Sprejem sankcij za zaščito splošnega interesa s strani mednarodnih organizacij

The adoption of sanctions in international law has become a common phenomenon, not only by States, but increasingly also by international organizations (IO). What is more, sanctions are progressively adopted not for the pursuance of an individual interest, but for the protection of the general interest, including in response to grave and systemic violations of human rights, apartheid, military coups and the prohibited use of force. Regardless of its expansion, the sanctioning practice of IOs has been left unaddressed in doctrine, whereby various aspects of entitlement and the limitations that restrict the adoption of sanctions by IOs remain unsettled. The aim of this study is to demonstrate that IOs, as autonomous subjects of international law, actively contribute to the protection of the general interest. This study identifies existing international legal regimes that frame and limit the adoption of sanctions by IOs in the general interest and explains the general and specific conditions for the application of these regimes to IOs. While States enjoy general capacities and competences, which are territorially (and not substantially) limited, the entitlement of IOs to adopt sanctions in a concrete situation depends on a variety of concepts, including: international legal personality, capacity, competence and attribution. In this study, these are understood as the general conditions for the adoption of sanctions by IOs. To accommodate the specific dichotomous nature of IOs - whereby they are creations of international law and are to a large extent dependent on their members, while at the same time autonomous subjects of international law, creating their own internal legal system - it is essential to distinguish between various aspects of their activities, which determine their positioning within the system of international law. In particular, making the distinction between capacities and competences on the one hand and the internal and external relations of IOs on the other, helps us understand how specific conditions, deriving from concrete regimes governing the adoption of sanctions (international institutional law, the general international legal regime of countermeasures, specific treaty-based regimes and the general regime of treaties) apply to IOs. In addition, by mapping the existing international legal regimes and the analysis of the corresponding practice under them, this study outlines the plurality of regimes, presupposes different types of interactions between them and simultaneously also delineates their possible convergences and conflicts.Sankcije v mednarodnem pravu so postale del stvarnosti, pri čemer jih ne sprejemajo samo države, temveč vse pogosteje tudi mednarodne organizacije (MO). Posebej pomembno je, da sankcije pogosto niso sprejete z namenom zaščite posamičnega (individualnega) interesa, ampak za zaščito splošnega interesa, na primer kot odziv na hude in sistematične kršitve človekovih pravic, apartheid, vojaške udare ali prepovedano uporabo sile. Ne glede na razmah prakse MO pa doktrina sankcij ne obravnava ustrezno. Pri tem različni vidiki upravičenja in pogojev, ki omejujejo sprejem sankcij s strani MO, ostajajo nejasni. Namen te študije je prikazati, da MO kot avtonomni subjekti mednarodnega prava aktivno pripomorejo k zaščiti splošnega interesa. Študija opredeljuje različne obstoječe pravne režime, ki uokvirjajo in zamejujejo sprejem sankcij za zaščito splošnega interesa s strani MO, ter razloži splošne in posebne pogoje za uporabo teh režimov s strani MO. Države uživajo splošno pravno sposobnost in pristojnosti, ki so ozemeljsko (in ne vsebinsko) zamejene, upravičenje MO za sprejem sankcij v posamezni situaciji pa je odvisno od različnih pojmov, kot so: mednarodna pravna subjektiviteta, pravna sposobnost, pristojnost in pripisljivost. V tej študiji so ti opredeljeni kot splošni pogoji za sprejem sankcij s strani MO. Za ustrezno umestitev MO kot subjektov mednarodnega prava v mednarodnopravni sistem je ključno upoštevanje njihove posebne, dihotomne narave: na eni strani gre za tvorbe mednarodnega prava, ki so pretežno odvisne od svojih držav članic, vendar pa so MO hkrati avtonomni subjekti mednarodnega prava, ki ustvarjajo svoje lastne, notranjepravne sisteme. Ta posebna značilnost zahteva razlikovanje med različnimi vidiki MO. Zlasti je pomembno razlikovanje med pravno sposobnostjo in pristojnostjo na eni strani ter notranjimi in zunanjimi odnosi, ki jih MO tvorijo na drugi. Razlikovanje med temi pojmi in odnosi je bistveno za razumevanje, kako se posebni pogoji, kot izhajajo iz posameznih režimov, ki urejajo sprejem sankcij (mednarodno institucionalno pravo, splošni mednarodnopravni režim protiukrepov, posebni pogodbeni režimi ter splošni režim prava mednarodnih pogodb), uporabljajo pri sprejemu sankcij s strani MO. Na podlagi pregleda obstoječih mednarodnopravnih režimov in preučitve sankcij, ki so na njihovi podlagi sprejeti v praksi, ta študija opredeljuje tudi različne vrste medsebojnih vplivov med temi režimi ter njihovega morebitnega sovpadanja (konvergence) in navzkrižij (konfliktov)

Right to Self-Defence against Non-State Actors in the Context of Fight against Terrorism (Pravica do samoobrambe zoper nedržavne akterje v luči boja proti terorizmu)

The use of force in self-defence against non-state actors in the territory of another state not having effective control over activities of non-state actors is subject of numerous controversies. While the traditional approach limits the use of force in self-defence from Article 51 of the UN Charter to the inter-state relations, the ever-present threat of international terrorism triggered new trends in expanding the notion of self-defence to private armed attacks. In the past, countries justified their use of force against non-state actors on the territory of another state by attributing the attack to the host state. However, in the last few years, especially in the context of fight against ISIL in Syria, an unwilling or unable host state doctrine received an unprecedented attention. The authors of the paper present prevailing legal arguments for the use of force against non-state actors and assess whether a wider understanding of Article 51 of the UN Charter has emerged