No. 74: Informal Entrepreneurship and Cross-Border Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa

Informal cross-border trading in Zimbabwe has become more than a survivalist strategy and should be seen as an important pillar of the country\u27s economy. This report, part of SAMP’s Growing Informal Cities series, seeks to provide a current picture of informal cross-border trading in Zimbabwe and provides detailed insights into the activities of traders from the capital, Harare, who travel regularly to Johannesburg, South Africa, as part of their business. The traders make a monthly profit that far exceeds the salaries of most Zimbabweans in formal employment. Furthermore, many traders have been able to grow their businesses to such an extent that they hire people from outside their families. In Zimbabwe, this trade remains a female-dominated activity and traders are generally well educated and relatively young. Almost all respondents interviewed had started their businesses in the post-2000 era. Most had never held a formal job and went into informal cross-border trading either because they were unemployed or already involved in informal sector activities in Zimbabwe. This report notes important contributions these traders make to both the Zimbabwean and South African economies. The contribution of the informal economy in generating jobs and reducing unemployment needs to be acknowledged in Zimbabwe by policies that encourage rather than restrict the operation of informal trade

No. 23: The Food Insecurities of Zimbabwean Migrants in Urban South Africa

This report examines the food security status of Zimbabwean migrant households in the poorer areas of two major South African cities, Johannesburg and Cape Town. The vast majority were food insecure in terms of the amount of food to which they had access and the quality and diversity of their diet. What seems clear is that Zimbabwean migrants are significantly more food insecure than other low-income households. The primary reason for this appears to lie in pressures that include remittances of cash and goods back to family in Zimbabwe. The small literature on the impact of migrant remittances on food security tends to look only at the recipients and how their situation is improved. It does not look at the impact of remitting on those who send remittances. Most Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa feel a strong obligation to remit, but to do so they must make choices because of their limited and unpredictable income. Food is one of the first things to be sacrificed. Quantities decline, cheaper foods are preferred, and dietary quality and diversity inevitably suffer. This study found that while migrants were dissatisfied with the shrinking job market in South Africa, most felt that they would be unlikely to find work in Zimbabwe and that a return would worsen their household’s food security situation. In other words, while food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a major driver of migration to South Africa, food insecurity in South Africa is unlikely to encourage many to return

No. 54: Medical Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Access to Health Services in South Africa

Medical xenophobia refers to the negative attitudes and practices of health sector professionals and employees towards migrants and refugees on the job. There is considerable evidence that many officials (especially the police, home affairs officials, refugee determination officers and customs agents) bring xenophobic attitudes with them when they come to work. Those in the “helping professions” (such as teachers, social workers and health care professionals) also come into contact with migrants and refugees in the course of their jobs. They have the power to withhold services and they can certainly influence the way in which those services are delivered. This report asks whether and how xenophobia manifests itself within the public institutions that offer health services to citizens and non-citizens. It presents and discusses the question from the perspective and experi­ences of the foreign patients who try to access the system. The study extends the findings of earlier research and suggests that the phenomenon of “medical xenophobia” is very real in the contemporary South African public health system. The bad treatment of foreign migrants and refugees in public health facilities cannot all be ascribed to xenophobia, however. Migrants are also caught up in the “crisis of care” that affects every patient in the public health system. The paper concen­trates on those forms of ill-treatment that can be attributed to xenopho­bia and argues that the withholding of treatment from those who need it, and any form of discrimination motivated by hostility to the patient based on their national origins, is a form of xenophobic violence. The fieldwork for this study was conducted in Cape Town and Johannesburg in August and September 2010. Within each city, three different types of neighbourhood were selected: a middle-income suburb, an informal settlement and a township. The survey focused on Zimbabwean migrants and used two major data collection methods: 100 in-depth interviews and 10 focus group discussions, half in each city. The findings of this survey are therefore indicative rather than representative. What they do show is a troubling disregard on the part of some public health professionals and workers towards the law and their ethical responsibili­ties to patients. We do not wish to claim that all health workers display the kinds of attitudes and behaviours described in the paper. Some clearly do take their ethical and legal obligations seriously and act with concern and care towards all patients, regardless of where they are from, and despite often trying circumstances. The Southern African Clinicians Society is a major case in point as they played a leading role in promoting equal treatment for all People Living With HIV (PLHIV), both foreign and local. However, by conducting research in six different communities in two major cities, this report suggests that there is a pattern of medical xenophobia that is not just confined to one or two rogue individuals or institutions. Medical xenophobia is a fundamental breach of South Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights, international human rights obligations and various professional codes of ethics governing the treatment of patients. Medical xenophobia manifests itself in several ways in the public health system. Amongst the practices uncovered in this study were the following: first, patients are required to show identity documentation, proof of residence status and evidence of a home address before treat­ment is provided. Patients who, for one reason or another, do not have such documentation on their persons can be denied treatment. Second, communication difficulties arise when health staff refuse to communi­cate with patients in a common language or allow the use of translators. Third, treatment is often accompanied by verbal abuse and xenophobic statements and insults. Fourth, non-South African patients often have to wait until all South African patients have been attended to even if they have been waiting longer for treatment. Finally, migrants and refugees have such difficulty accessing anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for HIV in public institutions that many are forced to rely on the NGO sector. All of these manifestations of medical xenophobia are examined at length, with supporting testimony, in this report. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for rooting out xenophobia in the public health system

