Interregional Disparities in Productivity and the Choice of Fiscal Regime

Two districts with divergent productivity levels engage in policy-making on the provision of local public goods that enhance future income and hence create a dynamic linkage across periods. The policy choices of district representatives are derived under alternative fiscal systems, and the problem of system selection is examined. It is shown that a decentralized system is more likely to be selected in a more equal society. On the other hand, when a great deal of benefit spills over from a local public good, or when policy makers are expected to care solely about the immediate effects of their decisions on their districts, a centralized system is more likely to be selected.Interregional and intergenerational spillovers; Decentralization; Centralization; Disparity in productivity; Dynamic political economy model

Electoral Commitment in Asymmetric Tax-competition Models

* Revised： [20-21 , 2020

Competition for private capital and central grants: the case of Japanese industrial parks

Policy competition, Infrastructure investment, Lobbying, Spatial model, H11, H54, H76, H77, R53,

Supplementary Budget and Fiscal Cap

本論文では，予算編成過程を描写するためのプリンシパル・エージェントモデルを構築する．プリンシパルである財政当局が，エージェントである支出官庁に支出を委任するために，1 期に当初予算，2 期に補正予算を配分する．支出官庁は1 期に，当初予算をより効果的に使用するための努力を行う．均衡では，支出官庁は社会的最適解に比べて低い努力水準を選択し，その後で意思決定を行う財政当局に多大な補正予算を選択させる．それを見越して，財政当局は当初予算を低く設定する．次に，当初予算と補正予算の両方にシーリングをかけた場合の効果を考察する．補正予算へのシーリングは，支出官庁に当初予算を効率的に使用するよう促すインセンティブとなる．一方で，経済の状況に応じた機動的な支出を妨げることを恐れて，補正予算には寛大なシーリングが設定される．シーリングを課すことが望ましいかどうかは，当初予算の硬直性による．A principal allocates a budget to an agent in each of two periods. The agent chooses an effort level to efficiently use the budget in period 1, anticipating the principalʼs decision in period 2. The agent can gain a larger budget in period 2 by exerting less effort in period 1. Fiscal caps imposed in both periods can induce the agent to devote the socially optimal level of effort, but the fiscal cap for the final period may be too generous, providing for discretionary expenditure that is contingent upon the state of the overall economy. Whether fiscal constraints are desirable depends on the rigidity applied in the primary budget