Who Laughs at a Rape Joke? Illiberal Responsiveness in Rodrigo Duterte\u27s Philippines

When a presidential contender makes a joke about lusting over a dead Australian missionary, calls the Pope the son of a whore, and confesses to killing criminals during his tenure as city mayor, one could expect that this candidate would not go very far. But not in the year 2016. Dubbed as ‘the year of voting dangerously,’ the Philippines rode the tide of global discontent and gave landslide victory to the controversial Rodrigo Duterte. This chapter examines the discursive underpinnings of Duterte’s rise to power by focusing on the process in which his supporters made ethical calculations from listening to his official speeches, live performance on television debates, and broader discussions in news and social media during the campaign period. We argue that Duterte’s ‘crass politics’ is a push back to the dominant moral politics perpetuated by institutions associated to the Philippines\u27 liberal democratic elite. While we condemn the Duterte regime’s disregard for human rights and due process, especially in the context of his bloody war on drugs, we also advocate a closer look at the ethics of Duterte’s responsiveness to deep-seated injuries endured by his constituencies both among marginalised and middle-class communities. Through a careful yet critical unpacking of his ‘crass politics of responsiveness’ from ethnographic research with Duterte supporters and media analysis of Duterte’s public performances, we hope to put forward a precise understanding of the emerging moral politics that underpins this unorthodox regime

The historical origins of corruption in the developing world: a comparative analysis of East Asia

A new approach has emerged in the literature on corruption in the developing world that breaks with the assumption that corruption is driven by individualistic self-interest and, instead, conceptualizes corruption as an informal system of norms and practices. While this emerging neo-institutionalist approach has done much to further our understanding of corruption in the developing world, one key question has received relatively little attention: how do we explain differences in the institutionalization of corruption between developing countries? The paper here addresses this question through a systematic comparison of seven developing and newly industrialized countries in East Asia. The argument that emerges through this analysis is that historical sequencing mattered: countries in which the "political marketplace" had gone through a process of concentration before universal suffrage was introduced are now marked by less harmful types of corruption than countries where mass voting rights where rolled out in a context of fragmented political marketplaces. The paper concludes by demonstrating that this argument can be generalized to the developing world as a whole

Caught between imperial Manila and the provincial dynasties: Towards a new fiscal federalism

“Imperial Manila” is often blamed for influencing public finance in at least three ways: a) by being the beneficiary of a disproportionately larger share of public spending; b) by “controlling” public spending allocations to the LGUs; and c) by passing on unfunded mandates to the LGUs. On the other hand, LGUs—notably those farthest from the capital—have become dominated by political dynasties, in turn linked to deeper poverty and underdevelopment. These two forces often contribute to a center-periphery relationship that perpetuates (or at least fails to correct) bad governance and fiscal dependence. How do we break this impasse? This paper outlines the original rationale behind decentralization and examines efforts towards more effective governance and increased fiscal independence of local government in the Philippines. It then examines some of the historical data and evidence, with a focus on provinces, cities and municipalities. It discusses some of the potential factors behind these patterns; and it concludes with possible reform options towards more effective fiscal federalism.