Migration and Food Security: Zimbabwean Migrants in Urban South Africa

This report examines the food security status of Zimbabwean migrant households in the poorer areas of two major South African cities, Johannesburg and Cape Town. The vast majority were food insecure in terms of the amount of food to which they had access and the quality and diversity of their diet. What seems clear is that Zimbabwean migrants are significantly more food insecure than other low-income households. The primary reason for this appears to lie in pressures that include remittances of cash and goods back to family in Zimbabwe. The small literature on the impact of migrant remittances on food security tends to look only at the recipients and how their situation is improved. It does not look at the impact of remitting on those who send remittances. Most Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa feel a strong obligation to remit, but to do so they must make choices because of their limited and unpredictable income. Food is one of the first things to be sacrificed. Quantities decline, cheaper foods are preferred, and dietary quality and diversity inevitably suffer. This study found that while migrants were dissatisfied with the shrinking job market in South Africa, most felt that they would be unlikely to find work in Zimbabwe and that a return would worsen their household’s food security situation. In other words, while food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a major driver of migration to South Africa, food insecurity in South Africa is unlikely to encourage many to return

No. 56: Right to the Classroom: Educational Barriers for Zimbabweans in South Africa

This report examines the obstacles to access by Zimbabwean children and students to schools and tertiary institutions in South Africa. There is a common assumption in South Africa that these children and students have no right to an educa­tion in South Africa. In fact, this view contravenes various international human rights conventions to which South Africa is a signatory. At the regional level, it is inconsistent with the SADC Education Protocol. At the national level, it violates the South African Constitution as well as legislation and stated government policies concerning the access of all children in the country to education. The question addressed in this report is whether school boards and principals follow popular sentiment or whether they honour international, regional and national obligations. The report focuses specifically on the case of Zimbabwean migrant children and students, following persistent reports that they are regularly denied access to the South African education system. The report shows that school boards and principals are caught between contradictory instructions from the Departments of Education and Home Affairs. The former, acting in a way that is consistent with the Bill of Rights, directs that schools should not deny education to any child, regardless of their national origin or legal status in the country. The Department of Home Affairs, on the other hand, follows the directives of the 2002 Immigration Act which places schools in the position of having to enforce immigration policy. This contradiction certainly needs to be resolved and there is only one way this could be done: by amending the immigration legislation and regulations to make it clear that it is not the duty of schools to deny an education to some children or to report them to the authorities. Levels of xenophobia are extremely high in South African society. Xenophobic attitudes culminated in widespread xenophobic violence in 2008 that left over 60 people dead and tens of thousands displaced from their communities. Among their number were many children. Migrant children were therefore directly exposed to the violence and venom of xenophobic mobs. Many more would have witnessed these disturbing scenes in the media. The other question addressed in this report is whether xenophobia permeates the school system as well. In other words, once the obstacles to school access are overcome, what kind of reception do migrant children receive from South African teachers and pupils. Some isolated case studies have suggested that non-South African children are not made to feel welcome in South African schools and that the xenophobic attitudes of parents are reproduced by their children. This study affords the opportunity to revisit this question and to ask how Zimbabwean children are treated by their fellow learners and by teachers in the classroom and playground. The report is based on research in six communities in Cape Town and Johannesburg conducted in September 2010 and examines the experiences of Zimbabwean migrant parents, children and students who seek to gain admission to public schools and tertiary institutions in South Africa. The report first examines the constitutional and legal rights of foreign migrants to an education in South Africa. The next section reviews the findings of previous studies that suggest that migrant children and students face significant difficulties and prejudice in South Africa. The ensuing sections of the report present and discuss our research findings on the current experiences of Zimbabwean migrants with the South African educational system. Finally, the report makes recommendations on how the situation can be improved

