Perspectives on institutional change - water management in Europe

CONTENTS: Mapping institutional change... 3, Insa Theesfeld, Frauke Pirscher; Affordability as an institutional obstacle to water-related price reforms... 9, Erik Gawel, Wolfgang Bretschneider; Analysing the shortcomings of the Ukrainian urban waste water sector - Institutional options for modernisation ... 35, Herwig Unnerstall, Nina Hagemann; Gemeinschaftsgüter und Gemeinwohl - Theoretischer Erkenntnisgehalt und praktische Relevanz für die Regionalentwicklung am Beispiel von Wasserinfrastrukturen und Kulturlandschaften ... 55, Andreas Röhring, Timothy Moss, Ludger Gailing, Rita Gudermann; Explaining top-down institutional design: The introduction of River Basin Management in Portugal... 85, Andreas Thiel, Catrin Egerton; Decentralization failures in post-socialist fishery management ... 107, Insa Theesfeld, Oscar Schmidt --

Adapting agricultural water governance to climate change : Experience from Germany, Spain and California

This study describes and discusses initiatives taken by public (water) agencies in the state of Brandenburg in Germany, the state of California in the USA and the Ebro River Basin in Spain in response to the challenges which climate change poses for the agricultural water sector. The drivers and actors and the process of changing agricultural water governance are its particular focus. The assumptions discussed are: (i) the degree of planned and anticipatory top-down implementation processes decreases if actions are more decentralized and are introduced at the regional and local level; (ii) the degree of autonomous and responsive adaptation approaches seems to grow with actions at a lower administrative level. Looking at processes of institutional change, a variety of drivers and actors are at work such as changing perceptions of predicted climate impacts; international obligations which force politicians to take action; socio-economic concerns such as the cost of not taking action; the economic interests of the private sector. Drivers are manifold and often interact and, in many cases, reforms in the sector are driven by and associated with larger reform agendas. The results of the study may serve as a starting point in assisting water agencies in developing countries with the elaboration of coping strategies for tackling climate change-induced risks related to agricultural water management

Effects of Student Choice on Student Motivation and Engagement within an Elementary Classroom

The purpose of this research is to determine the effects of allowing student choice on student motivation and engagement in an elementary classroom. Specifically, the study will focus on student engagement during reading instruction and motivation to participate when they are offered choice in reading materials versus when they are not offered choice in reading materials. Students will provide information about their thoughts on lessons; when they are able to choose their reading materials versus when they are chosen for them. This study aims to determine best teaching practices for student engagement and motivation during reading instruction. Student feedback and researcher observations were used to help determine the effects of student choice on engagement and motivation

Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Constraints for collective action in Bulgaria's irrigation sector

"Water for irrigation and irrigation infrastructure are both common pool resources, due to their low excludability and high rivalry. The well-known common pool resource dilemma is often the consequence. Collective action may be a way how societies can overcome this dilemma. First results from a three-month empirical field study in Bulgaria are presented trying to explain how actor groups characteristics, such as lack of trust between community members and effective institutional settings at the local level, such as information asymmetry, limited sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms and almost no monitoring mechanisms provide conditions under which opportunistic behaviour dominates. The effective rules-in-use in local communities are presented. The simplest example is watering crops without paying the water price. Individuals will use their power to maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they will not agree to any rule change. Moreover, the actors' attitude towards collective action is very pessimistic. This has a crucial impact on the evolving of credible commitment which is one prerequisite for collective action. The effects on water management can be severe and the common pool resource dilemma situation may continue. This article questions if there are additional influencing variables inherited from the transformation process that will have an impact on the institutional change and constrain the emergence of collective action solutions. The discussion is based on empirical material from Varbiza village in the south of Bulgaria." (author's abstract)Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Einschränkungen, die sich für kollektive Handlungen im bulgarischen Bewässerungssektor ergeben. Das empirische Material stammt aus Varbiza, einem Dorf im Süden Bulgariens. Wasser zur Bewässerung und Bewässerungsinfrastruktur sind beides gemeinsame allgemeine Betriebsmittel, was oftmals mit Problemen verbunden ist. Kollektivtätigkeit kann eine Möglichkeit sein, wie Gesellschaften dieses Dilemma überwinden können. In diesem Beitrag werden erste Ergebnisse einer dreimonatigen empirischen Feldstudie in Bulgarien vorgestellt und es wird erläutert, wie die Merkmale der beteiligten Gruppen und wirkungsvolle institutionelle Vorgaben auf lokaler Ebene Sanktionierungs- und Durchsetzungsmechanismen beschränken. Es werden die wirkungsvollsten Richtlinien, die von den lokalen Gemeinschaften verwendet werden, anhand einiger Beispiel dargestellt. Das einfachste Beispiel ist die Bewässerung von Getreide, ohne den Wasserpreis zu zahlen. Einzelpersonen verwenden ihre Energie, um ihre opportunistischen Strategien beizubehalten, und infolgedessen stimmen sie keiner Änderung der Spielregeln zu. Außerdem ist die Einstellung der Beteiligten gegenüber Kollektivtätigkeit sehr pessimistisch. Dies hat entscheidende Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung von Glaubwürdigkeit, die eine Vorbedingung für Kollektivtätigkeit ist. Der Artikel geht der Frage nach, ob es zusätzliche beeinflussende Variablen gibt, die vom Transformationsprozess herrühren und Auswirkungen auf den institutionellen Wandel haben und somit die Möglichkeiten kollektiver Problemlösung einschränken. (ICDÜbers

The Political Economy of Decentralization in Thailand - Does Decentralization Allow for Peasant Participation?

