In search of green political economy: steering markets, innovation and the case of the zero carbon homes agenda in England

Advocates of a democratic ‘Green state’ challenge Hayekian free-market environmentalist proposals for a minimal state and the emphasis of ecological modernisation discourses on technological innovation as the primary route towards ecological sustainability. However, these more strongly pro-market traditions raise important questions and provide useful insights concerning the challenges of translating the political ideology of ‘ecologism’ into practical proposals for democratic governance. Hayekian thought raises vital questions concerning the capacity of political processes to address complex challenges of coordinating the formulation and delivery of the sustainability objectives of ecologism. Scholarship on ecological modernisation and the ‘new regulation’ offer important insights into how shifting interrelationships between the state and private sector in the policy process might enable this challenge to be more effectively addressed. These areas for further developing proposals for a Green state are illustrated here through a case study of the zero carbon homes policy agenda in England

Understanding the influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior

International audienceIn this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle