Donning Coase‐coloured glasses: a property rights view of natural resource economics

Economic analysis of natural resource and environmental issues inappropriately places too much emphasis on Pigouvian externalities and too little on Coasean property rights and transaction costs. The crucial questions are who has what property rights and what are the transaction costs associated with these property rights. Asserting an externality implicitly assumes a set of property rights and hence a distribution of the social costs, but it is precisely a lack of property rights that allows decision makers to ignore social costs. By viewing natural resource and environmental problems through a Coasean lens, we better focus our attention on how property rights evolve, how they influence transaction costs, and how those transaction costs affect the potential for bargaining to minimise social costs.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Allocation and Dissipation of Resource Rents: Implications for Fishery Reform

In the move to adopt rights based arrangements for renewable resources to avoid the losses of open access and the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation, we argue that grandfathering the allotments of local users can be the most efficient distribution mechanism. We differ from the standard support among economists for auctions which contends that auctions allocate rights to the highest valued users and thereby maximize rents. Our contention is that rents are not a fixed stock as is commonly assumed, but rather depend upon the actions of those who use the natural resource and convert it into valuable goods and services. First-possession allocation assigns ownership and rents to existing users, reinforcing their incentives for stewardship and rent maximization. Resource rents are an important source of wealth and well being, especially in developing countries. By contrast the alternative, auction allocation, assigns ownership to winning bidders, but the rents are captured by the auctioneer, often the state, not local agents. We argue that there can be important efficiency effects. Our empirical focus is on fisheries, but the implications extend to other settings.

Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes

Lecture on Apr. 7, 2004 at the Franklin Thomas Backus School of Law, sponsored by the Center for Business Law & Regulation and co-sponsored by PERC, Property & Environment Research Center (Montana

Back to the Future: Privatizing the Federal Estate

5 pages. Contains references

G84-738 Management to Minimize Hay Waste

This NebGuide discusses harvest factors that affect hay yield and quality as well as ways to reduce losses during harvest, storage, and feeding. Hay is harvested, stored, and fed under a wide variety of conditions that influence both its yield and feed value. High quality hay is needed by animals that require high nutrient concentrations to reach desired levels of production. These include dairy cows, finishing beef cattle, fattening lambs, and race horses. Excellent hay management is required to produce the hay needed by these livestock. High quality hay is also used as a supplement to lower quality forages, such as crop residues. Hay of lower quality is nutritionally valuable, but should be used in other livestock production systems, such as the wintering of beef cows