Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims

The United States criminal justice system convicts, incarcerates, and, in some instances, executes people for crimes of which they are innocent. Although wrongful convictions may be an inevitable consequence of our criminal justice system, it would seem that a person wrongly deprived of his liberty is entitled to a civil remedy to compensate for the mistakes of the criminal system. Yet persons wrongly convicted of crimes who bring actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for an erroneous arrest, detention, or conviction are often denied monetary compensation. This Article considers the role of causation in section 1983 wrongful conviction cases. Although causation is seldom mentioned as an element of a section 1983 claim, it plays two roles in section 1983 litigation. First, causation is an inherent part of the deprivation element of a section 1983 claim. Additionally, causation serves as a link between the defendant\u27s breach and the plaintiff\u27s damages, which I refer to as damages causation. Wrongful convictions almost never happen for one reason but, instead, are usually the result of several different acts. Hence, they are not easily amenable to causation determinations and courts have used damages causation as a way to limit liability in section 1983 wrongful conviction claims. I argue that courts\u27 approaches to damages causation in section 1983 claims unnecessarily and improperly limit defendants\u27 liability in wrongful conviction cases

Advance in grain legumes genetic transformation: The case of GM pea and cowpea

Grain legumes are socio-economically important crops playing a substantial role in providing dietary protein for millions of households in the world. As multipurpose crops, they are used for different purposes such as food and feed. They also fix atmospheric nitrogen contributing to the sustainability of farming system by enriching soil fertility and maintaining the productivity of agricultural land. However, different production factors, such as insect pests and diseases, have limited the productivity of grain legumes both in field and during the storage and are impacting their contribution to nutrition security and poverty reduction. Furthermore, in the current trend of climate change, there is an increasing pressure on plant breeders to develop climate-smart varieties of crops with multiple traits against the different production factors. In order to enhance the economic and social contribution of grain legumes, genetic transformation approaches have been used to develop transgenic lines with new traits such as resistance to insects and diseases as well as tolerance to drought. In this paper, the experience and result of pea and cowpea Agrobacterium-mediated transformation will be presented. Special emphasis will be given to the success and challenges of transgenic insect resistance and its importance in these two important grain legumes. Based on insect bioassay tests, the level of insect resistance in some of the transgenic lines will be presented against that of none transgenic lines. Finally, recommendation will also be discussed for future genetic transformation to develop climate-smart variety of transgenic grain legumes

Qualified Immunity and Unqualified Assumptions

Section 1983 gives people the right to sue a government official for violating their constitutional rights. Qualified immunity provides these same officials with an affirmative defense -- even if they violated the constitution, they are not liable for monetary damages if the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. The qualified immunity is based upon the basic assumption that “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” If the law was clearly established the official will be liable. If not, the Court has reasoned that it would be unfair to hold defendants liable because they could not be “expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments.” At least one legal scholar has argued that police, in fact, are not regularly informed of court decisions interpreting Fourth Amendment use of force decisions and, accordingly, do not know the law governing their conduct. This Article builds upon and develops that assertion. To better understand how police learn of new legal opinions the authors surveyed police departments across the country asking specific questions about officials’ legal training. Based upon the responding surveys, it seems unlikely that reasonable officials are aware of recent legal opinions governing their conduct. Nevertheless, this Article argues that these findings do not necessarily resolve whether government officials should be aware of the law governing their conduct. This depends on whether qualified immunity is understood as a positive or normative standard. The authors conclude that the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine sets forth both positive and normative notions—what is (positive) and what ought to be (normative)—and then distorts them both. Qualified immunity does not operate as a true normative standard because it is so far removed from any real ideal. It also fails as a positive standard because it is divorced from reality. The result is an illogical and unworkable doctrine

Qualified Immunity and Unqualified Assumptions

Section 1983 gives people the right to sue a government official for violating their constitutional rights. Qualified immunity provides these same officials with an affirmative defense -- even if they violated the constitution, they are not liable for monetary damages if the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. The qualified immunity is based upon the basic assumption that “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” If the law was clearly established the official will be liable. If not, the Court has reasoned that it would be unfair to hold defendants liable because they could not be “expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments.” At least one legal scholar has argued that police, in fact, are not regularly informed of court decisions interpreting Fourth Amendment use of force decisions and, accordingly, do not know the law governing their conduct. This Article builds upon and develops that assertion. To better understand how police learn of new legal opinions the authors surveyed police departments across the country asking specific questions about officials’ legal training. Based upon the responding surveys, it seems unlikely that reasonable officials are aware of recent legal opinions governing their conduct. Nevertheless, this Article argues that these findings do not necessarily resolve whether government officials should be aware of the law governing their conduct. This depends on whether qualified immunity is understood as a positive or normative standard. The authors conclude that the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine sets forth both positive and normative notions—what is (positive) and what ought to be (normative)—and then distorts them both. Qualified immunity does not operate as a true normative standard because it is so far removed from any real ideal. It also fails as a positive standard because it is divorced from reality. The result is an illogical and unworkable doctrine