No. 08: International Migration and Urban Food Security in South African Cities

The drivers of food insecurity in rapidly growing urban areas of the Global South are receiving more research and policy attention, but the precise connections between urbanization, urban food security and migration are still largely unexplored. In particular, the levels and causes of food insecurity amongst new migrants to the city have received little consideration. This is in marked contrast to the literature on the food security experience of new immigrants from the South in European and North American cities. This paper aims to contribute to the literature on urban food security in the South by focusing on the case of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities and discussing the results of a household survey of migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The survey showed extremely high levels of food insecurity and low dietary diversity amongst migrants, which are attributable to the difficulties of accessing regular incomes and the other demands on household income. Most migrants are also members of multi-spatial households and have obligations to support household members in Zimbabwe. Although migration may improve the food security of the multi-spatial household as a whole, it is also a factor in explaining the high levels of insecurity by migrants in the city

The Return of Food: Poverty and Urban Food Security in Zimbabwe after the Crisis

The nadir of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in 2008 coincided with the implementation of a baseline household food security survey in Harare by AFSUN. This survey found that households in lowincome urban areas in Zimbabwe’s capital were far worse off in terms of all the food insecurity and poverty indicators than households in the other 10 Southern African cities surveyed by AFSUN. The central question addressed in this report is whether food security in Zimbabwe’s urban centres has improved. AFSUN conducted a follow-up survey in 2012 that allows for direct longitudinal comparisons of continuity and change. The status of household food security in low-income neighbourhoods in Harare was improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet persistently high rates of severe food insecurity demonstrate that the daily need to access adequate food continued to be a major challenge. The key lesson for policymakers is that even in the context of overall economic improvement, food insecurity remains endemic among the poorest segments of the urban population. Households are already accustomed to drawing on resources outside of the formal economy and improvements in employment income have not reversed that trend. These alternative livelihood strategies should therefore be considered as a normal part of urban life and supported with state resources that can improve access to food for the most marginalized groups

No. 22: The Return of Food: Poverty and Urban Food Security in Zimbabwe after the Crisis

The nadir of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in 2008 coincided with the implementation of a baseline household food security survey in Harare by AFSUN. This survey found that households in lowincome urban areas in Zimbabwe’s capital were far worse off in terms of all the food insecurity and poverty indicators than households in the other 10 Southern African cities surveyed by AFSUN. The central question addressed in this report is whether food security in Zimbabwe’s urban centres has improved. AFSUN conducted a follow-up survey in 2012 that allows for direct longitudinal comparisons of continuity and change. The status of household food security in low-income neighbourhoods in Harare was improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet persistently high rates of severe food insecurity demonstrate that the daily need to access adequate food continued to be a major challenge. The key lesson for policymakers is that even in the context of overall economic improvement, food insecurity remains endemic among the poorest segments of the urban population. Households are already accustomed to drawing on resources outside of the formal economy and improvements in employment income have not reversed that trend. These alternative livelihood strategies should therefore be considered as a normal part of urban life and supported with state resources that can improve access to food for the most marginalized groups

No. 13: The State of Food Insecurity in Harare, Zimbabwe

Harare is at the epicentre of the economic meltdown and political crisis that has devastated Zimbabwe over the last decade and led to a mass exodus from the country. Those who remained in Zimbabwe’s largest city and capital endured unprecedented hardship as the formal economy collapsed, unemployment soared and poverty deepened. Household surveys conducted in Harare with official sanction between 2003 and 2009 appear to demonstrate that food insecurity was not a particularly serious problem, a conclusion sharply at odds with reality. In 2008, at the height of the crisis, AFSUN therefore implemented its own baseline food security survey in Harare using a well-tested and reliable methodology. This paper presents and discusses the results of that survey and shows that Harare had become the most food insecure city in the SADC region by 2008. Levels of food insecurity were extraordinarily high as poor households struggled to find the income to purchase what little food was available in the shops and informal markets. The paper demonstrates that participation in the informal food economy was the major response to the crisis, providing poor households with a modicum of food and income. Urban agriculture for home consumption also grew in importance as a crisis response. While the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe has stabilised somewhat since 2008, the long-term impact of many years of enforced food insecurity on the city population is incalculable. This paper concludes with the recommendation that ongoing monitoring of the urban food security situation in Harare is essential in order to begin to develop national and municipal policies that could ensure a food secure future for the city

