The political economy of Public Employment Services: measurement and disempowered empowerment?

Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) and Public Employment Services (PES) are related components of the European Union and member state labour market policy. Typically, PES are analysed in terms of a narrow concern with efficiency and effectiveness of service. In this paper, we argue that PES are constituents in broader processes. They are not just means to facilitate employment, they are also part of transmission mechanisms for a political economy of competitiveness. They play a particular role in governance processes, and so serve to produce and reproduce power relations that are intrinsic to those processes. We argue that the technical ways that PES have been managed over recent decades has contributed to broader processes of disempowering labour, through depoliticized management practices. We argue that attempts at even limited re-empowerment of labour would require a repoliticization of these management practices

Erweiterung der Dispositionsmoeglichkeiten bei industrieller Arbeit am Beispiel von drei Humanisierungsprojekten in Schweden, Grossbritannien und den USA Schlussbericht. Abschlussdatum des Vorhabens: Oktober 1981

SIGLETIB: RN 7543 (83-031) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

If You Pay Peanuts …: A Laboratory Experiment on Reward Schemes in Employment Service Contracting

The design of tenders and contracts is a crucial factor in the success or failure of the contracting-out of reintegration services. In a laboratory experiment with professionals from private reintegration service providers, we tested two tender designs. In the first design, the government announces a predetermined amount that will be paid for each employment outcome. Participants then bid an amount of money that they are prepared to pay to operate the contract. This auction resembles contracting in the Australian Job Network and the British Employment Zones. The second design is the lowest-reward auction. In this auction, the participants bid a reward. The lowest bid wins the contract, and the reward is then paid for each unit of effort. The lowest-reward auction is similar to the current tendering practice in the Netherlands.We find that an auction with a fixed reward per placement is more efficient, yields more effort from the winner, and results in higher welfare than an auction in which bidders compete on the basis of the reward per placement. We derive this conclusion from both our theoretical analysis and data from our laboratory experiment with professional bidders