulfilled in the European authorisation scheme. The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) enjoys a strong agenda-setting power, while it is locked into a control arrangement that precludes arbitrary decisions. Moreover, all actors involved in the decision-making process are bound to a coherent and detailed set of legally binding decision-making criteria as well as subject to judicial review." (author's abstract
- …