No. 59: The Third Wave: Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has been extremely well-documented by researchers. In this paper, we suggest that there is a need to periodize these migration flows in order to understand how and why they have changed over time, not simply in terms of the volume of migration but the changing drivers of migration and the shifting nature of the migrant stream. Few previous studies have taken a longitudinal approach to Zimbabwean migration, primarily because most research takes place at one point in time. SAMP is in the fortunate position of having a large database at its disposal which allows us to compare migration from Zimbabwe at three different points in time: 1997, 2005 and 2010. Although migration from Zimbabwe since 1990 has consistently increased over time, it can be periodized into three ‘waves’ with distinctive drivers of migration, migration patterns and migrant profiles. The first wave occurred in the 1990s, the second from around 2000 to 2005 and the third in the years since. In this paper we identify continuities and shifts in migrant profiles and behaviours during each of these periods. The paper also examines contemporary migration from Zimbabwe during what we refer to as the third wave of migration.Our findings are based on a survey of Zimbaweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg conducted in late 2010. All of the respondents had come to South Africa for the very first time in 2005 or more recently. The main characteristics of third wave migrants are as follows: With regard to the feminization of migration, the proportion of female migrants in the third wave is the same as in the second wave (44%) which suggests that the gender balance has stabilised. However, unlike first and second wave migrants, females are now engaged in a much wider variety of occupations. There are more children and young people in the third wave. The proportion of young Zimbabwean migrants (aged 15-24) rose dramatically from 15% in 2005 to 31% in 2010. Our survey found that 28% of migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town were children living with their parents or guardians. Consistent with the younger age profile of the third wave, the proportion of unmarried migrants continued to rise (from 25% in 1997 to 31% in 2005 to 49% in 2010). More of the third wave migrants are school-leavers (the proportion of those with a primary or secondary education rising from 48% in 2005 to 60% in 2010). Some 35% of third wave migrants have never had a job in Zimbabwe. The proportion of working age migrants has continued to increase, as it has since the 1990s. The unemployed in Zimbabwe are a major component of the migration flow. Half of the third wave migrants (50%) were unemployed before leaving Zimbabwe, whereas only 18% are unemployed in South Africa. Wage employment rose from 45% in Zimbabwe to 62% in South Africa and participation in the informal economy from 8% in Zimbabwe to 20% in South Africa. Sixty-two percent of third wave migrants are employed and another 20% work in the informal economy. However, the third wave of migrants do seem to occupy more menial jobs than their predecessors. In 2005, for example, over 40% of migrants from Zimbabwe were in skilled and professional positions. Only 15% of the third wave are employed in these types of position. Nearly a quarter (24%) are engaged in manual work (compared to only 7% in 2005), 13% are in the service sector (compared to 9.5% in 2005), 8% are in domestic work (compared to 2% in 2005) and 4% are in the security industry (compared to less than 1% in 2005). In addition, many migrants have a second job or source of income, the most common being casual work and informal trading. Only 11% of the migrants have no income at all but a quarter earn less than R2,000 per month. Another 32% earn between R2,000 and R5,000 per month. Only 14% earn more than R10,000 per month and 3% more than R20,000 per month. Although the majority of migrants still move in their individual capacity, social networks (including kin and friendship ties) are playing an increasingly important role. For example, 51% of third wave migrants were preceded to South Africa by immediate family members. In addition, 52% had extended family members, 63% had friends and 65% had community members already in South Africa. Social networking not only influences the decision to migrate to South Africa, it has a cumulative impact on the decisions of later migrants. For example, while 49% of migrants had no immediate family members in South Africa prior to migrating, the number without immediate family members had dropped to 26% at the time of the survey. A defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe since the 1990s has been that the vast majority of migrants engage in circular migration, only spending short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to remain in South Africa for any length of time. In 2005, nearly a third of migrants returned to Zimbabwe at least monthly and 50% of migrants returned at least once every few months. Amongst third wave migrants, less than 1% return monthly and only 9% return once every few months. As many as 46% had not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa. South Africa is seen by many in the third wave as a longer-term destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half of the respondents, for example, want to remain in South Africa for a few years. Another 13% wish to remain indefinitely and another 8% permanently. In other words, two thirds of the migrants view a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable. Like their compatriots, third wave migrants are significant remitters of cash and goods to Zimbabwe. However, they occupy lowlier jobs which impacts on their incomes and remitting behaviour. Remitting continues, though not with the frequency or in the same amounts as with earlier rounds of migrants. Nearly a quarter of the migrants (24%) had not remitted any money to Zimbabwe. In 2005, 62% of migrants remitted at least monthly. Amongst the third wave, only 27% remit this frequently. The third wave relies much more on informal remittance channels than its predecessors. The proportion of migrants using formal banking channels dropped from 27% in 2005 to only 11% in 2010. On the other hand, the proportion of migrants taking money home themselves also dropped (from 35% in 2005 to only 9% in 2010). This is consistent with the fact that the third wave visits Zimbabwe far less frequently. Instead, these migrants tend to use returning friends and co-workers (up from 11% in 2005 to 27% in 2010) and informal money transfer channels (up from 3% in 2005 to 30% in 2010). All of this indicates that the nature of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is undergoing a significant shift and that without major economic and political changes in Zimbabwe, and possibly even despite them, the trends identified in this analysis of the third wave are likely to continue and even intensify