Threshold Assessment: the experiences of teachers who were unsuccessful in crossing the threshold

This is a postprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Research Papers in Education© 2003 Copyright Taylor & Francis; Research Papers in Education is available online at http://www.informaworld.comThis paper, the second in a pair of articles, reports empirical research undertaken into the implementation of one of the UK government's strands of performance-related pay: Threshold Assessment (TA). This procedure was introduced in English primary and secondary schools in summer 2000. Although the recruitment and retention of teachers had become a growing concern for the government by that time, it would have been politically difficult to award teachers across the profession a pay increase without attaching any strings whatsoever. The Threshold Assessment procedure requires teachers to demonstrate that they have met a number of 'standards' in order to 'cross the threshold' and to receive a pay award (when first introduced, in 2000, this was 2,000). This then allows them access to an upper pay scale, although progression up this is linked to their performance via the Performance Management procedure which was also introduced into schools at that time. The Teachers' Incentive Pay Project, currently in progress at the University of Exeter, studied the implementation of the first round of the Threshold Assessment procedure. It examined the way in which the procedure was conducted across England by collecting data from head teachers, teachers and threshold assessors. Ninety seven per cent of teachers applying to cross the threshold in the first round in summer 2000 were successful. This paper focuses on the experiences of teachers who were unsuccessful in their bid to cross the threshold, having been deemed to have 'not yet met' the required standards (referred to in this paper as NYM or 'unsuccessful' teachers). A number of issues emerge including differences between schools in the way in which the procedure was approached and undertaken; relationship problems between head teachers and teachers; the support available to NYM teachers; the appropriateness of the current procedure for 'nonstandard' teachers such as advisory/learning support staff, supply teachers and part-timers; the procedure's impact on teacher performance.This paper reports some of the key findings of the Teachers' Incentive Pay Project (TIPP), a three year project funded by the Leverhulme Trust

Performance-related pay: the views and experiences of 1,000 primary and secondary head teachers

This is a postprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Research Papers in Education© 2003 Copyright Taylor & Francis; Research Papers in Education is available online at http://www.informaworld.comThis is the first of two papers describing a study of the introduction of performance-related pay into the teaching profession in the UK. It reports the views and experiences of a national random sample of 1,000 primary and secondary head teachers in over 150 local education authorities in England who were responsible for implementing one strand of the government's performance-related pay scheme, Threshold Assessment. The second paper describes the views and experiences of teachers who were unsuccessful in crossing the threshold and therefore did not obtain a pay increment. Head teachers did not find it difficult to assess the five standards that teachers had to meet in order to receive their 2,000 additional performance payment, but they were very critical of the training they received, the amount of time they had to spend, and the changing ground rules. The success rate was 86% of all teachers eligible, but 97% of those who actually applied were awarded the additional payment. Most heads dealt with the applications entirely on their own, though one in six, mainly in the secondary sector, shared the task with senior colleagues. Unsuccessful candidates were few in number, but most were deemed to be failing on more than one aspect of their teaching. While those who were successful in crossing the threshold were pleased and relieved, unsuccessful applicants were said to be bitter, threatening action, in several cases leaving the school. External Threshold Assessors had to visit every school. In only 71 cases out of 19,183 applicants in our sample of schools was there disagreement. Three-quarters of heads felt Threshold Assessment had made a little or no difference to what teachers did in the classroom. This is confirmed by our other studies, which suggest that teachers simply keep more careful records, rather than change how they teach. Some 60% of heads were opposed to performance-related pay, but 39% were in favour of it in principle, though most of these were unhappy about the way it had been put into practice.The Teachers' Incentive Pay Project (TIPP) is funded by the Leverhulme Trust

Performance-related pay and the teaching profession: a review of the literature

This is a postprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Research Papers in Education© 2002 Copyright Taylor & Francis; Research Papers in Education is available online at http://www.informaworld.comThis paper examines and summarizes research into performance-related pay. It was undertaken as part of the Teachers' Incentive Pay Project, currently in progress at the University of Exeter, which is a study of the introduction of threshold assessment and performance management for teachers in schools in England and Wales. The paper examines research into the effects of pay on employees' behaviour and considers the claimed benefits and disadvantages of performance-related pay, both generally and with particular reference to the teaching profession. Proponents of performance-related pay claim that it improves the motivation of employees and assists in the recruitment and retention of high quality staff. Disadvantages include: neglect of unrewarded tasks; disagreement about goals; competitiveness; lack of openness about failings; cost and the possibility of demotivating those who are not rewarded. Performance-related pay has long been a feature of teachers' remuneration in the US, where it has usually been promoted in response to national crises perceived to be rooted in educational failure. Traditionally, most US merit pay schemes for teachers have not been long lasting. This paper considers research into a variety of US schemes, including studies of the conditions under which they are found to succeed. Performance-related pay works best in situations in which there are easily measured outcomes, such as in manufacturing, but the outcomes of teaching are many and varied and there have been problems related to measuring teachers' effectiveness. The paper reports claims by Odden (2000) that measuring teachers' performance is now more feasible and that, therefore, the time is right for the introduction of performance-related pay for teachers

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