One of the most important issues in rural development is empowerment and entitlement of farmers through participation. Decentralisation and participation are seemingly interdependent. Therefore, the paper begins with a theoretical discussion on the cause and effects of this interdependence. Decentralisation is often advertised as means to better incorporate the views and wishes of local actors. Yet, a decentralization process is no guaranty for political participation of local actors. The state induced decentralisation process in rural Thailand serves as an example to investigate forces that hamper or facilitate political participation. Change and uncertainty are inherent of political systems and the agricultural sector. Hence, this paper focuses in particular, on the last two politically turbulent decades in Thailand and its impact on political participation in rural Thailand. The Tambon Administration Organization (TAO) as one means of and likewise outcome of the decentralization process will serve as an example to discuss the effects of decentralisation on participation in the TAOs, using the concept of accountability. After increasing decentralization at the end of the 90s the last decade was coined by centralization policies. The ongoing political unrest could potentially trigger a new wave of political decentralization. However, the real reason for decentralization is not to distribute power but to maintain central effectiveness. Thus, we expect to see more decentralization without participation.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Ex-ante Policy Assessment of Agricultural, Environmental, and Rural Policies from an Institutional Perspective: The Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment

Ex-ante impact assessment of agricultural, environmental, and rural policies has become an integral part of political decision making processes in the EU. While there is a large variety of agrienvironmental modelling tools available to analyse likely social, economic, and environmental impacts of these policies, scientifically well-founded ex-ante policy assessment tools capturing the institutional dimension are still missing. In this paper, we introduce a formalised procedure for modelling – ex-ante – institutional aspects for policy implementation: the ‘Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment’ (PICA). PICA has been designed as an explorative, yet formalised methodology that enables policy makers to identify at an early stage potential institutional incompatibilities. After providing a brief overview of relevant approaches for policy assessment we elaborate on the four distinct steps of PICA and use a core element of the EU Nitrate Directive to illustrate its function.Methodology, Ex-ante Policy Assessment, Institutional Policy Assessment, Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy,

A breach of tradition during socialism: the case of water syndicates in Bulgaria

Im Verlauf der post-sozialistischen Übergangsphase verschlechterten sich die Bewässerungseinrichtungen Bulgariens erheblich und konnten nicht mehr die Ansprüche der neuen Landbesitzer und der landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsstruktur befriedigen. Deshalb erlässt die bulgarische Regierung zwei neue Gesetze mit dem Ziel, gemeinsame Handlungen zu fördern, Wassernutzervereinigungen zu etablieren und ein nachhaltiges Wassermanagement zu erreichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der Autor das häufig vorgebrachte Argument, dass Wassernutzervereinigungen in Bulgarien auf einfache Weise eingeführt werden können, weil sie mit den Wassersyndikaten verwurzelt sind. Empirische Ergebnisse von Untersuchungen einzelner Dörfer zeigen, dass die kollektive Erinnerung an Nutzungsregeln und Verhaltensmustern früherer Wassersyndikate begrenzt ist. Der Autor erklärt den Bruch mit dieser Tradition mit der Migration von den Dörfern in die Städte, der Unterdrückung des prä-kommunistischen so genannten kapitalistischen Verhaltens und der Dauer der kommunistischen Herrschaftsperiode. Zudem zeigt die Analyse der historischen kooperativen Entwicklung in Bulgarien, dass die Wassersyndikate administrativ von oben durchgesetzt wurden und nichts mit klassischen kooperativen Prinzipien gemein hatten. (ICGÜbers)"During the post-socialist transition period, the Bulgarian irrigation facilities deteriorated to a large extent and no longer meet the needs of the new landowner and agricultural production structure. The Bulgarian government therefore enacted two new laws to encourage collective action and to establish water user associations in order to achieve sustainable water management. In this article, we will question the frequent argument that water user associations could easily be established in Bulgaria, because they are rooted in the water syndicates. Empirical findings from village case studies reveal that limited collective memory exists today about former water syndicates' rules-in-use and patterns of action. We will explain this breach of tradition by the migration from villages to cities, the suppression of precommunist so-called capitalist behaviour, and the length of the communist period. Moreover, the analysis of the historical cooperative development in Bulgaria shows that the water syndicates were enforced by a top-down approach and did not have much in common with the classic cooperative principles." (author's abstract

Application of the Procedure for Institutional Compatibility Assessment (PICA) to the implementation of the EU Nitrate Directive in Midi-Pyrenees. Evaluation and suggestions for further improvement and integration into the final version of SEAMLESS-IF

Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, Farm Management, Land Economics/Use,